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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND 
THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
This chapter provides the framework for the thesis, starting with a 
presentation of the problem which this study aims to address. This is 
followed by an outline of the main purpose and hypothesis of the research. 
The concomitant features and sequence of the thesis are subsequently 
explained. The chapter ends with a description of the methodology and a 
review of the literature used to set the theoretical framework . 
1.1 The problem and its setting 
For over three decades, the European Union has pursued a policy of 
providing technical and financial aid to Africa. However, this aid has not 
had the desired effect of "developing prosperity"1 in the recipient African 
countries, as social and economic conditions on the continent continue to 
deteriorate. 
The Southern African countries' economic stagnation represents an 
example of how European development aid, aimed at achieving 
"comprehensive, self-reliant and self-sustaining development"2, did not 
achieve its objectives. 
1 Preamble of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. 
2 Commission of the European Communities, Lome I, 1975-1980, in Development, 
Brussels March l 975 
I 
The question which must be asked, is why Southern Africa is showing 
such a poor record in overcoming poverty, despite the region's vast potential 
and the European Union's long-standing commitment to development co-
operation programmes. 
The answer to this question lies with both international and regional 
circumstances. Firstly, there is an ever increasing disparity between North 
and South, due to the fact that "the South remains economically linked 
mainly to the market economy countries of the North - both a legacy of the 
colonial past sustained by the North's economic strength and a consequence 
of the development strategies sometimes adopted in the South" 3. 
Secondly, in Southern Africa, a further element adds to the dynamics 
of the North-South relations, in that the role played by South African 
domestic and regional policy had a major influence on foreign aid to the 
Southern African Development Community. 
Thirdly, the political contrast (due to apartheid) between South 
Africa and its neighbours was an impediment to South Africa's inclusion in 
regional development programmes. Nonetheless, the condemnation of 
apartheid by the Front-Line States and SADC, one aspect of a complex 
regional reality, did not prevent the implementation of actual co-
operation between the latter and Pretoria - a co-operation that foreign aid 
never took into account. In short, South Africa's racial policies 
overshadowed its potential economic role in the region and its economic 
power was seen only as a destabilising factor, jeopardising its neighbours 
and their economies. 
3 The Report of the South Commission, The Challenge to the South, Oxford University 
Press, New York, May 1990, p. 3. 
2 
Now that South Africa is fully part of the region, it is obvious that the 
regional co-operation scheme between the European Union and the regional 
states needs to be revised. This background would provide the starting point 
to address the problem of achieving sustainable development in Southern 
Africa 
1.2 Aim of the thesis 
This study aims to show and present evidence that European aid to 
SADC has not achieved the desired level of development. The thesis 
identifies as one of the main reasons the fact that the South African issue was 
overpoliticized to the detriment of an effective development strategy in the 
whole region. 
In this regard, the study argues that the development approach 
adopted has had a very limited effectiveness because it was based on a 
fictitious bilateral relationship between the European Union and SADC, a 
fiction that arose because South Africa could not be ignored completely. 
It is further argued that the European Union's co-operation 
programmes in Southern Africa cannot help the beneficiaries to achieve a 
sustainable development unless there is a re-adjustment of the present 
development approach which entails a re-organisation of the co-operation 
scheme in the region. 
Thus, the study intends to point out the complexity of the subject 
and proposes an alternative approach based on trilateral co-operation. This 
3 
recommendation is made in the light of the unsatisfactory outcomes of 
hitherto existing strategies seen in the incongruency between the resources 
spent and the results of the aid given. 
Existing works on the topic have not given adequate attention to the 
possibility of a state acting as intermediary in the flow of aid from First to 
Third world. Available literature on European development co-operation 
with SADC refers to general theories of development in Africa and tends 
to describe a bilateral relation between donors and recipients in which South 
Africa is excluded or otherwise not considered as a 'sui generis' actor. 
The reality however is that in Southern Africa the donors-recipients 
relationship is more than just a bilateral interplay between First and Third 
world. South Africa, as a hybrid of these two worlds, is an important player 
in the game. 
The study seeks to propose a new way of looking at the donors-
recipients equation by proposing that South Africa be viewed as a conduit 
between developed and developing countries. After all, it is not only more 
developed than its neighbours, but also more closely linked to the global 
economy. 
4 
1.3 Hypothesis 
The hypothesis of the research is that development aid by Europe to 
Southern Africa failed mainly because on an official level donors sided 
politically with SADC countries against South Africa without due 
consideration to the latter's actual relations with the region. The official 
strategy was one of exclusion, but in reality, there was a great deal of 
unofficial involvement with South Africa, both by the EU and SADC 
countries. By overplaying South Africa's negative role in an official capacity, 
the European Union underestimated both South Africa's positive 
involvement and overlooked SADC individual countries' own failures. 
1.4 Terminology and definitions 
The terminology and definitions used in this study are represented by 
the following italicised words, the scope of which are outlined below. 
With respect to the European Union, different abbreviations are used 
due to the transformations undergone by this organisation over the years: 
the European Economic Community (EEC) is the term valid from 1958 to 
1965~ in 1965 the three Communities, i.e. EEC, European Community for 
Steel and Coal (ECSC) and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EURA TOM) merged and thus the term European Community (EC) is used 
from the period 1965 to 1993. In January 1994, the EC was transformed 
into the European Union (EU) and hence when reference in this study is 
5 
made to the overall European initiatives, the most recent abbreviation, EU, 
will be used. 
Southern Africa is the geographical area including Angola, Botswana, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Afiica, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The political dichotomy which 
characterised this region meant that South Afiica (prior to the establishment 
of a multiracial democracy) was not considered part of the Southern Afiican 
grouping. Nevertheless, its use throughout the study is made in a way that 
indicates when it excludes South Afiica from the rest of the region. The 
region is in fact referred to as a whole when the study deals with the 
Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), which 
was established in 1980 but excluded South Afiica. In August 1992, 
SADCC's transformation into the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) preceded South Afiica's entry into the organisation in August 1994. 
Hence, in order to distinguish the SADC which includes South Afiica from 
the previous one, the abbreviation SADC is used alone when it excludes 
South Afiica and when it includes South Afiica, it is accompanied by 
adjectives such as 'more inclusive'. 
The co-operation between the European Union and SADC originates 
in the Convention of Lome between Europe and the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific states (ACP), where the term Africa refers to sub-Saharan 
Africa excluding the North Afiican states. It is to be considered that, 
despite South Afiica's membership in SADC, it is not in the ACP grouping 
and its inclusion is presently under discussion. 
6 
South Africa's status in the Lome Convention is directly related to 
the wider area of foreign aid and development co-operation, in the sense 
that the EU-ACP agreement is addressed to Third World countries and 
South Africa is not unanimously considered as part of the Third World. 
The term 'Third World' refers to those countries which are not among 
the Western industrialised nations - the 'First World' - nor among the 
industrialised socialist countries - the 'Second World'4. It includes 'the South', 
'the underdeveloped' and 'developing' countries, the 'peripheral' and 'semi-
peripheral' countries, the 'non-industrialised' and 'semi-industrialised' 
countries. 
The available literature onforeign aid and development in the Third 
World is very broad and encompasses different definitions. 
In his "Principles of development aid', Erik Hawkins points out that 
"it is useful to seek out a definition that will provide an objective and 
measurable concept. The semantic difficulties stem from the fact that aid may 
be identified in terms of the motivations behind it, or, in a more objective 
way, through an examination of the manner in which assistance is made 
available" 5. 
"Foreign aid", namely the Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
from the North to the South, "is the total flow of financial and other 
resources to developing countries116. 
4 Hariison, P., Inside the Third Word: the anatomy of poverty, Penguin, 
Hannondsworth, 1981. 
5 Hawkins, E., Principles of development aid, Penguin modern economies, 
Hannondsworth, pp. 25-6. 
6 Arnold, G., Aid in Africa, Kogan Page, London, 1979, p. 13 
7 
These resources are provided by countries which are the original 
sources of aid, the donors, to those receiving it, the recipients, with the aim 
of promoting development7. In this study, development refers to the process 
of promoting an overall improvement of people's living conditions, not only 
from a purely economic perspective, but also according to the notion that 
such a process "enables human beings to realise their potential, build self-
confidence, and lead lives of dignity and fulfilment"8. 
Development co-operation indicates a strategy undertaken by donor 
and recipient to implement development programmes according to a 
relationship of more equal footing and interdependence9. 
In proposing the reformulation of a co-operation formula, the present 
study emphasises the importance of sustainable development. The World 
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) defines sustainable 
development as "a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, 
the direction of investments, the orientation of technological development 
and institutional change are all in harmony and enhance both current and 
future potential to meet human needs and aspirations"10. Sustainability is 
also one of the fundamental characteristics of the development projects with 
regard to the donors' and recipients' respective roles. It means that that 
which is started with external help must gradually be run by the 
beneficiaries alone11 . As indicated in the literature review, the debate on 
sustainable development constitutes an emerging theory on development. 
7 Hawkins, op. cit., ibidem. 
8 Report of the South Commission, op. cit., p. 10. 
9 OECD, Twenty-five years of development co-operation. A review, Paris, 1985. 
10 Cf. World Commission on Environment and Development, Our common future, 
Oxford University Press, New York, 1987, p. 46. 
11 The Report of the South Commission, op. cit., pp. 79 et ss. 
8 
Finally, a development co-operation policy is loosely defined as a 
device or means which provides the basis for the creation of a development 
scheme and, with respect to Southern Africa, a trilateral co-operation 
scheme would be the result of a development policy jointly implemented by 
the EU, South Africa and its neighbouring countries, as represented by the 
present SADC or as single entities. 
1. 5 Time frame 
The time frame covered in this study spans from the late fifties to 
the present day. It is mostly concerned with events from the early eighties 
onwards although the analysis touches on the origin of European aid policy 
to Africa, inaugurated in the post-Second World War period when some 
European states still maintained colonial rule in their African dependencies. 
In fact, a review of the history of the European Union's relations with 
Southern Africa is important with respect to the implementation of any future 
regional policy by the former. A new co-operation strategy in the region 
should be based on knowledge of all aspects, past and present. Past 
experiences and the evaluation of previous collaboration all contribute to the 
drawing up of a trilateral co-operation plan concerning the European Union, 
South Africa and SADC, especially after South Africa's membership. 
9 
1.6 Sequence of the thesis 
The first chapter introduces the parameters of the study, presenting 
the research framework, the problem it aims to address and an outline of 
the main theme throughout the study. It presents the literature review which 
constitutes the theoretical framework of the thesis. 
The second chapter chronicles the evolution of the European 
Union's relations with SADC, going back to the origin of the present 
Convention of Association which was negotiated between the African States 
and the EEC at the time of the Treaty ofRome of 1957. 
The evolution of this relationship, which over the past thirty years 
was transformed from an agreement between colonial metropoles and 
dependent territories to an equal partnership between sovereign states, is 
examined through the Conventions of Yaounde and Lome. From 1958 to 
1990, the Convention was updated every five years and gradually extended 
to include the present 4 7 African associates. Among these, SADC is the 
largest recipient of European development aid under Lome III and N, due 
to special funding made available to the region "in favour of the victims of 
apartheid"12. As a consequence of the major changes which occurred after 
South Africa's entry into SADC in 1994, the operational framework of the 
regional development co-operation has become obsolete. In this respect, 
the second chapter looks at the European development instruments as 
provided by the general ACP-EU Convention, focusing in particular on the 
12 Commission of the European Communities, Assistance to Front-Line States and 
SA.DCC Member States, Special Programme for Southern Africa, Lines of budget for 
projects funding, Brussels, 1988. 
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policy of assistance in favour of SADC, in order to lay the foundation for 
the new co-operation approach proposed in the last chapter . 
The third chapter describes the nature of the Southern African 
relations as a central feature in the framework of the European regional 
policy in as far as these relations have been affected by SADC's past conflict 
with Pretoria. The chapter begins by outlining South Africa's relationship 
with its neighbouring states, SADCC's (as it was then known) origins, 
objectives and activities up until its recent transformation into SADC. Such a 
review is necessary in order to understand both what motivated a substantial 
allocation of development funds by Western donors and why the intended 
goals could not be achieved. The chapter expands upon South Africa's role in 
the region, in order to justify the assumption that South Africa's entry into 
SADC institutionalises 'de jure' what existed 'de facto'. Such a review 
provides the context in which Brussels established and implemented its 
regional development policy as well as its South African policy. 
The fourth chapter describes, specifically, the European Union's 
relations with South Africa. The overview of the Western World's attitude 
towards South Africa introduces what was called the 'twin track policy' 
endorsed to hasten the dismantling of apartheid. This policy encompasses 
both the positive and restrictive measures which evolved into the Special 
Programme on South Africa. European relations with South Africa, from 
the adoption of the Code of Conduct of 1977 to the latest developments in 
1995, are presented as a preliminary step before proposing a restructuring of 
the EU's development policy in South and Southern Africa. 
11 
The threads of the hypothesis interspersed throughout the study are 
drawn together in the fifth chapter, where the relevant factors for a new 
development approach in the region are analysed. The theoretical as well as 
practical forms of economic integration and co-operation are reviewed, both 
at the regional and international level. This review sets the conceptual 
framework for considering the Lome Convention and South Africa's 
Reconstruction and Development Programme as a suitable base for a new 
development strategy for Southern Africa. The recapitulation of the main 
international programmes of aid is illustrated by a presentation of the 
theoretical background of the strategies endorsed. The numerous 
development agendas reflect a conflicting relationship between donors' and 
Africa's views on the choice of a sound development approach. After all, 
the Convention of Lome entails some degree of convergence between 
Europe and its African partners. In particular, the new EU-South African 
partnership offers an unprecedented opportunity to revitalise the regional 
development strategy. 
In the sixth chapter it is proposed that, as a result of the new 
regional circumstances, the EU, South Africa and Southern African states 
implement a strategy based on trilateral co-operation. The structure of this 
new approach is described in order to point out its alternative nature with 
respect to the traditional North-South relationship. The overview of South 
Africa's and Europe's common concern for Africa closes the chapter and lays 
the foundation for evaluating the pragmatism of the trilateral approach 
envisaged. 
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1. 7 Methodology 
This study deals with international politics and, more specifically, 
international aid and co-operation. The bulk of this study concerns issues that 
are still in the process of being shaped and the empirical component of the 
content is larger than its theoretical one. 
Despite its theoretical limitation, the study operates from the premise 
that practice precedes theory. In the words of Fawcett and Down "the 
influence of theory on practice is slow to occur because a theory and its 
related findings do not tell clinicians what to do"13. 
In this respect, the study employs the principle of pragmatic 
adequacy, which means that the findings of the thesis are "related to a 
particular area of practice for which a theory is sought" 14. In other words, 
although the findings of the work do not flow from a water-tight theory, 
they could be useful in practice. 
The thesis satisfies the requirements for both exploratory research 
(or formulative research) and descriptive research, which refer to "studies 
developed from an operational point of view and based on empirical 
research" 15. 
In this context, the identification of a new development approach is 
set, on the one hand, against an historical background built upon the 
description of the relations between the Southern African states, between the 
latter and the European Union and between the European Union and South 
13 Fawcett, J. & Downs, F.S., The Relationship o/Theory and Research, University of 
Pennsylvania, Appleton Century Crofts, Norwalk, 1985, p. 66-67. 
14 Ibidem 
15 Kothari, C.R, Research Methodology: methods and techniques, Willey, New Dehli, 
1985, p.50 
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Afiica. On the other hand, the exploration of issues which are still in the 
process of being defined, allows one to cany out the analysis of current 
affairs necessary to recommend the development approach itself 
The strength of the study lies in the empirical research. Interviews 
with relevant players and appropriate interlocutors, as well as conferences 
and workshops attended by the author in Southern Afiica and in Europe 
form the raw material of the study. This has allowed the study to be 
continuously up-dated. 
1.8 Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework of this study evolved out of literature 
concerning North-South relations, more specifically in the context of 
development theories. 
Most development literature regarding Afiica and development 
evolves around the changing relations between the former coloniser and 
colonised. This dichotomy influenced the theoretical debate on development 
throughout its evolution. In this context, the notion of development was 
seen to be the domain of the coloniser and not of the colonised. The 
European countries, the former colonisers, were modern, the very centre of 
development whereas the Afiican countries were seen to be in need of 
development along with the guidance of their former colonisers. Europe was 
regarded as modem therefore developed. 
14 
This idea in tum led to another dichotomy between that which was 
modern and that which was traditional: modern was good and valued in 
Western societies and traditional, by definition not modern, then consisted of 
mostly "undesirable" factors albeit by default. 
This discourse culminated in what became known as the 
modernisation theory. According to Valenzuela "Modernisation literature 
assumes that the values, institutions and patterns of action of traditional 
society are both an expression of and a cause of underdevelopment and are 
main obstacles to modernisation"16. Modernisation theorists concluded that 
nattitudes and values in developing countries, in contrast to developed 
countries, are such that individuals behave in ways that are economically 
irrational or non-rational"l7. 
The modernisation theory was seen by its main critics as an 
oversimplified model of development, lacking adequate historical input and 
structural perspective. They saw as one of the theory's weakness its 
"encapsulating economic growth in simplistic notions about the displacement 
of'traditional' values systems and institutions by 'modern' ones"18. 
Modernisation, as a theory of development, was later countered by 
the theory of underdevelopment in the 1960s, which became known as 
dependency or 'dependencia', as it was popularly described. It originated with 
the work of a number of academics and development economists concerned 
with the continuing economic failure of peripheral Latin American countries 
16 Valenzuela, S. and Valenzuela, A, Modemisation and Dependency, in Comparative 
Politics, 1978, p. 69. 
17 Ibidem. 
18 Cf. Webster, A, Introduction to the Sociology of Development, Macmillan, London, 
1990, pp. 62. 
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in relation to the centre, the developed metropoles of the North. The 
'dependencia' theory was later embraced by Africanist scholars in their 
attempt to explain the plight of Africa under similar conditions as those in 
Latin America. The thrust of the theoty was to dismiss the hypothesis that a 
lack of development was caused by a deficiency in appropriate modernising 
values and that industrial countries could be of positive benefit to the Third 
World. Instead the latter's massive and persistent poverty is, as Frank argues 
"a reflection of political and economic dependency from the advanced 
countries" 19. 
It ought to be pointed out however, that the modernisation and 
dependency theories were formulated in the 1950s and early 1960s as 
attempts to offer explanations for the poverty of the former colonies, which 
became known as Third World countries after World War 1120 . 
Despite the fact that dependency dismissed the linear notion of 
modernisation, both these theories sought to answer similar questions, 
namely, what was development and how was it achieved. Each identified 
a complex process which would lead "from the undesirable underdeveloped 
condition to the desirable one"21. 
Modernists blame internal causes for underdevelopment, whereas 
dependency theorists blamed external factors. These differences are the result 
of their differing ideological orientations. 
19 Frank, G. A., Capitalism and underdevelopment in Latin America, Monthly Review 
Press, New York, 1%7, pp. 34. 
2o Ibidem, p. 54. Lack of development is seen as a condition prior to development, 
characterizing poor countries that were consequently indicated as 'underdeveloped'. 
21 Webster, op. cit., p. 191. 
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The process of development was seen by the modernists as leading 
to a Western liberal democracy, whereas it was seen by dependentists as 
leading to a socialist state22. 
In other words, these two schools of thought represent the 
ideological positions of capitalism and socialism, respectively23 . This 
ideological schism was further reflected in the post World War II division of 
the Northern hemisphere into the Western and Eastern blocks. 
As these theories were being bandied about both in the debate and the 
policy of development, the Africans were fighting for freedom and self-rule 
and the African stance on development issues supported decolonisation. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the relevant ideological discourses in Africa 
were expressed by anti-colonial nationalism and the struggle for 
independence with socialist undertones. 
Freedom, sovereignty and independence were the goals common to 
all African territories. Theory and ideology were of secondary importance to 
African leaders at this stage. Hence, the first Ghanaian President, Kwame 
Nkrumah, popularised the dictum: "Seek ye first the political independence 
and the rest will be added unto it"24. It was only later that he pronounced an 
anti-capitalist stance and stated that "Capitalism is too complicated a system 
for a newly independent nation" and that socialism would be a better 
option25 . 
22 Webster, A, op. cit. 
23 Webster, A, op. cit., p. 84 et ss. Dependency theory, of which Andre Gunder Frank 
is one of the main representative, originated in the neo-Marxist school. 
24 Nkrumah, K., I speak of.freedom, PanafBooks, London, 1961, p. 98. 
25 Nkrumah, K., Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, Thomas Nelson and 
Sons, Edinburgh, 1959, p. vii. 
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Furthermore, capitalism was seen as synonymous with colonialism 
and exploitation - the very causes of African underdevelopment26. After the 
attainment of political independence, the new African leaders adopted the 
ideology known as African socialism. 
As more and more African countries gained their political 
independence, the need arose for a collective strategy "to foster a common 
attitude to local and world problems which will ensure that problems peculiar 
to Africa will receive (sic) the attention which they have not had for so 
long"27. 
Furthermore, the creation of the United Nations after World War 
II brought a different perspective to the relations between North and South. 
With the adoption of UN policy to assist colonial territories to gain their 
autonomy, the international community was faced with the challenge of 
eliminating the disparities and inequalities between the developed and 
underdeveloped areas of the world28. 
It is in this context that development aid was conceived - that the 
developed members of the international community had a responsibility to 
fight against and eventually overcome underdevelopment of Third World 
countries. 
The very first kind of aid provided by the 'developers' was known 
as technical assistance, based on the assumption that "the disparity between 
developed and developing countries could be eliminated through largely 
26 Cf. Rodney, W., How Europe underdeveloped Africa, Harvard University Press, 
Washington. 1982. 
27 Nkrumah, K., I speak of freedom, op. cit.. 
28 Prinzi, D., Le radici de/la fame: co/onizzazione e liberazione, Ed. Studium, 1985. 
p.12. 
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technical measures by which knowledge would be transferred from the 
former to the latter"29. As a result, Western culture, institutions and 
technology started to be transplanted in the Third World. 
This approach continued to reflect the colonial theory that 
"imbalance between industrialised and underdeveloped societies was due to 
differences considered as natural as the geographical and morphological 
diversity"30. 
This logic could not however survive in the newly established 
political environment. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU), established 
in 1963 and inspired by the principles of Pan-africanism11, forcefully brought 
to the international fore the complexity of the issue of the South. 
Technical assistance was considered by its critics as inappropriate to 
foster development, as it did not allow the beneficiaries to modify their 
position of dependency on the Western countries12. 
In 1960 the UN inaugurated the first 'development decade', during 
which a special effort was devoted to economic aid to the Third World. A 
new strategy of economic co-operation was conceived to correct the 
deficiencies of technical assistance. 
29 Higgot, RA, Political development theory, Croom Helm, London, 1983, p. 1-3. 
30 Grassman, S. and Lundberg, E., eds. (AA VV.), The World Economic Order: past 
and prospects, Macmillan Press, London, 1981, passim. 
31 Tevoedjre, A, Pan-africanism in action: an account of the UAlvf, Centre for 
International Affairs, Harward University, Boston, 1965. On the concept of Pan-
africanism. 
32 Weisskopf, T., Dependence as an explaination of underdevelopment: a critique, 
Centre for Research on economic Development, The University of Michingam, 
Michingan, 1977. 
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The term co-operation emphasises a relation based on equality and 
collaboration between "aid-donors and recipients that are on the same level, 
each of them acting according to mutual interests and priorities"33. 
It can be argued that the conceptualisation of economic co-
operation arises from Rostow's theory on linear development, where 
economic growth is seen as the result of a universal process34. 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, economic co-operation was 
pursued as one of the main objectives of the industrialised countries' foreign 
policies towards the underdeveloped countries35. 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) review on development co-operation noted that "the basic 
proposition of international co-operation for development was that pre-
industrial and relatively stagnant economies could be launched on a course of 
dynamic economic and social transformation"36. It also considered that "the 
process undergone by the northern market economies starting mainly in the 
nineteenth century was believed to be possible in many underdeveloped 
33 In AA. VV., Aid for just development: report on the future of foreign assistance, Lynne 
Reiner Publishers, London, 1988. 
34 Rostow, W., Politics and the Stages of Growth, University Press, Cambridge. 1971. 
35 In the 1950s, only a few number of Western countries had elaborated a development 
programme, i.e. the United States, Great Britain, Portugal and the EEC members, 
then consisting of Belgium, France, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy and West 
Germany. In the years between 1960 and 1963 the majority of Western states started 
the policy of international co-operation and established an administrative structure for 
its implementation. 
In 1960 OECD set up its Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and in the 
following years, most of the present specialised international agencies, both within 
the UN and the World Bank (established in 1944 by the Conference of Bretton Woods 
as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) were created. 36 OECD, Twenty-five years of development co-operation. A review, op. cit., pp. 3 et ss. 
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countries through organised effort reinforced by external resources and 
advice"37. 
The perception of the success of the Marshall Plan in Europe 
contributed to the belief that capital transfer and industrialisation were the 
gateways to economic growth in Africa too. 
Thus, the North-South economic co-operation reduced the concept 
of development to purely economic criteria, without considering the 
multidimensional nature of the development issue and the fundamental 
diversity between European and African realities. More specifically, 
economic co-operation overlooked two vital aspects: the lack of cultural 
homogeneity between donors and recipients and, as Leistner points out, "the 
fact that in post-war Europe the task was not development but 
reconstruction" 38. On the other hand, as Gavin Williams warns 
African nationalists appealed to international agencies and the 
governments of industrial societies to fund development 
projects. Development was both the object of, and an 
instrument in, the battle to gain and maintain power 
domestically as well as to strengthen their sovereignty 
intemationally39. 
Most African governments associated development with industrial 
growth. Hence they encouraged foreign and local investments in industry 
37 Ibidem 
38 Leistner, G.M.E., International aid and African Development, in Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies, Special Jubilee Edition, October 1985, pp. 62. 
39 Williams, G., Africa in retrospect and prospect, in Africa South of the Sahara. 1994, 
Twenty-third edition, Europa Publications Limited, London, 1994. 
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through protective policies that caused "a dangerous isolation of the local 
economies from the world system"40. 
The Executive-Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa 
(ECA), Adedeji, wrote: "the African economy is the most open and the most 
exposed economy in the world, overly dependent on external trade, foreign 
technology and expertise"41. 
At the end of the 1970s, Africa's marginalisation had increased, 
despite the large scale of resources made available through economic co-
operation. The failure of two decades of aid undermined one of the 
fundamental assumptions of economic co-operation, namely that the 
countries of the North, by virtue of their wealth and level of modernisation, 
were in a position to assist with the advancement of the South and to help it 
become like the North. 
Towards the end of the 1970s, the challenge was to reform existing 
North-South relationships, through comprehensive negotiations on global 
economy. Under these circumstances, the idea of a New International 
Economic Order (NIEO) was formulated. The NIEO, described as "an effort 
to compensate for structural weaknesses of the developing countries"42, is 
mainly characterised by the latter's demands of a more equitable international 
economic system. 
40 Oualalou, F., Le Tiers Monde et la troisieme phase de domination, Edition 
Maghribines, pp. 40 et ss. 
41 Adedeji, A, Development and economic growth in Africa to the year 2000: alternative 
projections and policies' in Timothy M Shaw (ed.), Alternative Futures for Africa. 
Westview, Boulder, 1982, pp.280-1. 
42 Hveem, H., Mini- NJEO and national vulnerabilities in Southern Africa, in Region to 
Region Co-operation between Developed and DevelQPing countries, Kiljiunen, K. 
(ed.), Billing & Sons, Worcester, pp. 27 et ss. 
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The alternatives to the African crisis were based on two sets of 
proposals: the OAU Lagos Plan of Action and the World Bank's Accelerated 
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Although moving beyond the atmosphere of confrontation that 
had characterised the debate between modernists and dependentists, these 
two proposals reflected the same dichotomy. Ravenhill describes it as 
follows: 
the OAU followed a typical dependency approach in 
asserting that the origins of the current malaise lay outside the 
control of African leaders. The World Bank, on the other 
hand, placed the primary blame on the performance of African 
governments and heavily discounted the role of exogenous 
factors43 . 
The OAU's attack on the World Bank plan was motivated by the 
fact that "the recommended approach is to make Africa more dependent on 
the external market for its agricultural and mineral products and for its 
essential factor inputs" and considered it "contrary to the principles of self-
reliant and self-sustaining development of the Lagos Plan of Action"44 . 
Despite Africa's determination to break the links of dependency, fiscal 
policies and development strategies depended on the approval of the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund that "have taken over the colonial 
states' mandate to develop the underdeveloped economies in Africa"45 . The 
43 Ibidem, p. 3. 
44 Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: an assessment by OAU, ECA and 
ADB Secretariats' Annex I, 1982, pp. 44-5. 
45 Williams, G., op. cit., p. 5. 
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strategy elaborated by the World Bank and the IMF to pursue the political 
economic adjustment within the African countries, implemented through 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), is, as recognised during an 
important international forum, "more or less mandatory, because external 
support and debt relief will not be forthcoming unless predetermined specific 
actions are agreed on and are seen to be genuinely undertaken"46. In as much 
as there is recognition of the need for adjustment in Africa, research findings 
on the effectiveness and impact of the SAPs, remain controversial. Aid 
recipients perceive themselves "obliged to follow development policies 
under the dictates of the international financial institutions"47 
During the last decade, literature on development has been more and 
more concerned with the question of finding a way to lead the countries of 
the South out of the current crisis. The theoretical debate concentrated on 
how to integrate the upper-tier developing countries into the international 
system. Development research moved towards the 'theories of practice' or 
'theories on implementation' whose objectives are "to systematise 
development action in order to achieve the most favourable results. "48 
Examples of theories of practice are trickle-down benefit, sectoral 
development and growth-with-equity. Hence, the emergence of the concept 
of sustainable development represents a paradigm shift in the whole 
theoretical and pragmatic approach to development. 
46 Malima, K., Structural Adjustment: the African Experience, in Structural Adjustment 
and Bevond. (ed.) Van der Hoeven, R, Van der Kraaij, F., Collection of spechees 
delivered at the Conference on Structural Adjustment Programmes organised by the 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague, 1994, p. 10. 
47 The Report of the South, op. cit., p. 79. 
48 Toye, J., Do development studies have a core?, IDS Bullettin 11, no 3, 1980 
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The current strategy of development co-operation, adopted by the 
donor countries at the beginning of the 1980s, expresses the need to re-
orient development interventions according to the principle of sustainability. 
Development co-operation can be described as an attempt to 
implement aid policies according to the view expressed by the South 
Commission as follows: "the countries of the South will have to rely 
increasingly on their exertions" to achieve "a self-reliant and people-centred 
development"49. The Commission also indicated that single country's 
specific aid programmes as well as regional co-operation, both in the context 
of a North-South and a South-South co-operation, could be the solution for 
relaunching Africa's development. As Bade Onimode recalls, "the issue of 
regional co-operation and integration is addressed in the Lagos Plan of 
Action as the central strategy for the structural transformation in the 
African economies"5o. 
In this complex picture, one of the most significant examples of aid 
agreement and practice based on regional co-operation is the Lome 
Convention. Dating back to the late 1950s, it still regulates the development 
co-operation between the EU and the sub-Saharan African countries. The 
agreement, which is a significant model of an extended co-operation scheme 
between North and South, has been the subject of numerous development 
studies. The theoretical issues raised in the debate on Lome are related to 
the two main themes that ran throughout the literature concerning the 
North-South development relations: modernisation and dependency. 
49 The Report of the South Commission, op. cit., p. 79. 
50 Onimode, B., A future for Africa, Earthscan Publications, London, 1992, pp. 142-3. 
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On the one hand, Lome has been described as "a neo-colonialist 
attempt by Europe to control the economies of Africa, recognising the basic 
dependency of its underdeveloped signatories" despite Europe1s proclaimed 
task to assist them in achieving eeonomic independence51. On the other 
hand, this collaboration - covering issues like trade and cultural exchanges, 
technical and financial co-operation and investments - has followed an 
original approach towards constructing "special relationships with the 
continent's former colonial powers, even if it has not brought the benefits 
anticipated"52. 
To overcome this dichotomy, Rubin warns that "we need to ask 
what can be done within such arrangement to best grapple with the global 
issue of development"53. 
In reference to the EU-SADC co-operation, encapsulated in the 
framework of Lome, the poor results obtained thus far have been explained 
by analysts of the Convention in the framework of paradigms concerning the 
entire aid and development relationship between Europe and Africa. 
Compared to the conventional aid practice, the donor-recipient 
relation in Southern Africa is more than just a bilateral equation. The EU 
development co-operation with SADC was aimed above all at the reduction 
of regional economic dependency on South Africa54. 
51 Arnold, G., op. cit., p. 33. 
52 Ravenhill, J., Collective Self-Reliance or Collective Self-Delusion: is the Lagos Plan 
a Viable Altemative?,in Africa in Economic Crisis, in Ravenhill, J., (ed.), Columbia 
University Press, 1986, New York, p. 87. 
53 Rubin, A, Lome II: The Renegotiation of the Lome Convention, in The renegotiation 
of the Lome Convention. A collection of papers, Catholic Institute for International 
Relations (CIIR), London, 1978. 
54 Commission of the European Commmunities, Assistance to Front-Line States and 
SADCC Member States, Special Programme for Southern Africa, Brussels, 1988. 
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With this aim at the forefront, an original region to region co-
operation approach has been brought about in the North-South dialogue. 
This approach could in fact represent a functional answer to Rubin's 
question, i.e. to help solve the problem of harmonising both the strategies 
and the interests of developed and developing countries. 
Referring to the EU's future relations with the more inclusive SADC, 
Livi commented 
By channelling development aid according to the priorities 
indicated by a regional common body (SADC), the EU co-
operation strategy supports regionalism, that has repeatedly 
been indicated by African theorists as the most appropriate 
approach to achieve 'collective self-reliance' and to facilitate 
Africa's participation in the dynamics of the global 
international relations55. 
This approach based on regionalism has not achieved the desired self-
reliance. 
As shown in the above literature review, there is a lack of unanimity 
regarding the causes for the crisis in Africa. However, the writings on 
conflict in Southern Africa generally attribute the responsibility for the 
region's underdevelopment to destabilisation activities by South Africa. 
Ohlson and Stedman can be quoted in this respect, stating that 
South Africa's system of apartheid and its brutal and multi-
prolonged attempt to dominate the surrounding region was 
55 Livi, G., A new North-South Pact. A Convention for the year 2000, Address by the 
Head of Directorate General for Development Co-operation. Section for Eastern and 
Southern Africa, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, March 1990. 
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seen as the main factor in producing conflict in Southern 
Africa ( ... ) Conflict, insecurity and underdevelopment are 
inextricably interlinked in Southern Africa56. 
The EU-SADC co-operation up to the early 1990s is driven by the 
need to isolate South Africa as a result of the destabilisation controversy. 
Despite the development experience of the previous decades, the planners of 
the EU-SADC development approach did not take into account the 
numerous recommendations on development strategy policies, for example, 
those advanced by the theories of practice. 
For as the theories of practice maintain, "development actions need 
to be systematised in order to achieve the most favourable results"57. 
Theorists dealing with the EU-SADC co-operation do not explore the 
compatibility of development policies, goals and their feasibility in the co-
operation strategy adopted by the EU and SADC. A strategy which has in 
fact increased the Southern African countries' dependency on the donors as 
well as their vulnerability. Hveem emphasises 
If SADCC countries are not only highly dependent on, but 
even receive economic resources from, one or very few 
sources, there is a concentration of their external alternatives 
that represents another potential vulnerability58. 
56 Ohlson, T., and Stedman, S., Towards Enhanced Regional Security in Southern 
Africa, in Oden, B. (ed.), Southern Africa after Apartheid, The Scandinavian 
Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1993, p. 87. 
57 Williams, Gavin, op. cit. 
58 Hveem, Helge, op. cit., p. 32. 
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In this respect, the vast school of thought in favour of sanctions 
against South Africa, to which Hveem belongs, supported the opinion that 
SADC's vulnerability "would be greater the more the alternative relationship 
does not oppose the Republic of South Africa politically. "59 
On the other hand, the EU opposition to South Africa has been 
considered part of the Cold War strategy. The EU aid to Southern Africa 
during the years of the East/West rivalry is explained by Webster's argument 
that the co-operation between North and South was in the West's interests 
"to show countries pushing for economic independence that sustained 
development was possible under the Western wing1160• 
In the second half of the 1980s, the collapse of the communist 
system in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe changed the entire dynamics 
of international relations. In Southern Africa, the beginning of the post-Cold 
War period has had far-reaching political repercussions that culminated in 
the establishment of a multiracial government in South Africa. These 
momentous political events led to the normalisation of the Republic's 
relations at both the regional and international level, that in 1994 
materialised in South Africa's entry in SADC and in the opening of 
negotiations between Pretoria and the EU. 
These changes have considerable consequences for the whole 
Southern African region, as they create the foundation for a sustainable 
development strategy rooted in a completely new approach to regional co-
operation and aid relations. 
59 Ibidem, p. 32. 
60 Webster, A, op. cit., p. 49. 
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In the light of the literature reviewed, it is plausible to maintain that 
there is not yet sufficient material analysing the particular nature of South 
Africa's position in the co-operation between the EU and Southern Africa. 
The description of South Africa as the region's "engine of growth" 
and "powerhouse"61 , in fact, does not address the issue of its role in the 
development approach adopted by SADC's most important source of aid, 
the EU. 
The co-existence of First and Third World elements within the South 
African borders makes this country an outstanding semi-peripheral area, that 
could act as conduit between the developed North and the underdeveloped 
South. In this new capacity, South Africa could bridge the gap between the 
different cultural and economic levels existing between the donors and the 
Southern African states. The new South Africa could facilitate and expedite 
the process of regional integration through the adoption of a novel 
approach. South Africa's role would be original with respect to two main 
positions: the neo-classical theories of economic integration and the 
developed/underdeveloped dichotomy that has characterised the history of 
the North-South development relationship. 
Accepting Hawkin's view that "the ineffectivity of aid is also a 
result of looking at the donor and recipient sides separately"62, South 
Africa's potential role in harmonising features of traditional cultures with 
modem civilisation, both domestically and regionally, would lead to a greater 
effectiveness of aid schemes. 
61 Numerous authors have referrefd to South Africa as the region's engine of growth and 
powerhouse; cf, for example, Leistner, E., South Africa. Gateway to Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Africa Institute of South Africa, Pretoria, July, 1991 passim. 
62 Hawkins, E.K., op. cit., p. 23. 
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Extending Zartman's contention that "between an independence that 
is impossible and an interdependence that is dangerous, middle solutions have 
to be found "63, South Africa could be the missing link in the search for an 
endogenous solution to the issue of sustainable development in Southern 
Africa. 
63 Zartman, I., W., The politics of trade negotiations between Africa and the 
European Economic Community: the weak confront the strong, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1971, p. 101. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT AID 
TO SOUTHERN AFRICA 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter chronicles the evolution of the European Union's 
relations with the Southern African Development Community, SADC. It 
goes back to the origin of the present Convention of Association, 
negotiated between the African States and the EEC at the time of the Treaty 
of Rome of 1957. 
This history of the evolution of European development aid does not 
refer to the relations between individual African and European countries, but 
specifically to the means through which the European Union implemented 
the policy of development assistance with its African partners. 
The evolution of this relationship, transformed over the past thirty 
years from an agreement between colonial metropoles and dependent 
territories to an equal partnership between sovereign states, is examined 
through the Conventions of Yaounde and Lome. From 1958 to 1990, the 
Convention has been updated every five years and gradually extended to 
include the present 70 associates, 4 7 of which are African countries. 
Among these, the Southern African countries, through the Southern 
African Development Co-operation Conference (SADCC), have been the 
largest recipients of European development aid under Lome III and IV, due 
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to the financial allocations aimed at supporting the organisation in its efforts 
to reduce economic dependence on South Africa. 
The EU policy was best summarised by Holland, when he said "the 
Community supports SADCC as the avenue for freeing the regional states 
from South African economic hegemony" 1. 
The historical overview of the evolution of European development 
aid is aimed at showing that within the framework of development co-
operation between the European and underdeveloped countries, EU-SADC 
relations have always been 'special' because of the political situation in 
Southern Africa. 
The review includes an illustration of the technical instruments made 
available through the EU-ACP scheme in order to show the evolution of 
EUs policy in Third World countries and, above all, its peculiarities with 
respect to the Southern African region. 
2.2 The origin of the European development policy in Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
The European development policy in Sub-Saharan Africa was 
formulated after the Second World War. It originated as part of the efforts 
to unite continental Europe after the conflict. 
At that time various institutions were created in order to reduce the 
cultural, social and economic differences among European countries. The 
Holland, M., The European Community and South Africa. European Political 
Cooperation under strain, Pinter Publisher, London, 1988, p.25. 
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establishment of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation 
(OEEC), now OECD2, in 1948 was followed one year later by the formation 
of the Council of Europe. 
The inclusion of the overseas colonial dependent territories in plans 
for a European union was recommended for the first time by the Council of 
Europe, on the basis that some European states, notably Belgium, France, 
Italy and the Netherlands still maintained colonial ties with some African 
countries. In 1954, when the negotiations for the establishment of the 
European Communities were at an early stage, the Council declared 
The politics of the European integration have as corollary, in 
the interest of a common prosperity, the co-operation among 
the Council of Europe member metropolis and overseas 
territories, be these two already interrelated or not3. 
As summarised by Rubin in his analysis of the origin of Western 
development assistance to underdeveloped countries, the European 
programme on Africa "would surely not exist in its present form were it not 
2 Cf. Twickett, Cosgrove, C., Europe and Africa from Association to Partnership, Saxon 
House, England, 1978, p.2. The OEEC, now renamed OECD - Organisation for 
European Co-operation and Development - had two specific tasks: to assist in the 
administration of the Marshall Plan and, in the longer term, to promote the 
rehabilitation of the European economies. 
3 Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly Report, Africa's Development, Strasbourg, 
October 1957. The document , also known as the 'Strasbourg Plan', includes fi\·e 
recommendations: 
i) a global socio-economic development plan for Africa; ii) the liberalisation of trade 
exchanges on the two continents and between them; iii) market organisation and price 
stabilisation of raw materials; iv) intensification of investments and of private and 
public capital flows towards Africa; v) a common effort in the field of technical 
assistance. 
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for the long-standing relationships based on a history of close political, 
economic, and cultural ties with the existing or former colonial territories"4. 
Hence, in 1957 when three European Communities were established 
through the Treaty of Rome5, the issue of associating the African colonial 
territories was raised during the negotiations between Belgium, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany. 
2.2.1 Historical origin of the Euro-African association 
The colonial ties linking some EEC's member states to the continent 
and the Treaty of Rome constitute the historical roots of the Association 
between the Europe and sub-Saharan Africa. 
Since all EEC members, except West Germany and Luxembourg, had 
colonies situated mainly in Africa, proposals were put forward in the Treaty 
of Rome negotiations concerning the future of relations between the 
European states and their African colonial territories. 
A proposal concerning a system of co-operation among the states of 
Europe and Africa was presented for the first time by France who "brought 
4 Rubin, S., J., The conscience of the rich nations: The Development Assistance 
Committee and the common aid effort, Harper & Row, New York and London, 1966, 
pp. 42-3. 
5 European Community Treaties, Text of the EC Treaty, European Communities Official 
Publication Office, Luxembourg - Brussels, 1987. The three communities were the 
European Economic Community (EEC), the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM) and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
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up the colonial question, insisting that European economic integration would 
be possible only if it made provisions for the European colonies overseas116 . 
The proposal was rejected because of lack of unanimity among the 
EEC members, who saw France's proposal as "a return to the economic and 
political burdens of the colonial system"7, which would have resulted in the 
other European states having to sustain her colonial responsibilities. This 
point was enlarged upon by Couste, who explains why the inclusion of the 
African territories in the Treaty of Rome was a particularly delicate issue for 
France. The French Overseas Territories and Countries, known as "Pays et 
Territories d'Outre Mer", P.T.0.M., included a vast empire, located in 
West, Equatorial and Central Africa8. 
The economies of the P. T. 0 .M. were inseparably tied to France 
through a system of preferential trade, commercial subsidies, expatriate 
personnel and investments, and on the whole they were wholly dependent on 
the metropolis. "The expenditure for the P.T.0.M." points out Couste, 
"weakens France economically"9. He continues the analysis stating that since 
France paid higher preferential prices for her overseas supplies, the 
establishment of a EEC custom union excluding the colonies would have 
seriously affected the French economy vis-a-vis the other EEC members, 
6 Zartman, W., The Politics of Trade Negotiations between Africa and the European 
Economic Community: the weak confront the strong, Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, p. 6. 
7 Ibidem, p.7. 
8 Lister, M., The European Community and the Developing World, University of York, 
pub. by Avebury, 1988, p. 4. In the French constitution of 1946, the African 
dependent territories were no more referred to as colonies, but P.T.0.M. 
9 Couste, P.B., L'association des Pays d' Outre Mer a la Communaute Economique 
Europeenne, Paris, 1959, abstracts. 
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who followed usual trade patterns to regulate their import-export relations 
with developing countries. 
Given the above, "the principle of 'associating' the overseas territories 
in the Common Market was in practice imposed by France1110. Faced with 
French demand for association being a prerequisite for her entry to the 
Community itself, the European Five reacted in different ways 11 • 
Belgium aligned with France and also Luxembourg reacted positively 
towards the association project. The Netherlands, despite their colonial 
possessions, were not particularly concerned about including the colonial 
territories in the Community. West Germany was interested in improving its 
political and economic relations with the developing countries, with which it 
maintained a large trade12. Italy, with her mandate in Somalia, was prepared 
to consider an association regime for the African territories. 
France succeeded in eliciting some degree of understanding among the 
Six, by stressing the humanitarian content of her proposal. With the 
establishment of the special external tariff for the associates, France offered 
JO Zartman, W. I., The Politics of Trade Negotiations between Africa and the European 
Economic Community: the weak confront the strong, Princeton, Princeton University 
Press., op. cit., p.8. 
1 1 Ibidem, chapt. I, passim. During the preparatory stage of the negotiations to 
establish the EEC, France did not raise the question of associating the territories. 
Firstly, the French government itself had not decided exactly which territories to 
include and more time was needed to formulate a specific policy proposal on the 
issue. Secondly, France allowed negotiations to progress to the point where a 
fundamental economic formula made it possible to create some kind of protectionism 
for her territories' economic weakness. 
12 Cassese, A, Le Relazioni Internazionali della CEE, in La Comunita lnternazionale, 
Luglio 1960, N. 3, passim. West Germany's position in the Post-Second World War 
period was notably delicate and Bonn did not want to support any suggestion of neo-
colonialism. 
37 
to share the exclusivity of her colonial market and investment area with the 
European partners, within the framework of a preferential trading zone13• 
Eventually, the European governments "made the decision that the 
(their) national interest is served by assistance to overseas countries with 
which there have been historic political ties" 14. The acknowledgement of the 
existence of a mutual interest, for the African as well as for the European 
states, led to the association of the EEC with its members' African colonial 
territories. 
2.2.2 The EEC Treaty and the Association of Overseas Countries and 
Territories 
The results of the negotiations that followed France's proposal and 
which ended with the signature of the Treaty of Rome are reflected in the 
Preamble and in Part IV of the same treaty. 
The Preamble recognises 'the intent of confirming the solidarity which 
binds Europe and overseas countries and the will of granting the 
development of their prosperity in accordance with the principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations•1s. 
13 Treaty of Rome, Art. 133, 1958. It is to be noted that the Association gave France a 
solution to the problem of being concurrently in the Franc Monetary Area and in the 
EEC, as she could not afford possible isolation from the rest of Europe. 
14 Rubin, S., J., op. cit., p. 43. 
15 Cf. Zartman, W., op. cit. 
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Part IV provides the institutional framework for the Association 
between the EEC and 25 Overseas Countries and Territories16: 
"The basic principle of the association was that the rules 
which were adopted to regulate the relations between the 
colonies and their metropole be extended to apply to the 
relations between the colonies and the EEC as a whole" 17. 
Furthermore, since the Treaty of Rome was designed for the 
integration of geographically contiguous states with equally developed 
economies, Part IV set out the legal framework for overcoming the problem 
of derogating to the Treaty, establishing the status of 'associate' as a form 
of incomplete membership in the EEC18. 
The rules regulating the relations between the EEC and the African 
dependent territories are set in Part IV and in the 'Implementing Convention', 
16 Art. 131, Part IV, EEC Treaty. This article refers to the Annex IV, which lists the 
associated countries. The 25 African territories, the majority of which were French 
territories, are the following: 
- French West Africa including: Senegal, Sudan, Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, 
Mauritania, Niger and Upper Volta; 
- French Equatorial Africa including: Middle Congo, Ubangi-Shari, Chad and Gabon; 
- St. Pierre and Miquelon, the Comores Archipelago, Madagascar and dependencies, 
French Somalia, New Caledonia and dependencies, the French settlements in 
Oceania, the Southern and Antartic Territories; 
- The Autonomous repubblic of Togoland; 
- The French Trusteeship Territory in Cameroon; 
- The Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi; 
- The Italian Trusteeship Territory of Somalia; 
- Netherlands New Guinea. 
17 Svensson, V., Essays on the EEC-African Association, Lund, 1979, p. 6. 
18 European Communities Treaty, op. cit. The association provided the overseas African 
colonies with a legal status between member and "Third state", where "Third state" 
refers to all those parties which are external in respect of the Association established 
within the EEC Treaty This means that the associate is not bound to the EEC 
institutions by the same kind of duties as the member state, therefore it cannot enjoy 
the same rights, i.e. no representation in the supreme bodies, or, if present, no right to 
vote. 
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which was appended to the Treaty19. These rules covered three aspects: 
development aid, trade and free right of establishment20. 
Part IV governs the latter two issues, whereas the Implementing 
Convention concerns the EEC assistance aimed at "the promotion of social 
and economic development of those countries and territories"21 . 
The Association provisions of Part IV consists of six articles, from 
131to136. 
Article 131 refers to the "special relations between the non-
European countries and territories and Belgium, France, Italy and the 
Netherlands" and explains that the Association is aimed at promoting the 
economic and social development of the associates "in order to lead them to 
the economic, social and cultural development to which they aspire"22 . 
Article 132 sets the guiding principle of multilateral reciprocity, 
indicates the financial and commercial aspects of Association, the right of 
free establishment and of free movement of labour23 . 
Article 133 is more specific, as it sets the provisions for the abolition 
of custom duties on the imports and for the progressive construction of a 
single tariff among the EEC members and the associated states. This article 
is concerned with the main procedures of the trade between the European 
Community and the African associates and a safeguard clause that could be 
19 Treaty of Rome, Implementing Convention relating to the Association with the 
Community of the Overseas Countries and Territories. 
20 Ibidem. The 'right of establishment' provides for freedom of establishment of EEC 
companies in the associates' territory on an equal footing with local companies. 
21 Ibidem, Art. I. 
22 Treaty of the EEC, Part IV, Art. 131. 
23 Ibidem, Art. 132. Multilateral reciprocity is applied to the reciprocal trade on the 
basis of same treatment. The significance of these latter paragraphs is not only 
economic, but also political, since all of six European states could from now on 
penetrate those territories that before were the sole preserve of French enterprises. 
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invoked by the associated territories in order to protect their new industries 
from outside competition24. 
To this end, they could apply the Common External Tariff - CET, 
which is a tariff established to give a preference to the Associates' imports 
in the European market, whereas there was no reciprocity for the EEC 
members' goods. 
This difference in the observance of duties motivated the content of 
Article 134, which act as a safeguard to the EEC states, since it enables 
them to appeal to the Commission when a third country's import into an 
Associate member country is detrimental to the trade of a European 
member's goods in that same market25. 
Finally, Article 135 refers to subsequent conventions to regulate the 
free movement of labour among the Member states and the Associates, 
whereas Article 136 provides for the establishment of an Implementing 
Convention to "determine the particulars and formulate procedures of the 
association of the countries and territories with the Community"26. 
The above articles were valid for an unlimited period and provided 
the basis for the renewal of the Association in the years that followed. 
From the Treaty of Rome, via the Yaounde agreements, up to the 
present Lome Convention, an increasing number of sub-Saharan and 
European countries adhered to the Association, which represents the 
"fulcrum of Euro-African post-colonial relations"27. 
24 Ibidem, Art. 13 3 
25 Ibidem, Art. 134 
26 Ibidem, Artt. 135-136. 
27 Svensson, Vidar, Essays on the EEC-African Association, Lund, 1979, p. 19. 
41 
2.3 The post-colonial Euro-African relationship 
The Convention of Association was created to last for only five 
years, until 1962. The EEC Council of Ministers was empowered, before the 
five years elapsed, "to determine the provisions to be made for a further 
period"28. 
As pointed out by Lister, "this procedure did not call for any 
consultation with the African associates"29. The reason for such a unilateral 
procedure was due to the fact that the association was designed for political 
dependent territories with no decision making power. However, by the time 
the convention expired, the associates were becoming independent. 
The question to be addressed was whether independence would mean 
the end of association or not. In 1961, the Council of Ministers declared: 
( ... ) the gaining of independence by an associated country 
does not necessarily mean the end of the regime of 
Association to the Community. This regime persists if the 
country of new independence shows the will and the 
Community does not raise objections. 10 
EEC Commissioner Lemaignen's revtew of the renewal of the 
Convention shows that the EEC Commission's position on the validity of the 
association was in accordance with the wishes of the associates.31 
28 Treaty of the EEC, Part IV, Art. 136. 
29 Lister, M., op. cit., p. 20. 
30 Van der Goes, Political and institutional fonns of collaboration, Work Papers on the 
Conference of the European Parliamentary Assembly and the AASM Parliament 
Representatives, June 1961. Quoting the EEC Council of Ministers. 
31 Lemaignen, R, L'Europe au Berceau, Pion, Paris, 1964, Chapt. 4, passim. 
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On the African side, as more countries gained independence, they 
expressed the wish to maintain their privileged relationship with the EEC. 
"Not only were they willing to fulfil the terms of the first association, they 
wanted to extend the arrangements for a further five years"32. 
As a result, it was decided to create an institutional framework in 
order to discuss the conditions for the renewal of the association and in 
1961 the negotiations between the EEC and the African states started in 
Strasbourg33. For the first time in the history of Euro-African relationship, 
the Europeans and their former African colonies set up a joint decision 
making process. In so doing, the unequal relation between metropole and 
former colonies started to be transformed into a partnership. Eventually, the 
renewal of the Convention strengthened the ties between Europe and 
Africa, surviving not only the wave of liberation struggles but also the 
opposition of those who saw the association as expression of neo-
colonialism, as illustrated in the following section. 
2.3.1 The European-African Conventions in the context of the North-
South dialogue 
In the vast debate concerning the meaning of the association between 
the EEC and the African countries, it has been noted that "in the context of 
the relationship between the European and the African associates, the basic 
principles and contents of the Association represent the invariable, whereas 
32 Lister, M., op. cit., p. 29-30. 
33 The representatives of the European Assembly and of the AASM met in Strasbourg 
to discuss four main issues: (a) political and institutional forms of C<H>peration, (b) 
technical and cultural assistance, (c) economic problems and (d) a development fund. 
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the variable element was the attitudes of the Africans"34. The inclusion of the 
African point of view changed the dynamics of the Association from one 
which was Eurocentric to one which reflected the concerns of the Africans 
themselves. 
As discussed above, the Association began as a colonial powers' 
unilateral initiative, based on a non-egalitarian relationship. Gradually, with 
the former colonies' independence, this relationship evolved into an 
international agreement between sovereign states. 
There are numerous differing opinions regarding the motivations 
behind the renewal of the association. Before presenting a brief exposition of 
some of the most popular stances, it seems appropriate to concur with 
Lister's point: 
the Community wished to maintain a position of influence in 
the colonies and former colonies; the Associates wished to 
avoid the uncertainties of absolute independence. They were 
reluctant to venture into the international political system 
without any economic or political support from Europe35. 
Another important factor to consider up-front is that theoretical 
issues concerning the Association relate to the vast and complex domain of 
the North-South relations. As explained in Chapter One, the Euro-African 
Association has been described as "a neo-colonialist attempt by Europe to 
control the economies of Afric~ recognising the basic dependency of its 
underdeveloped signatories" despite Europe's proclaimed task to assist them 
34 Svensson, V., op. cit., p.21. 
35 Lister, M., op. cit., p.30. 
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m achieving economic independence36 . On the other hand, this collaboration 
- covering issues like trade and cultural exchanges, technical and financial 
co-operation and investments - has followed an original approach towards 
constructing "special relationships with the continent's former colonial 
powers"37. 
The African countries themselves held no unanimous views on the 
Association. The main distinction between pro- and anti-European links is 
expressed by the opposing views of outstanding African leaders. The 
Senegalese leader Leopold Sedar Senghor and Ivory Coast's Houphouet-
Boigny on the one hand and Ghana's Nkrumah, on the other, represent, 
respectively, the advocates and the opponents of the idea of 'Eurafrica'38. 
The critics of the association strongly rejected the validity of the 
'Eurafrica' theory. As Lister puts it "in Nkrumah's view the Yaounde 
association was neo-colonialism in practice"39. For instance, Nkrumah 
denounced the multilateral character of the Euro-African association that 
"rationalised the division of Africa into economic zones based upon 
Europe"40 and described it as a new system of 'collective colonialism'41 . 
On the other hand, the pro-European position consisted of Senghor's 
and Houphouet-Boigny's assertions that Africa could develop only in 
symbiosis with Europe. This belief, as formulated by Senghor, assumes that 
36 Arnold, G., op. cit., p. 33. 
37 Ravenhill, J., op. cit., p. 87. 
38 On the theory of 'Eurafrica', ref. to Lister, op. cit., chapt. I and VI, passim; Svensson, 
op. cit. passim. The concept of 'Eurafrica' has been used, since the fifties, as the 
codeword for a European-African alliance based on economic complementarity. 
39 Lister, M., op. cit. p. 208. 
40 Nkrumah, K., Neo-Co/onialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism, Heinemann, London, 
1965, Introduction. 
41 Quoted from Gruhn, l.V., The Lome CoTTVention: inching towards interdependence, 
International Organization, Spring 1976, p.244. 
45 
Africans and Europeans "shall go back to the sources of African-Negro and 
European civilisation in order to grasp what is essential in both their spirit"42. 
Senghor remarked that the creation of "new forms and institutions - cultural, 
political, social and economic - suited the possibility for African emotionality 
and European rationality to enrich each other"43. 
Drawing from Houphouet-Boigny's assumption of a growmg 
interdependency, the idea was that the African countries could only prosper 
if they took part in the developing network of reciprocal relations on the 
basis of specialisation44. 
Once we have put forth our full effort of heart and spirit and 
intellect, once we have achieved this inner revolution, the rest 
will be given to us in addition- that is to say, the capital, the 
technicians and the techniques. 45 
The eventual continuation of the Association can be seen as the result 
of the advancement of the idea of economic complementarity as a rationale 
for the Euro-African relationship. 
42 Senghor, L.S., Dialog mil Afrika und dem Islam: zwei Vortrage, Mohl, Tubingen, 
1987. On the relationship between the Western civilisation and Africa. 
43 Ibidem. 
44 Ibidem. Quotation by Houphouet-Boigny 
45 Ibidem 
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2.3.2 The Yaounde Conventions 
Yaounde I and II are set in a period of transfonnation from colonial 
to post-colonial Euro-Afiican relations, marked by the dissolution of Afiican 
non-alignment and recognition of the inevitability of dependency upon 
Europe. Such a transformation is well exposed by the following statement 
made at the time of the renegotiations of Yaounde in 1969. 
A quarter of a century after the end of the Second World War 
the old pattern of the European control over and concern for 
Afiica has been shattered. Afiican independence has strikingly 
altered political relationship (sic). Both parties to the fonner 
relationship are in a transitional period of searching for their 
own solutions to the problems and have as yet only a most 
unclear idea as to the lines along which future relationships 
between the two areas should evolve. It is a period of 
convalescence and confusion following colonialism. In time, 
Africa might become for Europe just another region of the 
world, and vice versa. But a far more likely outcome is that 
the influence of history and geography added to other factors 
will produce some patterns of special relationships. 46 
The first Yaounde Convention was signed in July 1963 between the 
EEC and the Afiican Associated States and Madagascar, AASM. These 
being: Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Central 
Afiica, Congo-Brazaville, Ivory Coast, Dahomey (Benin), Gabon, 
Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia and Togo. 
46 Nielsen, W.A., The Great Powers and Africa, London 1969, pp. 180-81. 
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The Convention was valid for five years, until July 1969, when it 
was renewed for another five years. Hence the second Convention of 
Yaounde came into force in 1970 and expired in 1975. 
The Convention of Association signed in Yaounde provided the 
commercial framework for financial and technical co-operation, which was 
essential to the success of the development policy. The Convention is 
divided into five titles: 
I. trade exchanges between AASM and EC 
II. financial and technical co-operation 
III. freedom of establishment, services, payments and capital movements 
IV. institutions 
V. general provisions 
The Conventions of Yaounde primarily referred to economic and, to a 
lesser extent, social development. Indeed, they provided the commercial 
framework for financial and technical co-operation, necessary for the 
improvement of the low-income affiliates• terms of trade and their chances 
for economic growth. According to numerous economists who have 
analysed the Convention, the value of terms of trade is by no means 
undisputed and has served as a basis for many policy recommendations by 
UN Conference for Trade And Development (UNCTAD)47 
What is important to emphasise, without detailed analysis of the 
content of the two agreements, is that both Conventions contributed to the 
gradual reinforcement of the structure of Association between the African 
47 See for example Meier, G.M., The International Economics of Development, New 
York, 1968, passim. 
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and the EC countries48, giving a new insight to the North-South dialogue as 
a whole. 
Firstly, because they are the result of the first international 
negotiations of the new independent African states, that acted together as 
one single group. Secondly, the African associates were represented in joint 
institutions with the EC for the first time. Previously the status of 
associate/colony did not allow representatives to be accredited. This was 
made possible by the establishment of new mixed institutions, such as the 
Council of Association, the Association Committee, the Euro-African 
Parliamentary Conference, the Court of Arbitration and a Secretariat49. 
Furthermore permanent diplomatic missions were established in Brussels by 
the Associates. 
In this respect, the Yaounde Conventions had a positive effect on the 
African setting as they stimulated a co-operation among the African 
associates, who were obliged to act as a collective group. 
48 Chapter I, p.5. After 1965 the EEC is referred to as the EC. 
49 The Council of Association was to meet annually in order to survey the general 
operation of the Convention and to establish the general guidelines for technical and 
financial co-operation (see Article 27 of the Convention). The Council was composed 
of the six member states and the EEC Commission on the one hand and of the 
governments of the Associates on the other. The votes required in order to reach 
decisions, both in the Council and in its assisting Committee, were two: one on the 
Six side and one for the Eighteen AASM countries. The Parliamentary Conference 
was a joint body of members of the European Parliament and representatives of the 
Associates' Parliaments. It met once a year and, in addition, received the report of the 
Council. The Court of Arbitration's function was to settle disputes on the 
interpretation or application of the Convention if the Council failed to reach a 
political understanding. Its President was appointed by the Council and the four 
members were nominated: two by the EEC Council of Ministers and two by the 
Associates. In reality, this Court never operated. The Secretariat assisted both the 
Council and the Committee. 
49 
On the whole, Yaounde was the result of a compromise, which tried 
to address the interests of the various parties involved. For Africa, the 
unquestionable advantage was the link between its developing markets and 
the European Common Market, where the Associates' goods enjoyed 
preferential treatment. 
As far as the EC was concerned, the Conventions met the European 
strategic as well as economic interests in taking part in the development of 
the African countries at a time when the process of independence in Africa 
was undermining the European influence on the continent. In the context of 
the Cold War, regionalisation was seen as the strategy that the EC adopted 
because, as outlined by Lister, "it needed an associated bloc or sphere of 
influence to play a significant role in world affairs", both vis-a-vis the USSR 
and the USA50. 
Another school of thought suggests however, that the "idea that 
Lome should lead to the formation of a new alliance which would be in the 
position to compete with the super powers ought to be resisted"51 . In this 
respect, Lome can be regarded as a step away from geographical 
regionalism, as unlike Yaounde, it includes Caribbean and Pacific countries, 
as illustrated in the next section. 
50 Lister, M., op. cit., p.193. 
51 Svensson, V., op. cit., p.42. 
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2.4 From Association to partnership: the Lome Conventions 
In 1975 the Yaounde Convention was replaced by a more 
comprehensive co-operation agreement that was signed in Lome by a larger 
number of states. 
In 1973, while the negotiations regarding the United Kingdom's 
accession to the EC were still under way, discussions on the inclusion of 
Commonwealth countries had already started52. The positive outcomes of 
both these negotiations resulted in the Convention of Lome encompassing 
nine EC member states and 46 countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the 
Pacific, (ACP). In 1977 the ACP countries increased from 52 up to the 
present 70 members53, as listed in Table 1. 
Lome marked the transition from a EC-AASM association to a EC-
ACP development co-operation54. This change reflects the new character of 
the bilateral relationship, which followed the elaboration of the 'Principles of 
Addis Ababa'55. 
52 Faber, G., The European Community and Development Co-operation, Van Gorcum. 
Assen, The Netherlands, 1982, chapter II. In January 1973, Great Britain, Denmark 
and Ireland became full members of the European Community, bringing its members 
to nine. 
53 In 1975, the ACP grouping consisted of 46 countries, the original 18 AAMS, 21 of 
the Commonwealth Less Developed Countries and seven other African countries: 
- Africa: Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Swaziland, 
- Caribbean: Bahamas, Barbados, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago; 
- Pacific: Fiji, Tonga and Western Samoa. 
In 1977, 8 other countries joined the ACP: Cape Verde, Comores Islands, Papua New 
Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles and Suriname. 
In 1980: Zimbabwe; in 1984 and 1985: Mozambique and Angola; in 1989: Haiti and 
Dominican Republic; 1990: Namibia; 1993: Eritrea. 
54 Convention of Lome, 1975. Introduction. 
55 Djamson, E.C., The Dynamics of Euro-African Cooperation, Nijhoff, J. (pub.), The 
Hague, 1975, p. 34. 
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Table I - ACP COUNTRIES 
Lome IV 
AFRICA 
1 Angola 41 Swaziland 
2 Benin 42 Tanzania 
3 Botswana 43 Togo 
4 Burkina Faso 44 Uganda 
5 Burundi 45 Zaire 
6 Cameroon 46 !Zambia 
7 Cape Verde 47 IZimbawe 
8 Cenral African Republic 
9 Chad 
10 Comoros CARIBBEAN 
11 Congo 
12 Djibouti 48 Antigua and Barbuda 
13 Equatorial Guinea 49 Bahamas 
14 Eritrea soj Barbados 
15 Ethiopia 51 Belize 
16 Gabon 52 Dominica 
17 Gambia 53 Dominican Republic 
18 Ghana 54 Grenada 
19 Guinea 55 Guyana 
20 Guinea Bissau 56 Haiti 
21 Ivory Coast 57 Jamaica 
22 Kenya 58 Saint Christopher & 
23 Lesotho Nevis 
24 Liberia 59 Saitlt Vincent & 
25 Madagascar f The Grenadis 
26 Malawi &J Saint Lucia 
27 Mali 61 Suriname 
28 Mauritius 62 Trinidad & Tobago 
29 Mauritania 
3) Mozambique 
31 Namibia PACIFIC 
32 Niger 
33 Nigeria 63 Fiji 
34 Rwanda 64 Kiribati 
35 Sao Tome Principe 65 Papua New Guinea 
36 Senegal 66 Solomon Islands 
37 Seychelles 67 Tonga 
38 Sierra Leone 68 Tuvalu 
39 Somalia 69 Vanuatu 
40 !Sudan 70 Western Samoa 
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2.4 1. The institutions 
In order to update its framework to reflect the extension of the 
agreement, the Lome Convention operated an institutional restructuring 
programme. This re-adjustment was not a significant transformation, as 
Lister indicates "the Yaounde joint institutions were transposed into the 
Lome context"56, and renamed as follows: 
• the ACP-EU Council of Ministers, is the supreme body with decision 
making powers on questions of ACP-EU co-operation as well as intra 
ACP matters. Member states are represented at ministerial level. 
• the ACP-EU Committee of Ambassadors (based in Brussels), monitors 
the ACP-EU co-operation and supervises the implementation of the 
Convention. It has powers delegated to it by the Council of Ministers. 
• the ACP-EU Joint Assembly, consists of representatives from each ACP 
state and an equal number of members from the EU Parliament. 
• the ACP-EU General Secretariat (based in Brussels) coordinates the 
activities of the ACP institutions. 
2.4.2 Lome innovations 
The structure of the Lome Convention was similar to the Yaounde 
ones, but covered a larger number of sectors: trade co-operation, export 
earnings scheme from commodities, industrial co-operation, financial and 
56 Lister, M., op. cit., p.96. 
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technical assistance, freedom of establishment, payments and capital, 
institutions. 
Lome's wiq~r content emphasised the EC's commitment to 
"safeguardµtg the interests of the ACP States", that is sqown by a change 
from seeking mutual benefits to benefits specifically for the A(:P countries57. 
This new direction resulted in the following essential features58: 
• it is a contract negotiated between equal partners, that enables the 
associated countries to plan their economies by using specific 
instruments. 
• it is non-aligned in that it respects each partner's freedom to choose its 
economic system, political model and economic model. It embraces 
countries represented by governments of varying political tendencies. 
• it combines a whole range of co-operation instruments to be used 
according to each country's own priorities. 
The above features constituted the thrust of the new relationship 
between the EC and the ACP States, not only in the first Lome agreement of 
1975 but also in all the following conventions. Despite the numerous 
resemblances, Lome I and II are characterised by a predominantly 
commercial content, whereas Lome III and IV place a greater emphasis on 
the socio-political aspects of development, with a shift from a strategy of 
economic assistance to one of development co-operation. As a parallel 
development to the changing objectives, different measures were 
57 Par. 2.2.2 Art. 132. The introduction of the principle of non-reciprocity is one of the 
major innovations with respect to the past. 
58 Commission of the European Communities, Southern Africa and the European 
Community, Directorate General Information, Brussels, September 1990, p. 5 
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established by the Lome Convention to implement development strategies in 
favour of the EC's underdeveloped partners. 
2.5 Instruments of EU-ACP co-operation 
Through the elaboration and re-adjustment of the various 
instruments of co-operation established by the Convention of Lome, it has 
been possible to adapt it to the changing circumstances that have 
characterised the North-South relations in the past decades. As is well-
known, from 1975 to 1990, the Convention has been renewed every five 
years, up to the present Lome IV, in force until the year 2000. 
The EU assistance to ACP countries is provided through a variety of 
forms, consisting of a trade and an aid component. The instruments of 
financial and technical co-operation made available can be broken down into 
two broad categories: 
• Programme aid 
• Non-programme aid 
The difference between these two categories is that programme aid 
consists of a fixed level of financial resources made available to ACP 
countries individually and regionally on a multi-annual basis, through the 
European Development Fund (EDF), whereas non-programme aid is not 
fixed up-front. 
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The measures for financial and technical co-operation date back to 
the very first Convention of Association of 1962, such as the EDF and the 
European Investment Bank (EIB). They both provide financial and 
technical support for the implementation of development projects, but the 
EDF is concerned exclusively with EU-ACP co-operation, whereas the EIB 
allocates funds to EU, ACP and Mediterranean countries. 
It should be noted that the nature of the EU-ACP co-operation 
instruments proves that the requests presented in the previously-mentioned 
Principles of Addis Ababa were taken into account over the course of the 
years. For example, Stabex and Sysmin, with respect to the principle of free 
and assured access to EC markets for all African products with the guarantee 
of stable, equitable and remunerative prices for their main products in order 
to increase their exports earnings; EDF, for the facilitation of regional 
integration through financial, technical and industrial co-operation59 . 
2.5.1 The European Development Fund 
The Fund was established by the first Implementing Convention in 
1958 with the aim of financing projects and programmes in the associated 
countries60. It falls under the category of Programme Aid and consists of all 
EU member states' financial contributions. It is administered by the EU 
Commission. 
59 Dj EC . amson, . ., op. ctt. 
60 Para. 2.3. It was initially called Development Fund for the Overseas Countries and 
Territories. 
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The Fund is renewed every five years within the Convention's 
financial protocol. Since 1958, there have been seven successive funds, each 
backing up (until 1990) a five year convention. Since Lome IV will run for 
10 years (1990-2000), the seventh EDF has been divided into two parts, the 
first one runs up to 1995 and the second one to the year 2000. As the table 
shows, the fund has been steadily growing: 
Table 2 - EDF allocation under Lome I, II, ill, IV 
EDF IV (Lome I) 
EDF v (Lome II) 
EDF VI (Lome Ill) 
EDF VII flo~e IV- 1° half) 
Million ECU 
3072 
4 724 
7 400 
10 800 
EDF allocations are aimed at funding the programmes selected by 
individual ACP countries according to the priorities and the economic 
strategies set in their National Indicative Programme (NIP) or Regional 
Indicative Programme (RIP). Each ACP country or region is allocated a 
fixed amount at the start of each Convention for the funding of civil works, 
material and equipment supplies, technical assistance, training, facilitated 
imports61 . 
The remainder is used for circumstantial assistance, e.g. structural 
adjustment support, emergency aid or refugee aid, Stabex transfers, Sysmin 
61 The Courier, Lome JV, January 1990. 
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loans62. Each Fund provides grants, which represent the bulk of financial 
aid, as well as loans, and is supplemented by loans from the EIB. 
Table 3 - EDF Sectoral Distribution 
REGIONAL AID 
(RIP) 
EDF SECTORS 
+ 
FOOD AID 
2.5.2 The European Investment Bank 
NIP's ECH063 
The European Investment Bank finances loans64, subsidies on loans 
and risk capital to EU, ACP and Mediterranean countries, Central and 
Eastern Europe. It is endowed with capital subscribed by the Union member 
states. Project appraisal is conducted directly by the EIB with respect to 
production projects or action programmes in industry, including agricultural 
processing, mining, tourism, energy, transport, telecommunications. 
In providing loans the EIB takes into account the economic and 
financial situation of the ACP country concerned, in order to have assurances 
that the debt can be served. The recipient has to offer suitable forms of 
security or guarantees. 
62 Para 2.5.2 
63 Par. 2.4.2.ECHO was established in 1992. 
64 Em loans' interest rate is cheaper than commercial loans' one. 
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2.5.3 Non-programme aid 
Non-programme aid is the type of assistance that is not allocated up-
front, but according to specific circumstances. The procedures for allocation 
are based on the relevant provisions of the Convention, relating to six main 
instruments: 
• Trade development 
• Stabex 
• Sysmin 
• Structural adjustment support 
• Emergency aid 
• Humanitarian aid 
Emergency and humanitarian aid represent an innovation with respect 
to the past. After the introduction of 'Cultural and social co-operation' in 
Lome III, there had been a growing concern on the development of human 
resources. Indeed, emergency and humanitarian aid are the basic components 
for the protection of people in need, mostly victims of both natural and 
manmade disasters. 
In 1992, the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) was 
set up specifically for managing humanitarian aid and providing assistance to 
victims, such as refugees and displaced people. 
The structural adjustment dimension was included with the 
consideration that in implementing development projects, programming 
cannot be separated by a general economic adjustment. 
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2.5.3.1 Trade development 
The bulk of the trade benefits of the Lome Convention is represented 
by the principle of non-reciprocity, according to which concessions made by 
the EU in favour of exports from the ACP countries do not need to be 
reciprocated. 
The main components of the trade benefits are those derived from 
qualified duty and quota-free access to the EU market and from the 
application of the cumulative provisions of the rule of origin65. 
Qualified duty and quota free access allow the vast majority of 
products originating in the ACP States to enter the EU duty-free and in 
unlimited quantities on the basis of the above mentioned principle of non-
reciprocity. This means that the ACP is not required to apply reciprocal 
treatment to EU exports, upon which duties are charged. Special 
arrangements exist for products of particular importance to some ACP 
countries, such as bananas, sugar and beefM. 
It is very important to note that the facilities made available through 
the cumulation provisions have not been utilised by the ACP. This is a major 
weakness of ACP countries that have shown an inability to maximise on the 
cumulation and, as a consequence, still remain exporters of primary product 
to the European market67. 
65 Lome IV, Text of the Convention, Part Three, Title L passim. 
66 Ibidem. In the specific protocols, the Union agrees to buy a fixed quantity of the 
relevant products at a guaranteed price. 
67 SADC/EU Joint Docwnent. As discussed in the last chapter, this is a central issue in 
the present negotiation of South Africa accession to Lome 
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The issue of industrialisation is related to trade development. In order 
to promote a more prosperous distribution of industry throughout the ACP 
and close the gap between the industrialisation of the North and the 
underdevelopment of the South, the Convention introduced an Industrial Co-
operation Board and a Centre for Industrial Development. These structures, 
like the dispositions in favour of industrialisation and technology transfer, 
were aimed at developing the ACP industrial infrastructures. In addition, 
specific mechanisms were set up to support this policy with further devices 
to protect and increase the ACP exports. 
2.5.3.2 Stabex 
Stabex - the system for stabilisation of export earmngs from 
agricultural commodities - was first introduced in Lome I with the objective 
of providing funds to ACP countries to cover shortfalls in earnings brought 
about by fluctuations in prices or output of agricultural products exported to 
EU countries. It was aimed at eliminating or alleviating the destabilising 
effects of sharp fluctuations in commodity prices after the oil crisis of 
197368. 
68 Cf. Martin, G., African-European Economic Relations under the Lome Convention: 
Commodities and &heme of Stabilization of Export Earnings, in African Studies 
re\iew, V. 27, N. 3, September 1984, pp.41-66. Stabex emerged within the 
framework of the North-South dialogue on a possible New International Economic 
Order - NIEO. Furthermore, it shows the European countries' awareness of their 
dependence on raw materials imported from the ACP states particulary after the oil 
crisis of 1973 when the EC members saw the real possibility of an OPEC cartel 
situation being repeated. 
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The eligibility criteria for assistance is that the individual agricultural 
commodity affected should account for at least 5% of total export earnings 
to all destinations. Stabex assistance is in the form of grants and the recipient 
is required to give an account of what is done with the aid funds. 
2.5.3.3 Sysmin 
Sysmin is a mechanism established with Lome II to assist ACP 
states dependent on mining exports to Europe. It was created to remedy the 
effects of serious disruptions affecting the mining sector, after an ACP 
request to include mineral products in Stabex was rejected. The difference 
between the Stabex and Sysmin mechanism is that Sysmin aid is not 
automatically granted when the income deriving from mineral exports falls. 
Unlike Stabex, the funds allocated by Sysmin are not meant to compensate 
the country for its loss of income, but have to be directed at the financing of 
ACP proposed programs and projects, aimed at empowering the export of 
the specific mineral toward the EU. Furthermore, Sysmin aid also involves 
co-finance by other donors, for example World Bank, African Development 
BankandEIB. 
The products covered by Sysmin are copper and cobalt, phospates, 
manganese, bauxite and aluminium, tin, iron ore and uranium. A country can 
apply for Sysmin assistance if the relevant products have represented more 
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than 15% of their total exports for 4 years or 20% or more of their export 
earnings from all mining products69. 
2.5.4 Regional co-operation 
Regional co-operation is a device established by Lome to improve the 
collaboration among developing neighbouring states in order to optimise the 
utilisation of development assistance through regional programmes70. It is 
aimed at fostering an increased co-ordination in furtherance of sectoral 
policies, in other words at 'correcting sectorial imbalances' by creating an 
economic integration among the aid recipients in the same geographical 
area. 
In this respect, the EU co-operation with SADC was conceived as a 
commitment to a more effective assistance, based on a fundamental 
reconsideration of the philosophical approach to development co-operation. 
This approach pursues economic objectives while simultaneously 
emphasising the rational management of the resources. It recognises the 
multi-dimensional interdependent relationship both between donors and 
recipients and between the recipients themselves. 
Regional co-operation is based on regional programming, meaning 
that a greater confidence is placed in the capacity of the beneficiaries to co-
operate with each other and carry out joint development operations where 
69 The Courier, Lome JV, op. cit. For the least developed countries, the percentage fixed 
in the two cases is 10% and 12%, respectively. 
70 See para. 2.5.1 
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such an approach is more advantageous than individual project 
implementation. Within the EDF, the National Indicative Programmes have 
been instituted parallel to the regional programmes to underline the 
complementary nature of national and regional operations. Furthermore, 
regional co-operation stimulates a constructive involvement of the individual 
states in the identification of sub-regional priorities. 
In this context, the EU assistance to SADC set up a regional decision 
making process that represents a contribution to capacity-building regarding 
the management of Southern African affairs. On the other hand, the highly 
political content of the EU support to the organisation has also affected its 
organisational ability to implement a policy conducive to regional 
development. 
2.6 European development co-operation in Southern Africa 
The links between the EC and the Southern African states were 
consolidated after SADC establishment in 198071 , which gave the Southern 
African countries a distinct character with respect to the wider ACP 
grouping. The association of the Southern African states with the European 
Community took place in the period from 1975 to 1990. 
The European development co-operation with SADC72 is one of the 
most interesting examples of region-to-region co-operation, as it goes 
71 See Chapter III 
72 In the present section, we are referring to SADC before South Africa's entry. 
64 
beyond the common need to help a group of developing countries improve 
their socio-economic conditions. 
This co-operation represents the EUs commitment to the struggle 
against apartheid and distinguishes the development strategy implemented in 
Southern Africa from the general aid mechanism set up within the Lome 
convention. 
In order to understand the rationale behind the EU aid to SADC, it is 
necessary to outline the background of the North-South dialogue in the early 
1980s. 
The EC concern to meet its associated partners' requests was 
justified by two main factors. Firstly, Lome was seen by the developing 
countries as nothing more than a neo-colonialist subterfuge, for despite the 
policies implemented to foster development in Third World countries, no real 
success had been obtained by the mid 1970s. 
Secondly, it is to be remembered that Lome I came into being at a 
time when the Southern African countries of the ACP grouping, were 
committed to the struggle for liberation73. In 1974 the Portuguese coup 
brought independence for Angola and Mozambique, whereas Rhodesia, 
South-West Africa and South Africa were still under white rule. In this 
context, the EU development co-operation in Southern Africa became a 
political vehicle to prove how seriously Europe repudiated its own colonial 
past once and for all. Hence, the EU responded to SADC's appeal to 
73 Chapter II. Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, Angola and Mozambique were grouped 
together as Front Line States and later the grouping included Lesotho, Swaziland and 
Zimbabwe. 
65 
oppose South Africa's apartheid and econonuc dominance, by endorsing 
Southern Africa's economic and moral goals. 
Therefore, EU development strategy in the region was specifically 
designed to assist the Southern African countries to reduce "their economic 
dependence on the outside world, particularly on the Republic of South 
Africa, the dominant economic power in the region"74. 
The allocation of EU resources was driven by the belief that 
dependence on South Africa was inimical to regional development both 
because of apartheid and for more general economic reasons. 
As a result, the EU development approach was not based on a 
strategy that optimised the utilisation of the available resources. An 
optimisation would have been possible only through the adoption of a neutral 
stance by the Union. Instead, the EU played the role of 'Godfather' in 
SADC's opposition to South Africa. Such a strategic stance had direct 
repercussion on the outcome of the EU aid to the region, as this stance was 
based on a fictitious paradigm. The fiction arises from the politically correct 
but unrealistic determination to ignore South Africa, despite its numerous 
"unofficial" links with the EU member states as well as with its neighbours 
2.6.1 The EU aid programme for SADC 
SADC is the EU1s largest aid recipient among the ACP countries, as 
it enjoys the aid instruments made available by the Lome Convention and a 
74 Commission of the European Communities, Southern Africa and the European 
Community, op. cit., p. 11. 
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special budget-line, specifically introduced for the region. In 1988, on the 
initiative of the European Parliament, a new budget was in fact established 
to fund regional programmes in Southern Africa, in addition to the existing 
technical and financial instruments of the EU development assistance. 
This new budget was entitled "Assistance to Front Line States and 
SADCC Member States", designed primarily "to counter the activities of 
destabilisation by South Africa"75. 
This special allocation formalises the perception that warfare in the 
region was mainly attributed to South Africa's attempts "to consolidate 
apartheid and the country's economic hold on the Southern African region by 
unsettling and thereby weakening its nearest opponents, the Front Line 
States"76. 
As shown in the following table, at the end of Lome III, some 3,300 
MECU had been transfered to Southern Africa, which means that since 1975 
the EU has provided over 40% of its total development assistance to the 
region77. The EU contribution to SADC has been constantly raised until 
1990. Over the first 18 years of implementation of the Convention, from 
1975 to 1993, the Union committed 5000 MECU to the region, accounting 
for two thirds of the organisation's financial co-operation. 
In 1991, it was decided to decrease the amount allocated to the 
region under Lome IV from 141 MECU to 121 MECU. 
75 Commission of the European Communities, Special Programme for Southern Africa, 
Budget line 9531, Lines of budget for projects funding, Brussels, 1988. 
76 Commission of the European Communities, Southern Africa and the European 
Community, op. cit., p. 49. The problem of South Africa's involvement in the region 
are examined in Chapter III. 
77 World Bank, World Development Report, 1989. 
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The explanation provided for such a decision is that during the 
preceding period SADC failed to utilise all its available aid. 
Table 4 - EU financial assistance to the SADC States (1975-1993) 
INSTRUMENTS Lome I Lome II Lome Ill Lome IV Total 
National Programmes 267.5 371.7 824.6 ro5.6 2369.4 
Regional Programmes ~ 70 141 121 362 
EIB loans 66.1 152.9 201.2 ~.1 650.3 
Interest rate subsidies 
on EIB loans 6.2 17.4 19.2 21.7 64.5 
Stabex 33.9 35.1 56.4 68.1 193.5 
Sysmin 
-
82.3 21.6 100 203.9 
Emergency& 
refugee aid 44.5 33 86.5 83 247 
Food aid 81.7 147.5 246.4 250.9 726.5 
Other assistance 51 68.7 47.2 41.5 ll.4 
Total 580.9 978.6 1644.1 1821.9 a:Y.25.5 
Grand Total 5025.5 
Source: Commission of the European Union, Directorate General for Development, 
Brussels, July 1994. 
Given the fact that, in the same period, the Community's funds 
allocation to South Africa - that benefits of a separate programme of 
assistance introduced in 198678- started to increase, it is realistic to maintain 
that development assistance to the region cannot be treated separately. This 
is particularly important when taking into account the fact that SADC is the 
largest EU recipient, whereas South Africa is its largest single recipient. 
78 Chapter IV, para 4.4.2.1 
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2. 7 Conclusion 
The chapter reviewed the evolution of the Euro-African conventions, 
described as the most significative example of aid agreement in the complex 
dynamics of the North-South relations. 
Despite the mechanisms established to foster development in the 
continent, through the agreements of association and co-operation, the per 
capita GNP recorded are some of the lowest in the world. As a result, the 
effectiveness of the EU's development policy in sub-Saharan Africa has given 
rise to much criticism. 
It is doubtful whether the guiding principles of the 
Community varied from altruism under the Treaty of Rome, 
to a desire for mutual benefits under the Yaounde system, 
back to a more altruistic interest in ACP development under 
Lome. However, these changing principles did reflect 
development strategies 79 
The above observation highlights that although the action 
conducted by the Union through the Convention's instruments remains 
relatively limited, the type of assistance set up by the Euro-African 
association has been in the vanguard in furthering development co-operation 
between First and Third World. 
79 Lister, M., op. cit., p. 59 
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Since the first convention of association in 1958, considerable 
progress has been made in the Euro-African relationship. Firstly, as it reflects 
the transition from a non-egalitarian model of relations to an international 
agreement between sovereign states. Secondly, because through a variety of 
co-operation instruments, the Convention has continuously been updated in 
order to adapt it to the changing circumstances that have characterised the 
North-South relations over the past decades. 
On the whole, the continuation of the links with the former colonial 
powers introduced a completely new approach in the global framework of 
the North-South relations. Despite the deficiencies, the conventions 
provided the African states with a common institutional background to 
negotiate as a single group not only with Europe but also in other 
international forums which constituted a tangible advance in Africa's 
politico-economic circumstances. In so doing, they got accustomed to 
reaching common decisions, although all they had in common was 
underdevelopment, lack of skills and poverty. 
As Stevens points out, the Lome Convention can indeed be regarded 
as an a attempt "to break out of the impasse created in the global 
negotiations between industrialised and developing countries to establish a 
regional arrangement that would incorporate a number of the items of the 
new international economic order agenda"80• 
Through four renewals, the Convention grew not only in 
membership but also in content, despite some critics that labelled it as a 
80 Stevens, Christopher, The Lome Convention, in Region-to-region co-operation 
between.Develo.ped and Developing countries, op. cit., p. 77. 
70 
'neo-colonialist subterfuge'81 . Indeed this criticism has affected the 
Community's development policy in Southern Africa. Despite the region's 
vast potential and the EU financial assistance, the European development 
strategy in the region did not achieve significant results in its attempt to 
break SADC's links with South Africa. "The difficulty in realising this 
objective lies in the fact that South Africa exerts virtually unassailable 
economic superiority over its regional neighbours1182• 
As discussed in the last part of the chapter, a major limitation of the 
Convention's effectiveness in the region was its political content. By 
establishing an anti-apartheid strategy to assist SADC, the EU development 
assistance in Southern Africa was overpoliticised. The struggle against 
white-ruled South Africa became a vehicle to show the European 
commitment to an anti-colonialist approach in the North-South relations 
debate. 
As the following chapters are going to show, until the early 1990s, 
the political situation in Southern Africa was one of the factors that impeded 
a re-orientation of the EU development policy in the region. In this respect, 
South Africa's entry in SADC offers an opportunity to update the EUs 
regional strategy and also represents a promising prospect for the Euro-
African co-operation as a whole. 
81 Galtung, A Superpower in the making, London, 1973, p. 73. The 1960s criticism of the 
association has been reproduced in the work of various authors in the 1970s and 1980s. 
82 Ibidem, p.22. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE NATURE OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN RELATIONS 
3 .1 Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the nature of Southern Afiican 
relations, with particular reference to the SADC's past conflict with Pretoria 
and how this has affected European regional policy. The major elements of 
this contrasting relationship illustrate the variety of causes that have impeded 
actual growth in the region. 
Firstly, South Afiica's relationship with its neighbouring states is 
examined, in order to illustrate how the political contrast overshadowed 
South Afiica's potential economic role in the region. Its economic power 
was in fact seen as a destabilising factor which by jeopardising its 
neighbours' stability, hindered their economic growth. Apartheid was 
indicated as the main cause for the region's disruption. 
The analysis then focuses on SADC and its evolution from the 
previous Southern Afiican Development Co-ordination Conference 
(SADCC). Such a review aims to show that, due to the region's economic 
interdependence and heterogeneity, the causes of underdevelopment could 
not be removed as long as South Afiica was excluded from regional 
integration programmes. Ultimately, the economic interdependence between 
South and Southern Afiica and the existence of common regional bodies, 
such as SACU and CMA, show that South Afiica's entry into SADC 
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institutionalised 'de jure' what existed 'de facto' prior to the establishment 
of a non-racial government. 
3.2 Historical background to South Africa's relations with Southern 
Africa 
The following section focuses on the history of Southern African 
relations from the mid 1970s to the early 1990s, showing the complex 
interaction between economic and security interests originating in the 
individual players' search for political and economic stability. 
At the outset it is important to note that the situation in Southern 
Africa reflected on a smaller scale, the political climate which characterised 
the years of the Cold War, when the balance of power between the East and 
the West depended on a strategy of deterrence1. In Legum's analysis of the 
international dimension of Southern Africa's crisis, he offers a broad view of 
the region as a peripheral area of confrontation between the Western powers 
and the Soviet allies in the wider context of the strategic division of 
spheres of influence2. 
The Southern African states needed external assistance in their 
struggle to liberate the continent's last colonies and to fighting South Africa's 
apartheid government. This led to a diplomatic co-operation between African 
countries with the West, on the one hand, as well as the Eastern block, on 
2 
Carnes, L. and Barnett, F. R (eds.), Political Warfare and Psychological Operations, 
National Defence University Press, Washington, January 1989. Passim 
Legum, C., The Battlefront of Southern Africa, Africana Publishing Company, New 
York, 1988 
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the other. In this respect, both Legum and Sommerville agree on the African 
states' role in causing international involvement in the region. 
As Legum puts it "The African leaders decision to collaborate with 
the West reflect their understanding that only the Western government had 
the power and the authority to intervene successfully in South Africa and 
Rhodesia"3. Conversely, Sommerville points out that 
Without Southern African movements or leaders seeking for 
international support for their struggles, there would have 
been no opportunity for the Soviet Union to have become 
involved in the national, regional and international politics of 
Southern Africa4. 
Furthermore, as Mills explains, South Africa formed a 'cordon 
sanitaire' "in the view of a world divided between communists and anti-
communists"5. 
3.2.1 Security through deterrence 
South Africa's regional policy in the 1970s and 80s is hence 
characterised by a 'detente' phase, "intended to bring stability to the area 
through prevention of the spread of further radicalism and ensuing chaos, 
3 Ibidem, p. xix 
4 Somerville, K., Southern Africa and the Soviet Union. From Communist International 
to Commonwealth of Independent States, MacMillan Press, London, 1993, p. xiv. 
5 Mills, G., The History of Regional Integrative Attempts: the Way Forward, in South 
Africa in the Global Economy, Mills G., Begg A and Van Nieuwkerk A (eds.), 
SAHA, Johannesburg, 1995, p. 222. This political stand was an inheritance from the 
1940's and 50's political strategy of building a defence alliance with the West. 
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thereby maintaining the security interests (of South Africa)"6. After the 
Portuguese coup in 1974, the independence of Angola and Mozambique, 
followed by the constitution of a self-declared Marxist government in 
Maputo and the eruption of civil war in both countries, South Africa became 
seriously concerned about the country's growing isolation7. Against the 
trend of other regional events, such as the collapse of the Rhodesian peace-
initiative and South Africa's intervention in Angola in 1975-76, Pretoria's 
perception of threat increased8. 
The presence of Soviet, East European and Cuban forces in 
Southern Africa countries strengthened South Africa's fears that the region 
was becoming Moscow's satellite and that the country was threatened by a 
'red encirclement'9. After the imposition of the UN arms embargo in 1977, 
South Africa became convinced that the West would not have supported its 
defence effort against the communist 'total onslaught'10. 
6 Mills, G., The History of Regional Integrative Attempts: the Way Forward, in South 
Africa in the Global Economy. Mills G., Begg A and Van Nieuwkerk A (eds.), 
SAHA. Johannesburg, 1995, p. 221 
7 Jaster, R, South Africa's Narrowing Security Options, in Southern Africa, Reitional 
Security Problems and Prospects, ed. by R Jaster, ISS, Adelphi Library 14. The 
review of South Africa's fears about external threat and the building of a 'Fortress 
south Africa'. 
8 Ibidem. In 1975, under Vorser's government, South Africa's attempt to mediate in the 
Rhodesian negotiations also ended up in a failure and South Africa withdrew its 
defence force from the country. In 1976, South Africa's Angolan campaign, during 
which the SADF almost conquered Luanda, also ended with the withdrawal of its 
troops. 
9 Rotberg, I. R, South Africa and Soviet Union: a Struggle for Primacy, in South 
Africa and its Neighbours, Rotberg, RI, Bienen, H.S., Legvold, R, Maasdorp, G., 
(eds.), Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass., 1985. 
10 Ibidem, p. 10. This expression was formulated under Botha's government to indicate 
the global communist offensive targeted to destroy the political and social order in 
South Africa. 
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In 1978, President Botha adopted a 'total strategy' aimed at creating 
domestic security through regional stability11 . This policy became known as 
'destabilisation', to indicate the political, military and economic initiatives 
endorsed to ensure South Africa's security at the regional and domestic 
level12. 
The total strategy was meant as a defence against the communist 
infiltration from its neighbouring territories, where guerilla war was being 
carried out by the liberation movements13• These guerillas were actively 
supported by the Front-Line States (FLS) - Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, 
Botswana, Tanzania, Lesotho, Swaziland and, after having achieved 
independence, Zimbabwe - in pursuit of their commitment to the liberation of 
white-ruled Rhodesia, South-West Africa and South Africa14. As a counter-
strategy, South Africa's provided assistance to Mozambique's Resistencia 
Nacionao de Mocambique (RENAMO), to Angola's Uniao para 
Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) and led raids against the South-
11 Geldenhuys, D., Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy making, 
SAIIA, Johannesburg, 1984, p. 140-41. This strategy reflected the 'hard' line of 
Pretoria's foreign policy and was adopted to protect the reformist trend from 
domestic as well as outside threats. Opposition to SA government came not only from 
the anti-apartheid movements, but also from the Conservatives who were against the 
programme of reforms initiated by President Botha. 
12 On destabilisation there is a vast amount of literature. See for example, Rotberg, op. 
cit., passim; Lee, M., SA.DCC. The Political Economy of Development in Southern 
Africa, Nashville, Winston Derek Publishers, 1989; UN Study, South African 
Destabilisation: The Economic Costs of Frontline Resistance to Apartheid, pub. by 
UN-ECA, 1990. 
13 Jaster, R., South Africa's Narrowing Security Options, op. cit. Guerrilla war was 
supported by the supply of weapons and military training to African guerrillas by 
different parties at regional as well as international levels. 
14 Geldenhuys, D. and & Gutteridge, W., Instability and Conflict in Southern Africa: 
South Africa's Regional Role in Regional Security, Institute for the Study of Conflict, 
London, n. 148. The FLS, a grouping established in 1975, supported anti-apartheid 
and liberation movements with logistic help, with a modest financial aid and great 
rhetorical incitement. From the bases established in their territories, guerrilla attacks 
were launched against the Republic. 
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West Africa People's Organisation (SW APO) and South Africa's African 
National Congress bases in the neighbouring states. 
Given the above, South Africa's detente strategy has been interpreted 
m different ways. As Geldenhuys pointed out "what for a target state 
constitutes destabilisation, may for the 'offending' state represent no more 
than the legitimate protection of its national interests" 15• Yet, to borrow Du 
Pisani's remark, "the concept of 'national interest' had but limited theoretical 
and practical utility"l6. 
Besides the variety of interpretations, it is to be remembered that non-
coercive instruments, also formed part of Pretoria's policy17. The search for 
regional security was expressed by political and economic initiatives aimed at 
promoting regional co-operationl8. 
3.2.2 South Africa's attempts at regional peaceful coexistence 
At the end of the 1970s, South Africa's search for regional stability 
was reflected in a policy aimed at establishing institutional links with its 
neighbours. Both the proposal for a regional economic community and the 
policy of bilateral agreements were guided by the need to "not merely 
15 Geldenhuys, D .. , The Destabilisation Controversy: An Analysis of a High-Risk 
Foreign Policy Option for South Africa, in Politikon, Vol 9, n. 2, December 1982. 
16 Du Pisani, A, South Africa and the Region, in From Pariah to Participant, South 
Africa's evolving foreign relations, ed. by Greg Mills, The South African Institute of 
International Affairs, Johannesburg, 1994,p. 52. 
17 Geldenhuys, D., Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy making., op. 
cit., pp. 64 et ss. On the 'soft line' component of South Africa's policy and the 
division between 'verkrampte' and 'verligte'. 
18 On South Africa's integrative attempts before SADCC's formation, see Mills, op. cit., 
pp. 216-22. 
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expand existing economic ties, but also develop a common approach in the 
security and political fields"I9. 
In 1979, South Africa made a proposal to establish an organisation 
for regional co-operation, the Constellation of Southern African States, 
CONSAS20. It was addressed to Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia, 
Rhodesia and the two independent homelands, Transkei and 
Bophuthatswana. 
The initiative failed to materialise, due to the refusal of the regional 
states to open a formal relation with Pretoria and to recognise the status of 
South West Africa and of the homelands21 . Moreover, it must be taken into 
account that Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, the BLS, already belonged 
to two organisations in which South Africa was also a member, such as 
SACU and CMA, whereas the rest of the region was not willing to further 
the existing economic ties with the Republic22. 
After the failure of CONSAS, Pretoria's need to pursue regional 
stability increased and its policy of negotiation with the neighbouring states 
intensified23 • As a result, in 1982 and 1984 bilateral agreements on security 
were signed with Mozambique and Swaziland, respectively. 
19 Botha, RF., South Africa. Debates of the House of Assembly, 6/6/79. 
20 Ibidem. 
21 Halbach, A The South African Homelands and its Consequences: an Evaluation of 
Separate Development, Institute for Economic Research, Munich. In 1985, CONSAS 
was implemented on a small scale with the establishment of a Secretariat for 
Multilateral Co-operation in Southern Africa (SECOSAF) between South Africa, 
Transkei, Venda and Ciskei. 
22 On the existing economic ties, see para. 3.6; CMA and SACU are reviewed in para. 
3.10.l and3.l0.2 
23 Geldenhuys, D., The Destabilisation Controversy: An Analysis of a High-Risk Foreign 
Policy Option for South Africa., op. cit. It is to be considered that from 1980 onwards, 
ANC and SW APO attacks on South Africa and Namibia increased. South Africa 
responded with raids against the organisations' bases mainly in the territories of 
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In 1988, in the wake of the repercussions that the political events in 
USSR had in Southern Africa, this diplomacy aimed at creating a network of 
regional agreements culminated in the negotiations that led to the withdrawal 
of Soviet, Cuban and South African troops from Angola and foreshadowed 
Namibia's independence two years later24. 
3.3 Southern Africa's strategy of economic development 
Despite the attempts to establish better relations with the region, 
South Africa did not succeed in changing its neighbours' perception that its 
regional policy jeopardised their political and economic independence. In the 
words of Barber and Barratt, "The overriding aim of South African 
governments was the preservation of a white controlled state, although the 
means employed to maintain white power and identity changed as the 
challenges increased "25. 
CONSAS' design was read as a further expression of the Republic's 
will to dominate over the region. As some analysts pointed out 
South Africa sought to increase the security and wealth of the 
Republic by surrounding her with dependent territories which 
Moz.ambique and Angola. Lesotho, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Zambia were also 
involved. 
24 Somerville, op. cit. On Namibia 
25 Barber, J., & Barratt, J., After Apartheid: a Survey of South Africa, in The Economist, 
3-9 November 1990, pp. 1-26. 
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would put political stability as well as economic and technical 
co-operation high on her list of priorities26. 
In 1980, as shown in the following section, the Southern African 
independent states established the Southern African Development Co-
ordination Conference (SADCC), with the objective of removing all existing 
links with Pretoria. SADCC's member states embarked upon a strategy of 
economic liberation, guided by the belief that "they would have reduced their 
historic dependence on South Africa by 'delinking' from South Africa"27. 
The above remark shows that political consideration prevailed over 
pragmatism, presuming that regional development could be achieved 
excluding South Africa. Yet, as Green and Thompson explained, in 
Southern Africa the separation of political-economic goals, strategies and 
tactics from those more narrowly related to security and power is artificial 
even at an analytical level28. 
to 
This view is supported by Mandaza, who deemed it was imperative 
transform into action our common recognition that SADCC 
and national liberation struggles are two sectors of a single 
front. Only by harmonising our actions can both SADCC and 
26 Barber, J., South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945-1970, OUP, London, 1973. As quoted 
in Mills, op. cit., 219. 
27 Amin, S., Chitala, D., Mandaza, I., (eds.), SADCC. Prospects for Disengagement and 
Development in Southern Africa, United Nations University & Zed Books, London-
New Jersey, 1987. Preface. 
28 Green RH. & Thompson, C. B., Political Economies in Conflict. SADCC, South 
Africa and sanctions, in Frontline Southem Afri~ Johnson and Martin (eds.), op. 
cit., pp. 339-386. 
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the Liberation Movements realise our common cherished 
goals29. 
However, the Western countries, "who wished to draw the region 
closer to the West1130 encouraged this programme, which was seen as a kind 
of Marshall Plan for the region3l. 
In consideration of the above, the following analysis is going to 
concentrate on the evolution of SADCC up to its transformation to the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992. 
3.4 From SADCC to SADC: an overview of Southern Africa's 
metamorphosis 
The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference 
(SADCC) was brought into existence in 1980 as an initiative of the Front-
Line States' governments32. Based on the Declaration of Lusaka, SADCC 
was formally established by Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
29 Mandaza, I., Perspectives on Economic Cooperation and autonomous Development in 
Southern Africa, in op. cit., SADCC. Prospects for disengagement and development 
in Southern Africa, ed. by Amin, S., Chitala, D., Mandaza, I. Quotation from a speech 
byS. Nujoma 
30 Ibidem, p.8. 
31 Leys, R and Tostensen, A, Regional Cooperation, in Southern Africa: the Southern 
Africa Development Co-ordination Conference, Review of African Economy, n. 23, 
1984. 
32 SADCC. A Handbook, Printing and Publishing Co., Botswana (Pty) Ltd, 1988. Since 
1980 the African National Congress, the Pan Africanist Congress and the South West 
Africa People's Organisation were also represented among SADCC's Nine, even 
without being formal members of the organisation. 
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Zambia, Malawi, Lesotho and Swaziland33. Zimbabwe, which gained 
independence shortly after SADCC establishment, joined the organisation in 
that same year. In 1989, when South West Africa gained independence and 
became Namibia, it joined SADCC and SADCC's membership increased to 
ten. 
As stated in the "Programme of Action", SADCC's founding 
objectives were: reduction of economic dependence, particularly, but not 
solely, on the Republic of South Africa; forging of links to create a genuine 
and equitable regional integration; mobilisation of resources to promote the 
implementation of national, interstate and regional policies; concerted action 
to secure international co-operation within the framework of the strategy for 
economic liberation34. 
SADCC's strategy for the achievement of the above objectives was 
revised in 1992, when a Treaty was signed for the establishment of the 
Southern African Development Community, that converted the old SADCC 
"from a co-ordinating conference to a community"35. With the conclusion of 
the Treaty, SADC was formalised in terms of international law and its 
33 Maasdorp, G., The Southern African Development Coordination Conference, in South 
Africa in Southern Africa. Economic lnteractio!!, Leistner E. and Esterhuysen P. 
(eds.), Africa Institute of South Africa, Pretoria, 1988, pp. 70-82. The Declaration of 
Lusaka ratified the declaration of intent presented at the Arusha Conference in 
Tanzania the year before. It recalled the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969, a coordinated 
plan elaborated by Tanzania's President Nyerere for the regional struggle against the 
last colonies in the continent. 34 Ibidem. 
35 SADC, 1995 Theme Document, SADC: Resources, Institutions and Capacity for 
Integration, Lilongwe, Malawi, 1-3 February, 1995, p.l. 
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structure was re-organised in view of the possible inclusion of a non-racial 
South Africa36. 
As highlighted in the 1992 theme document, 'SADCC: Towards 
Regional Integration', this transformation provided the institutional 
framework for adopting a new approach to regional integration, in 
recognition of the fact that the traditional policy of regional co-operation was 
inadequate in a post-apartheid context37. 
3.4.1 SADC's re-organisation 
As an overview of existing literature shows, SADC's transformation 
is an institutional response to the changing circumstances, through which 
the organisation sought to strike a balance between the 
informality and flexibility of the old SADCC and a desire to 
acquire the necessary clout to move faster and more 
determined towards the goal of regional integration38. 
For the achievement of its goals, SADC maintained both the previous 
institutional and operational structures. SADC's institutions consist of a 
'Summit of Heads of State (or Govemment)', meeting once a year; a 'Council 
36 Leistner, E., SADCC into SADC - what does it mean?, in SA Foundation Review, 
Vol 18, n. 11, Nov. 1992. The Treaty provided the organisation with a legal 
personality, meaning that SADC may act on behalf of its member states. 
37 SADCC, 'SADC: Towards Regional Integration', January 1992 
38 Tostensen, A, fVhat Role for SADCC, in Southern Africa after apartheid, Oden, B., 
(ed.), Seminar Proceedings N. 28, The Scandinavian Institute for African Studies, 
Uppsala, 1993, p. 156. 
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of Ministers' who approve projects to be included in the regional programme 
of development; a 'Standing Committee of Officials' who screen projects 
prepared by 'Sectoral Coordinators' sometimes working in collaboration with 
aid-funded experts; a 'Secretariat responsible for overall co-ordination of 
programme execution and liaison among the different SADC institutions and 
'Sectoral Committees and Commissions', appointed by the Standing 
Committee to draw-up sectoral development programmes39. 
The above institutions are responsible for SADC activities which are 
implemented according to a model of sectoral co-operation inherited from 
the previous structure. 
As shown in Table 5, SADC continues to operate according to a 
sectoral division of functions among its member states, the difference is that 
"while the old SADCC concentrated on intensifying co-operation, mostly by 
coordinating activities of member states, the new mission calls for deeper 
integration"40 . Each member is responsible for a different sector of activity, 
according to the view that "sectoral co-operation is a workable option to 
yield resource mobilisation and to facilitate regional integration"41 . 
39 Two Sectoral Commissions have been established: the Southern African Transport and 
Telecommunications Commission, SATCC, and the Southern African Centre for 
Agricultural Research, SACCAR. 
40 SADC, 1995 Theme Document, SADC: Resources, Institutions and Capacity for 
Integration, Lilongwe, Malawi, 1-3 February, 1995, p.l. 
41 Ibidem. 
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Table 5 - SADC sectors and co-ordinating countries 
Sector Coordinating Country 
Energy Angola 
Trade and Industry Tanzania 
' 
Food, Agriculture and Zimbabwe 
natural resources I 
Transport and Conununication Mozambique 
Culture and Information Mozambique 
Mining Zambia 
Human Resources Development Swaziland 
Labour Zambia 
Tourism Lesotho 
Finance and Investment (I) South Africa 
Sub-sectors (Food, Agriculture and 
Natural Resources) 
Agricultural Research and Training Botswana 
Food security Zimbabwe 
Forestries, Fisheries and Wildlife Malawi 
Livestock Production and Botswana 
Animal Disease Control I ' 
Environment and Land management Lesotho 
Marine Fisheries Namibia 
The acuteness of the contradiction underlying regional integration 
that excluded South Africa was brought into the open by SADC that in 1993 
declared "membership of democratic South Africa in SADC will give a 
major boost to efforts already underway to promote regional integration and 
co-operation in Southern Africa"42 . Ultimately, South Africa's membership 
42 SADCC, 1993 Theme Document, A Framework for Building the Community, 1993, p. 
32. 
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m SADC highlighted the varymg degrees of Southern Africa's 
interdependence. 
3.4.2 Implications of South Africa's membership in SADC 
In August 1994, South Africa became SADC's eleventh member. Its 
entry into the organisation laid the foundation for the implementation of a 
closer economic and political co-operation between SADC's member states. 
South Africa's membership is a pre-requisite for the harmonisation of the 
regional countries macroeconomic policies. As SADC observed 
South Africa's accession will facilitate the process of 
multilateral negotiations aimed at restructuring the existing 
unbalanced regional relations ( ... ) In particular new 
opportunities could arise in co-ordinating initiatives in 
various areas at regional level; unhindered flow of capital, 
labour and technological resources to productive activities in 
the region; further consolidation of the regional market and 
mobilisation of financial resources for natural and human 
resources development in the region as a whole43 . 
Given the above, it can be argued that SADC transformation was 
necessary to formalise the existing links with Pretoria as well as to provide 
the organisation with an institutional framework suitable for restructuring the 
regional relations in a post-apartheid Southern Africa. As discussed further 
43 SADCC, 1993 Theme Document, op. cit., ibidem. 
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on 4i the study, in the wake of the i~ternational and regional changes of tfie 
ear\y l 990s, Southern Africa is ~ the process of re-orgamsmg ft$ 
4rv~J9Fm~nt strategy. As Tosten~ remarked 
Originally SADCC was set up as a loose association of states 
with a common denominator. The member states were 
otherwise very heterogeneqps in terms of economic size, 
~P,litical systems, foreign orieptation and internal policies, and 
c~Hural characteristics44 . 
. l: 
Th~ following section is dedicated to a review of the Southern Africa 
economtp context. Whilst South , Africa's economic development and 
' I 
potenti~ fire an asset for the region ~P;P Africa as a whole, the heterogeneiW 
between SADC members' levels of ~yvelopment could compromise the 
achievement of balanced growth in tµe region. 
3.5 Southern Africa's economic profde 
The numerous links between South Africa and Southern Africa 
reprpsent a fundamental component of Southern African relations. ll i~ 
'I 
rql~worthy that the acute imbalanc~~ characterising the region are inher~! 
.. I 
to structural differences typical of less developed and more advNJ~ed 
I t(1 
economic systems. Looking at the international agencies' classification of the 
Southern African states, the economic profile shows the heterogeneity in the 
44 Tostensen, A, What Role for SADCC, in op. cit., p. 155. 
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levels of national income within members of the same regionaj grollpings, not 
offiy vis-a-vis South Africa4s. 
Using the World Bank World Development !}~port 1994 
cf~ssification, in Southern Africa there is one upper middl~-inyPme country 
(~~mth Africa), four lower-income countries (Angola, Bot~wcra, Namibia, 
S)Vaziland) and six low-income countries (Lesotho, Malawj, ~ozambique, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe)46• Of these, at least four ~~ considered 
' 
"severely indebted low-income countries" (Angola, Mozambiqlle, Tanzania 
'lnd Zambia), two are "moderately indebted" (Malawi and Zi4'~bwe). This 
µieans that in the SADC context, only one is a developed copntry (Soµth 
Africa), four are least developed countries (Lesotho, Tanz~a, Zambi~ 
Malawi) and the rest developing. A further distinction arises in rf;'spect to five 
of SADC's members that are in SACp. According to GATT classificatwp, 
among SACU members one of tpem (South Africa) is classified ,s 
developed country; three are developing countries (Botswana, Swazilaml, 
Namibia) and one is a least developeq country (Lesotho). 
I 
South Africa, with 30% of the region's population and 18% of its 
land area, contributes 76. 7% of the regional GDP and has a GDP per capita 
four times the regional average47. 
The review of the regional economic interdependence offers 
additional elements for assessing whether the 'old' SADC's programme of 
45 For the criteria used for the classification, see Van Arkadie, B., Special Arrangements 
for the least developed countries, in Kiljilµlen, op. cit., pp. 65-7. 
46 World Bank, World Development Report, 1994. The four lower-middle income 
countries have a GNP per ccqii~ Q( U$$675 to US$8,356; the six low-income 
countries' GNP per capita is less~ l,JS$615 in 1992. 
47 World Bank. World Development Refx,>rt, 1992. 
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'delinking' the region from South Africa and extra-regional forces can be 
regarded as feasible. 
3.6 Economic interdependence 
At the outset, it needs to be said that the South Africa-Southern 
Africa economic relationship is highly unbalanced in South Africa's favour. 
Before the establishment of a non-racial government in South Africa, this 
asymmetry was attributed to South Africa's wish to dominate the region. 
Because of the political contrast, the economic interdependence 
between South Africa and the region was deliberately ignored or considered 
an obstacle to the region's development. This view is reflected in SADC 
observation that "thirteen years after SADC's establishment, South Africa has 
stronger economic relations with the rest of the region than the SADC 
countries have among themselves"48. 
The overview of these relations emphasises that South Africa has a 
valuable contribution to make in post-apartheid programmes of regional 
development. 
48 SADC, 1993 Theme Document, op. cit., p. 28. 
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3.6.1 Trade relations 
In analysing South Africa's foreign trade relations it is to be taken 
into account that, due to the political situation especially for the period 
1986-1991, data are sparse and unreliable. Because of sanctions, both 
South Africa and its trading partners withheld information. The reluctance 
to reveal the extent of trade led to the situation where "the unreported trade 
may be of a size comparable to the recorded trade"49. As a result and 
because much of this trade was conducted via third countries50, the statistics 
on the various dealings with the Republic do not reflect the actual volume of 
exchanges within the region. 
South Africa serves as trading partner to most of Africa, not only 
with respect to merchandise. It produces one quarter of the total GNP of the 
continent and 60% of its electricity; it has one third of the total length of rail 
track and one half of total irrigation land in Southern Africa 51 . In the field of 
education, South Africa counts for 67% of teachers and lecturers in the 
49 Lipton, M., South Africa's Role in Agricultural Production and Marketing in Southern 
Africa, in Poverty, Policy and Food Security in Southern Africa, ed. by C. Bryant, 
Boulder, Colorado, 1988. Quotation, p. 178. 
50 Leistner, E., South Africa. Gateway to Sub-Saharan Africa, op. cit. 
51 Lloyd, AA, The economic future of Africa and the possibility of a Southern African 
Economic Community, in AIESEC Congress Report, Interdependence. The economic 
interdependence between countries in Southern and Equatorial Africa, Holiday Inn, 
Belville. 
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region and two thirds of all Africa's university students are studying either 
there or in Egypt52. 
Regarding trade exchanges, it is interesting to look at data referring 
to South Africa's merchandise trade with Africa in 1985, during a period of 
sharp political contrast with the continent and also the last year of data 
release. As can be seen in Table 6, the size of trade was quite large. 
With respect to its neighbours, South Africa is SADC countries 
major trading partner. Table 7 and 8 show the proportion of South African 
foreign trade conducted with the SADC group. In 1990 it had again reached 
the level attained in 1970 after declining between 1974-8453. 
52 Ibidem. 
53 Maasdorp, G., Southern Africa Development Community, Briefing Document, 
National Workshop, Helderfontein, South Africa, 1-2 June 1995, p. 19. 
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'Table 6- South Africa's merchandise trade with Africa* 
Percentage of exports & imports, 1985 
Export to Africa Imports from Africa 
Commodity group % of total X '%of total M 
1 Animal & animal products 13,2 7,2 
2 Vegetable products 11,4 8,3 
3 Animal & vegetable fats & oils 22,6 1,5 
4 Prepared foodstuffs 9,9 18, 1 
5 Mineral products 5,7 4, 1 
6 Chemical & chemical products 28,2 0,4 
7 Plastics, resins & rubber products 45,8 0,3 
8 Hides, skins & leather 0,6 13,8 
9 Wood & wood products 13, 1 18,3 
10 Pulp, paper & paperboard 7,7 0,8 
11 Textiles 5 10,7 
12 Footwear & millinery 44,7 4,3 
13 Non-metallic products 33,2 0,5 
14 Gems & jewellery 0, 1 14,7 
15 Base metals & base products 6,4 4,5 
16 Machinery 35,9 0,3 
17 Vehicles & transport equipment 26,6 0,3 
18 Optical & other instruments 18,2 0,4 
19 Musical instruments I I 
20 Miscellaneous manufacture 14 2, 1 
21 Work of art 0, 1 2,2 
22 Unclassified 0, 1 0, 1 
(*) Excluding trade with the Southern African Custom Union 
Source: Commissioner for Custom and Excise, Monthlv Abstracts of Trade 
Statistics, January-December 1985, Pretoria Government Printer, 1985 
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Table 7 - South Africa's Foreign Trade, 1990* 
Imports Exports Total 
SACU 1440 8 861 10 301 
Rest of SADC ( 6 countries) 563 2 426 2 988 
Rest of PTA (IO countries) 27 349 377 
Rest of Afiica ( excl. SADC/PT A) 123 1 294 1 418 
Afiica 2 153 12 930 15 084 
Total all countries 44 125 60 929 105 054 
SACU as % of total 3.3 14.5 9.8 
. SACU & SADC as% of total 4.S 18.S 12.6 
··· Afiica as % of total 4.9 21.2 ' 13.3 
Source: Finansies & Tegniek. 4 October 1991 and IS May 1992. 
Table 8 
-
South African Trade with Southern Africa, 1992* 
Country Exports Imports Total RatioXIM 
Botswana 4 284.6 496.1 4 780.7 
Lesotho 2 541.0 152.8 2 693.8 
Namibia 3 873.2 734.6 4 607.8 
Swaziland 2 233.8 804.1 (a) 3 037.9 
SACU 12 932.6 2 187.6 15 120.2 
Angola 365.2 365.2 
Malawi 698.0 134.0 832.0 
Mozambique 678.2 51.0 729.2 
Tanzania 27.7 10.3 38.0 
Zambia 1 112.2 44.6 1 156.8 
Zimbabwe 1 553.4 762.6 2 316.0 
Non-SA CU 4 434.7 1 002.5 5 437.2 
Total SADC 17 367.3 3 190.l 2 0557.4 
SACU% 74.5 68.6 73.6 
Note: (a) 1991 figure. 
Source: South African Reserve Bank, Pretoria 
*)From: MAASDORP, Gavin, Southern Africa Development Community, Briefing 
Document, National Workshop, Helderfontein, South Africa, 1-2 June 1995 
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In the same period, foreign trade flows of Lesotho, Swaziland, 
Zimbabwe and Namibia were heavily oriented towards South Africa. This is 
especially so with respect to their imports and this applies to Botswana and 
Malawi too, whereas for Zambia and Mozambique, South Africa is the 
second most important supplier54. Access to the South African market is 
particularly important for its neighbours' manufactured products such as 
textiles and furniture, for which there are no alternative viable markets. Some 
items are notably known to be exported in large quantities: agrochemicals, 
pharmaceutical products, petroleum products, machinery and equipment, 
spare parts, building materials, clothing, food and a whole variety of 
consumer goods55. 
Trade with SADC countries excluding South Africa was zero in the 
case of Namibia and insignificant for Angola, Lesotho, Swaziland and 
Tanzania, whereas it was most significant for Malawi and Zimbabwe. If 
South Africa is excluded, the value of intra-SADC trade amounts to less 
than 4 per cent of the total trade of SADC countries. Instead, the latter's 
trade with South Africa increased from 16.8 per cent of total SADC foreign 
trade in 1970 to 23.1 per cent in 1984. 
The proportion of South Africa's foreign trade conducted with SADC 
countries declined by almost 50 per cent between 1970-8456. 
It is to be considered that the South African communication and 
transport system serves most of SADC countries in their import-export trade 
54 Ibidem. 
55 Leistner, E., South Africa. Gateway to sub-Saharan Africa, op. cit. 
56 Ibidem, p. 19. The decrease was from 12 per cent to 6.5 per cent. 
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outside Africa, as six of them are landlocked and the existing regional routes 
need to be repaired and upgraded. 
Table 9 shows the presence of South African enterprises in the 
neighbouring countries in 1985. 
Table 9 - Subsidiaries of major South African firms in Southern Africa 
COUNTRY SECTORS 
Agribusiness Mining Construction Manufacturing Trade Banking 
Botswana 2 5 4 8 8 
I I 
Lesotho 2 5 I 1 7 7 I 
I I 
Swaziland 5 2 I 5 15 14 I 
I I 
Namibia 45 14 I 5 10 9 I 
I I 
Mozambique 0 0 I 0 1 0 I 
I I 
Zimbabwe 1 25 I 7 97 12 I 
I I 
Zambia 0 6 I 0 10 0 I 
I I 
Malawi 0 0 I 1 4 0 I 
Total I 88 I 57 I 23 I 152 I 50 i 
Source: Witulski, U., Macroeconomic linkages Among Southern African States, 
Weltforum, Munich, London, 1990, p.185 
In 1988, a mere three years later, South African investments in 
Africa, particularly in the Southern region, totalled R 4 billion. Considering 
the importance of foreign currencies for the debt ridden countries of 
Southern Africa, the South African enterprises are hardly replaceable. As 
concerns credit facilities, in October 1985 short term credit from South 
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Africa to Africa was R80 million and long term credit R200 million57. Also in 
countries with strong economies like Zimbabwe, five of its top ten industries 
are controlled by or associated with South African companies58. 
A brief overview of migrant labour provides a further example of the 
varying levels of regional interdependence. 
3.6.2 Regional migrant labour 
Labour is a significant example of the complex interaction between 
the South African economic system and its regional peripheries. Major 
movements of workers take place from Mozambique, Namibia, Lesotho, 
Botswana and Swaziland, followed by Malawi and Zimbabwe. These 
countries are characterised by high poverty, a large rural sector and 
scarcity of job opportunities59. Migrant labour to South Africa has always 
been a sensitive issue. As SADC pointed out "The centuries old system of 
migrant labour in Southern Africa poses serious policy challenges for the 
member states"60. The earnings remitted home by migrant workers 
contribute substantially to the income and the foreign exchange earnings of 
57 Butts, K.H. and Thomas, P.R , The Geopolitics of Southern Africa. South Africa as 
Regional Superpower, Westview Special Studies on Africa, Westview Press, Boulder 
and London, 1986, pp. 28 e ss. 
58 Maasdorp, G., The Southern African Development Coordination Conference, in South 
Afri~ op. cit., p. 91. Zimbabwe benefits substantially from a preferential trade 
agreement concerning the export of sophisticated goods such as radios to SA 
59 Leistner, E., Overview of Interaction in Africa, Africa Institute Bulletin, Vol 27, n. 9; 
Central Statistical Service, South African Labour Statistics, Pretoria, 1987. In 1986, 
non-South African registered workers amounted to 378,125, whereas in 1987 it 
increased to 600,000 to which is to be added an additional 1,3 million employed 
illegally. 
60 SADC, 1995 Theme Document, op. cit., p. iv. 
96 
the home countries61 . The Chamber of Mines estimates that over RI billion 
goes to these countries, whereas there are no available figures on the amount 
of remittances taken or sent home through banks, post offices or in the form 
of goods62. After the establishment of a non-racial government in South 
Africa, the level of migrant workers has been increasing and it is realistic to 
expect the endorsement of restrictive measures by Pretoria63. In the context 
of its domestic economic constraints, South Africa cannot afford "the 
spectre of millions of migrants flocking to the relatively greener pastures of 
its economy"64. In this respect, migrant labour is a significant example of the 
possibility that, as Du Pisani warned, "the end of apartheid may paradoxically 
also inflict new costs upon the region"65. 
61 Leistner, E., Labour Migration, in South Africa in Southern Africa, op. cit., pp. 112-
120. In estimating the overall earnings and advantages deriving from working in 
South Africa, it is important to consider that food, housing and medical care are 
guaranteed beside the monthly wage. 
62 Ibidem. A calculation can be made taking as an indicator the so called 'compulsory 
deferred pay'. The compulsory deferred pay is that portion of the worker's wage 
which has to be paid out in their own countries and which represents a very important 
source of income for the sending state. In 1985, these remittances amounted to RI 16 
million for Lesotho, R83 million for Mozambique, R28 million for Malawi. The 
voluntary deferred pay to other countries amounted to R87 million plus the Rl35 
million remitted through the TEBA's (The Employment Bureau of Africa Limited) 
field remittance system and R22 million in other payments, which gives a total 
amount ofR471 million to the country of origin. 
63 Ibidem. After the formation of the National Union for Mineworkers in 1982, the 
unionists in South Africa started to exert pressure to reduce the presence of foreign 
workers in the country. As a result, in 1986, different law measures were introduced 
to assure more stability to the industrial sector with respect to the flow of migrant 
labour 
64 Du Pisani, A, op. cit., p.67. 
65 Ibidem 
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3.7 Major obstacles to Southern African economic growth 
There appear to be two sets of obstacles hindering Southern Afiica's 
pursuit of its collective economic growth, due to interacting economic and 
political features. From the survey carried out, it emerges that it is not 
sufficient to attribute the anomalous dynamics of the intraregional relations 
only to the contrast with South Afiica. On various occasions, regional 
players as well as the community of foreign donors and investors pointed out 
a number of other reasons for this. As noted on the occasion of OECD's 
1994 meeting on Southern Afiica 
The economies of these states are in a bad state indeed, being 
incidental consequences of what is primarily a political crisis. 
The critical political climate, both at the regional and domestic 
level, is at the very origin of the slow (or absent) economic 
development that has led to the present diffused 
unemployment and poverty66. 
In its 1995 consultative conference, SADC emphasised that in order 
to promote regional integration, it is necessary 
to create measures that include the removal of existing 
political and economic barriers; macro-economic convergence 
and stability; poverty alleviation; stimulation of the private 
66 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) - Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC), Meeting on Development Challenges and the Role of 
Aid in Southern Africa, Paris, 1994. 
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s~tor; convertibility of SADC currencies; the establishment 
of a new sector on 'Politics, qemocracy and Security67. 
Given the above, SADC couQtries will have to implement a closer co-
operation both at the political and economic level, in order to distribute the 
benefits of undergoing development efforts. As Coetzee outlined, the task of 
of creating the conditions for economic revival is a political one, based on the 
adoption of a balanced approach between efficiency and equity 
considerations68. 
The political framework is of crucial importance, especially if 
sustained economic growth is to be achieved. Sound 
macroeconomic policies an4 'flealthy balance of payments are 
required for restoring international confidence and creating 
the environment for private tu.vestment69. 
From this, it can be seep tflat t.Qe re-orientation of the regional 
1: 
development strategy entails structural problems to be addressed both 
politically and economically. 
67 SADC, Review of the 1995 Consultative Conference, Note from the Secretariat, 
Lilongwe, Malawi, 5/2/95. 
68 Coetzee, S., Southern Africa qfter April 1994: A time for thinking anew, in Africa 
Insight, vol. 24, n. 1, 1994, pp. 2-4,. 
69 Ibidem, p. 4. 
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3.8 Structural underdevelopment 
I 
~quthern Africa has been it\ ~ s\ate of deepthittg economic $lagrtation 
since the 1970s and 1980s and its dependence on external sources has 
increased70. Along with the aim of addressing the macroeconomic causes 
underlying its structural underdevelopment, SADC 1995 Theme Document 
recommended the co-ordination of structural adjustment policies71 and 
addresses the organisations' main setbacks, that the following section is going 
to briefly overview. 
Table 10 - Real GDP and population growth rates of SADCC countries 
Country Real GDP 'Population growth 
Growth% 
1965-80 1960-89 1965-80 1980-89 
Botswana 13.9 11.3 3.5 3.4 
Lesotho 6.8 3.7 2.3 2.7 
Mala\\>i 5.5 2.7 2.9 3.4 
Moz.ambique 
- 1.4 2.5 2.7 
Namibia 
-
0.4 2.4 3.1 
Tamania 3.9 2.6 2.9 3.1 
Zambia 2 0.8 3 3.7 
Zimbabwe 5 2.7 3.1 3.5 
Source: World Development Report, 1991 (Figures not available for Angola and 
Swaziland) 
70 Davies, R, A Statistical Profile of the SADCC Countries in the 1980s, Centre for 
Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape, Bellville, 1990. 
71 SADC 1995 Theme Document, op. cit., pp. 7 et ss. on the overall constraints. On 
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) see Van der Hoeven, op. cit. SAPs consists 
in a package of economic policy reforms adopted by developing countries as a 
condition of receiving IMF or WB loans. They are implemented in countries where 
there is an unfavourable climate for investment and economic growth. 
100 
It is to be said that standards of living are declining, with population 
growth rate outstripping economic growth rate. 
Hawkins, however, expressed the opinion that the region's poor 
export performance, coupled with a low capacity to import, is chiefly 
responsible for the overall negative economic performance72. The economic 
take-off is hindered by declining terms of trade, worsened by a chronic 
shortage of foreign exchange, low levels of production and investments. 
Moreover, it can be said that the present structural 
underdevelopment is the result of endogenous and exogenous factors. As 
extensively discussed by Van der Hoeven 73, the regional economic systems 
are still affected by the distortions of the past, when the colonial system had 
structured their economies according to the export oriented model, on the 
basis of which the colonies exported raw materials and imported 
manufactured goods. As a result, these countries are totally reliant on 
primary exports for their foreign exchange earnings and due to the declining 
values of their goods in the international market, their exports generate ever 
decreasing quantities of exchange. On the whole, this situation has led to 
the massive problem of non-performing loans and debt service. 
At the same time, the present economic underdevelopment has been 
nurtured by the one-party political system common to almost all SADC's 
member states. The low level of economic development reflects that African 
ruling elites have regarded social development as the prerogative of a few, 
72 Hawkins, AM., Economic Development in the SADCC Countries, in Maasdorp & 
Whiteside (eds.), 1992 .. 
73 Van der Hoeven, op. cit, Part One, passim, pp. 17-52 .. 
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giving rise to a lack of pluralism visible in the low participation of the people 
in the political process. Referring to a restrictive attitude common to many 
African leaders, Nyerere commented 
The best intentioned govefQIIlents too readily act as if people 
had no ideas of their own. This is quite wrong ... people do 
know what their basic needs are .. .if they have sufficient 
freedom they can be relied upon to determine their own 
priorities for development74. 
3.8.1 The political framework 
Southern Africa has lived in the shadow of regional political conflicts 
and poor domestic political management. On the whole, SADC's member 
states' political attitude is characterised by a general aversion towards any 
form of loss of sovereignty in both domestic and regional affairs. "The 
region's heads of state have shown reluctance to share power within their 
own nations, indeed even to allow political opposition to exist, let alone the 
principle of regional co-operation"75. As put by Obasanjo76 
socio-economic development is burdened by frequent 
violations of human rights from one-party and one-man 
dictatorships leading to poor and ineffective governance, lack 
74 Ravenhill,J., op. cit., p.61 
15 Leistner, E., Designing the framework for a Southern African Development 
Community, in Africa Insight, Vol. 22, n. l, 1992, p.6. The analysis noted that "there 
is not a single example in that ten year period where any of those countries set aside 
self interest and acted in regional interest" 
76 Obasanjo, OlusegunA.frica and Regional Co-operation, op. cit., p. 17. 
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of accountability and disregard for the rule of law, ridden 
with denial of rights and justice to minorities leading to 
internal and regional conflicts, excessive expenditure on the 
military and widespread famine, malnourishment, 
environmental degradation, uncontrolled population growth 
and abject poverty. 
The absence of political freedom is identified as one of the most 
serious obstacles to development, as a lack of public accountability and a 
narrow base of decision-making, prevent people from participating in the 
development process. This situation is echoed in SADC's recognition that 
"the low level of involvement of people in the political process and 
governance" hinder development and growth in the region77. 
Taking into account the importance of the role of consensus and 
participation78, aid donors introduced the concept of'good governance' into 
their development strategy. This means that assistance is provided to 
"promote transparent and accountable institutions, the rule of law, 
democratisation and sound public and private sector development" as "they 
reinforce each other"79. 
It is to be noted that the relation between aid and the protection of 
the private sector lies not only in the need to protect democratic principles, 
but also in the link between the impact of development programmes and 
investments. Thus far, the absence of the private sector in policy-planning, 
due to the above mentioned lack of pluralism, has discouraged foreign 
77 SADC 1995 Theme Document, op. cit. p.27. 
78 The Report of the Commission of the South, op. cit., p. 116 
79 OECD-DAC, Development Challenges and the Role of Aid in Southern Africa, op. 
cit., p. 5 
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investors who do not trust a system where there is no form of investment 
protection . 
3.8.2 The institutional framework 
The improvement of SADC's institutional framework is central to 
political transparency and to solving problems concerning the 
mismanagement of regional and international resources. SADC has cited its 
weak institutional capacity as one of the primary causes of 
underdevelopment80 . Its repercussions are visible in the low levels of 
interstatal co-ordination and in the organisation's scarce capacity to promote 
actual integration among its individual members' productive sectors. In this 
respect, SADC has been criticised for its 'national chauvinism' that as 
Weimer pointed out, is reflected in a general "lack of will and of capacity to 
translate the logic of regional planning into domestic political planning' 81 . 
The distortions at the institutional level compromised the 
effectiveness of sectoral co-operation, a co-operation that had originally been 
adopted as a cost-saving strategy to avoid the institution of a brand new 
central bureaucracy. 
80 SADC 1995 Theme Document, op. cit., p. 27. 
81 Weimer, B., An Assessment of SADCC's Current Position and Possible Future 
Relations with South Africa, Seminar at the Africa Institute of South Africa, Pretoria, 
516190. 
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3.8.3 SADC's reliance on foreign assistance 
As a result of the above situation, SADC has not been able to 
optimise the available foreign aid. Paradoxically, despite the large flow of 
foreign aid to SADC, its reliance on external support increased. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, SADC became EU's largest recipient among the 
ACP grouping. While European aid accounts for two-thirds of the total 
foreign assistance, Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) represents 900/o 
SADC's finances. The lack of management vis-a-vis this aid led to an under-
utilisation of the available ODA 82. Moreover, because of the absence of an 
effective central body with co-ordinating power, SADC and its member 
states have played a very limited role in project implementation, although the 
Lome mechanisms of National and Regional Indicative Programmes provide 
the framework for the recipient's active participation in aid management83 . 
In this context, it is to be expected that some frictions could arise 
between SADC and South Africa with respect to the issue of co-ordinating 
interventions with International Cooperating Partners (ICP). On the one 
hand, SA's approach is contrary to the view that foreign assistance to SADC 
must be expanded84, as it sees ODA as a temporary binding measure and not 
a permanent solution to underdevelopment85 As discussed in the fifth 
82 Club de Bruxelles, The future of the relations between the European Community and 
Southern Africa, Brussels, 1993, p. 54. The reduction of the EU amount allocated to 
SADCC, reduced from 141 to 121 MECU, was due to the fact that SADCC failed to 
use all the aid made available to it. 
83 Chapter IL para 2.5.4. See also Chapter V, para. 5.5 
84 SADCC in the 1990s. A Common Responsibility, Study by AWEPAA & African-
European Institute, Amsterdam. January 1990 
85 Naidoo, ]., Development of Africa, Statement to the United Nations Economic and 
Social Council, Geneva, 5 July 1995. 
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chapter, South Africa aims to utilise ODA according to a scheme which 
would lead to sustainable development through a gradually decreasing ICP 
involvement86. On the other hand, SADC has called for the ICP "to support 
democratic South Africa and ( ... ) at the same time to increase assistance to 
SADC" as necessary "if further polarisation and marginalisation in regional 
development is to be avoided"87. This indicates SADC's wariness that, in a 
post-apartheid context, the aid quota to the organisation could be further 
reduced. As the OECD Development Assistance Committee remarked, in 
the past the substantial fund allocation to the region was "strongly motivated 
by the need to support the anti-apartheid stance of SADC"88. 
SADC 's initiative in the process of up-dating its strategy is the first 
step in the active role, it is to play in securing a balanced distribution of 
development aid to its member states. 
3.9 SADC towards a post-apartheid regional strategy 
The historical, institutional and operational review presented 
previously shows that from being "the symbol and tangible embodiment of 
the political economy of Southern African liberation"89, SADC has now 
adopted a more genuine economic rationale. As the EU pointed out 
86 Chater V, para 5.8.2 
87 SADC 1994 Annual Report, p. 37. 
88 OECD-DAC, Development Challenges and the Role of Aid in Southern Africa, op. 
cit., p.5. 
89 Green & Thompson, in Johnson and Martin (eds.), op. cit., p. 360. 
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(referring to South Afiica's membership), now "SADC can be freer to 
concentrate on economic problems"9o. 
In its 1995 theme document, the organisation reviewed the past 
shortcomings and developed a pragmatic approach based on the recognition 
that sustainable growth can be achieved only through a balanced 
development within the region, to be pursued through the correction of the 
existing distortions91 . In SADC's new approach, a central issue is the 
mobilisation of regional resources to promote the implementation of national, 
interstate and regional policies, with the aim of removing the identified 
obstacles to growth92. 
A major barrier has fallen with the abolition of apartheid. After all, 
South Africa's accession to the organisation of necessity facilitates the 
elaboration of more pragmatic plans of action. It also requires a more 
objective evaluation of the regional constraints, both of which stimulate the 
endorsement of effective economic policies. As The Economist warned 
The SADCC governments hope future South African 
investment may speed their growth. But the dearth of such 
investment in the past was not mainly the result of apartheid: 
for straightforward business reasons, nobody else wanted to 
invest in SADCC either.93 
South Afiica - thanks to its level of development - is in the position 
to influence the pace of regional co-operation. Despite the diversity existing 
90 EU, Southern Africa and the EC, op. cit., p. 50. 
91 SADC, 1995 Theme Document, op. cit. 
92 Ibidem. 
93 The Economist Survey of South Africa, 3 November 1990, p. 23. 
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in the respective levels of development, SADC's member states can still 
restructure the regional relations in a mutually beneficial manner, maximising 
the experiences of the past. 
In this respect, whilst the fifth chapter will concentrate on the 
framework of a post-apartheid formula for development, the following 
closing section presents the two other forms of economic interaction in the 
region, namely SACU and CMA. Since SACU and CMA are composed of 
some of SADC's members, these two regional arrangements could potentially 
be integrated with SADC to form the core of SADC's post-apartheid 
structure. 
3 .10 Economic integration schemes in Southern Africa 
The Southern African organisations for the implementation of joint 
regional action are: the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the Common 
Monetary Area (CMA). A fourth grouping is the Preferential Trade Area 
(PT A), now called the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa 
countries (COMESA). However, it does not fall in the ambit of the present 
study, firstly as it covers a geographic area beyond Southern Africa and 
secondly, because, unlike SADC, it cannot be regarded as a single collective 
recipient of EU development aid94. 
94 All PT A countries are EU recipients within the ACP grouping, but there is no specific 
EU budget-line for PT A as such. Furthermore, since this organisation is based on a 
traditional market-integration scheme, it is not viewed as a suitable option for re-
organising the development strategy in Southern Africa. 
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SACO and CMA are two long-standing arrangements based on the 
market integration model95 . Their potential role is emphasised by 
negotiations presently held with a view to re-orientating Southern Africa's 
development approach. Concurring with the ADB study regarding a new 
approach to regional integration in Southern Africa, SADC highlighted 
SACU's role, 
The heterogeneity of member states m economic 
performance, institutional structures and capacities to 
implement integration are such that the process requires a 
multi-speed approach ( ... ). The countries of the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACO) may be interested in moving 
in a common market while remaining within SADC.96 
3 .10 .1 The Southern African Customs Union 
The Southern African Customs Union is a free trade area comprised 
of South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and since 1990, Namibia 
(BLSN)97. Its origins date back to the end of the last century, when a 
customs union was established between the territories that presently make 
95 Chapter V deals extensively with various forms of integration and co-operation. 
Matthew, op. cit., pp. 239-240. On the monetary union as an expression of the 
orthodox theory of economic integration see Cooper, C.A and Massei, B.F., A new 
look at custom unions theory, Economic Journal, vol. 75, n. 4, 1965. 
96 SADC l 995 Theme Document, op. cit., p. 2. 
97 Davies, R, The Southern African Customs Union (SA.CU): background and possible 
negotiating issues facing a democratic government, Southern African Perspectives, 
Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape, 1994. 
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up South Africa98. In 1910 it was extended to the British administered High 
Commission Territories, which are now known as BLS99. 
The present SACU agreement came into force in 1969, after the 
independence of the BLS countries and provides for the continuance of the 
customs union arrangements that have been in operation since 1910. Its aim 
is to encourage development in the BLSN as well as the diversification of 
their economies. SACU set out to achieve this through the implementation 
of free trade, based on the interchange of goods and application of the 
same tariffs and regulations to goods imported from outside the customs 
area100. 
The main provisions of the agreement relate to reciprocal duties, 
arrangements for admission of goods from one territory to another and 
collection of duties from other territories. Along with the aim of the 
agreement, the member states established a Common External Tariff (CET) 
and a revenue-sharing formula101. 
The durability of the SACU agreement depends on the ongoing 
negotiations between its members. Despite the fact that the Union is not seen 
as completely satisfactory by any party, it has been in place for nearly a 
98 Maasdorp, G., The Southern African Customs Union, in South Africa. in Southern 
Africa, op. cit., pp. 32 et ss. It was in 1889 that for the first time a Customs Union 
Convention was established between the Cape Colony and the Orange Free State. 
Swaziland was part of the Transvaal custom area from 1884 to 1904, when it joined 
the above-mentioned Convention. 
99 Ibidem. In 1910 the Union of South Africa was formed and in that year it signed a 
Customs Union Agreement with the High Commission Territories. When Botswana 
(Bechuanaland Protectorate) and Lesotho (Basutoland) became independent in 1966 
and 1 %8 respectively, SACU was formally established as it still is. 
100 SACU Agreement, Preamble. 
101 Ibidem. Artt. 4 and 14. According to the revenue sharing formula, each SACU 
member receives its annual share of the grouping's revenue. South Africa's share is 
defined on the residual basis after the BLSN countries have been allocated their share. 
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quarter of century and its re-negotiation reflects the fact the agreement is 
going to be maintained102. 
3.10.2 Common Monetary Area 
The trade facilities established by SACU are supported through those 
provided by the Common Monetary Area (CMA), which operates through 
the Multilateral Monetary Arrangement (MMA), concluded in March 1992. 
The CMA between South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland was 
renewed in 1986 as a continuance of the previous Rand Monetary Union 
(RMU)103. Botswana withdrew from the grouping in 1974, while Namibia 
entered the agreement after its independence 104. 
The MMA operates in tandem with SACU and regulates currencies 
and banking-related issues, providing for a common exchange rate and free 
flows of capital among its members105• It should be taken into consideration 
that if the agreement terminates, South Africa's partners would need to 
replace the present backing that their currencies get from the rand through 
the support of other monetary institutions106. It is to be noted that monetary 
102 Isaksen, J., Prospects for SACU after apartheid, in Oden (ed), op. cit., pp. 182- 200. 
103 See Goedhuys, D.W., The Common Monetary Area, in South Africa in Southern 
Africa, op. cit., pp. 55 et ss. The first Customs Union Agreement was signed in 1969. 
104 Ibidem. Botswana withdrew from the RMA in 1974, its economy being less dependent 
on South Africa than those of Lesotho and Swaziland,. In that same year a central 
national bank was set up, the Bank of Botswana, with its own currency, the pula. As 
far as Namibia is concerned, , the agreement provided for the use of the South African 
Rand until the Namibian Dollar was introduced 
105 Ibidem. Parity is maintained between the members' currencies, although each 
country may change its rate unilaterally. 
106 Maasdorp, G., The advantages and disadvantages of current regional institutions for 
integration, in Baker, P., Boraine, A, and Krafchick, W. (eds.), South Africa and the 
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union, as a form of special economic integration, could contribute to the co-
ordination of the fiscal and monetary policies in SADC envisaged regional 
re-organisation101. 
3 .11 Conclusion 
This chapter focused on the main features of the relations between 
the Southern African States and South Africa. 
The presentation of SADC from its origin to its recent transformation 
contributed to draw a comprehensive picture of the complex regional 
dynamics, characterised by the conflicting relations with Pretoria. It has 
been shown that the implementation of a genuine co-operation within the 
region was hindered by political constraints and not only by the contrast 
between South Africa and its neighbours. From the various themes reviewed 
in the chapter, it emerges that there are a number of different reasons for the 
region's structural underdevelopment and, thus, blaming South Africa's 
policy and economic dominance is an oversimplification108. 
World Economy in the 1990s, Cape Town, 1993. The amount of circulating money is 
backed by a deposit in the South African Reserve Bank, that manages gold and 
foreign exchange reserves of the other members. In case of termination of the 
agreement, the rand balances of Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia at the South 
African Reserve Bank are to be repaid partly in rand and partly in foreign exchange 
in the same proportion that the Bank's domestic assets bear to its foreign assets. 
107 SADC 1995 Theme Document, op. cit. On the mobilisation of financial and capital 
resources; on the role of the monetary union see Cooper, C.A and Massei, B.F., A 
new look at custom unions theory, op. cit. 
108 ASSET, Scenario for a subcontinent, Conference held in Mbabane, 13-15 March 
1991. The conference, which brought together important personalities in the region, 
was organised to evaluate the opportunities for economic growth in Southern Africa. 
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South Afiica's membership in SADC represents an opportunity to 
ultimately endorse a pragmatic regional strategy that benefits the regional 
economic interdependence and optimises the available resources. SADC 
itself noted that "one of the major shortcomings of the organisation has been 
its inability to mobilise significant levels of the region's own resources for the 
implementation of its projects and programmes" 109. Furthermore, it has been 
pointed out that SADC's inability to manage foreign aid is also one of the 
causes that has impeded the achievement of the organisation's self-
sufficiency. 
This chapter constitutes the framework within which the European 
Union allocated substantial development funds to SADC and as examined in 
the next chapter, developed its policy towards South Afiica. The analysis 
carried out also provides the background to the important elements in the 
adoption of a post-apartheid development strategy, discussed in chapter Five 
and Six. 
There was a general acknowledgement was openly made of SADCC's failure and of 
the need to promote a full collaboration with South Africa. 
109 SADC, Review of the 1995 Consultative Conference, Note from the Secretariat, 
Lilongwe, Malawi, 5/2/95 
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CHAPTER IV 
EUROPEAN RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the relations between the European Union 
and South Africa. It reviews the main events which have characterised the 
evolution of the European South African policy from the 1970s to the latest 
developments in 1995. 
Prior to the re-opening of dialogue with Pretoria, the EU was 
aligned with the international community's strategy of isolating South 
Africa. The 1990s witnessed a transition in treating South Africa from 
'pariah' to 'partner'"1. In 1994 official institutional contacts between the EU 
and South Africa were re-established, marking the beginning of a new era not 
only for the EU-SA relationship but also for Southern Africa as a whole. 
The importance of the normalisation of the EU-SA relations is 
emphasised by Holland, when he remarks that 
To fully appreciate the changed nature of community's 
relations with South Africa, it is necessary to remind 
ourselves of the 'abnormal' relations that existed from 1977-
1991. In fact, the EU has never had 'normal' relations with the 
Republic2. 
1 Holland, M., From Pariah to Partner: relations with the EU, in From Pariah to 
Partner: South Africa's international relations from 1990 to 1994. South Africa 
Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 1993, p. 128. 
2 Ibidem, p. 129. 
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The 'abnormal' nature of the EU-SA relations is due to an intrinsic 
contradiction characterising the European anti-apartheid policy, a 
contradiction reflected by the EU's policy on South and Southern Africa. 
As shown in the previous chapter, the political contrast between 
South Africa and its neighbours was an impediment to South Africa's 
inclusion in regional development programmes. Such a contrast had a major 
influence not only on foreign aid but also on the overall EU policy towards 
South Africa. 
The following analysis explores the extent to which South Africa 
was actually isolated by the European Community, to show that despite the 
political rhetoric, the European (as well as the Southern Afiican) states 
maintained their links with South Africa. 
It can be argued that the EU's South Afiica strategy was 
characterised by a dual nature, due to the incongruency between its 
objectives and the measures adopted to achieve them. "The purpose of the 
Community's policy (the removal of apartheid) and the mechanism for that 
policy raised a fundamental question. Could the chosen policy mechanism 
fulfil the stated policy aim?"3. 
In order to answer this question, the impact of the EU policy is 
assessed within the framework of the different historical phases of the EU-
SA relations. The analysis distinguishes three main periods in the evolution of 
the Union's policy towards South Africa: the origin and background of the 
EC's opposition to apartheid (1973-1985), the 'twin track policy' (1985-
1993), the post-apartheid initiatives (1993-1995). 
3 Holland, M , The European Community and South Africa. European Co-operation 
under strain, op. cit., p. 35. 
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On the basis of such a review, it seems that the EU's policy was 
constantly contradictory. Firstly, the discrepancy originates in the co-
existence of Europe's political opposition to apartheid and the n~d to 
protect both its economic and strategic interests in the country. Secondly, 
sanctions impeded the economic growth actually needed to improve the 
living conditions of the most disadvantaged groups. Thirdly, in the 
transitional period, the strategy adopted by the Community to contribute to 
a "peaceful, irreversible and profound" transition to a non-racial South Afiica 
gives rise to additional contradiction4. 
Within the context of South Africa's new domestic circumstances 
and of its entry into various African organisations, the reformulation of the 
European Union's policy towards South Afiica has become imperative. 
The last section of the chapter is dedicated to the very recent 
improvements in the European Union's relations with Pretoria. One of the 
first results of the reopened dialogue was the conclusion of a temporary 
agreement of co-operation, which laid the foundation for the ongoing 
negotiation of a more global agreement. The definitions of the terms and 
conditions of the bilateral co-operation is not an easy task. The question to 
be addressed is to what extent the Republic should be ranked as a 
developing country, taking into consideration the repercussions that this 
decision will have not only on the content of the EU-SA agreement, but also 
on SADC and other African countries. 
4 European Parliament, Resolution on South Afri9!, 13/6/1991. 
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Indeed, the risk is that the EU formula will entail once again a 
contradiction that could jeopardise the implementation of an adequate 
strategy to foster a balanced development in Southern Africa. 
4.2. The background to the relations between the European 
Community and South Africa 
For more than three centuries, South Africa has been strictly linked 
to Europe, initially through colonialism and, with independence, through 
political, economic and cultural ties. In the middle of the twentieth century, 
the intensity of these links gradually diminished. 
The deterioration of South African relations with the international 
community, in fact, dates back to a relatively recent period, as specific 
measures against South Africa were adopted by the United Nations in the 
early 1960s, twenty years after the introduction of the apartheid legislation5. 
The historical framework of the EC strategy to hasten the dismantling 
of apartheid legislation originates in the UN South African policy. At the 
end of the Second World War, the Union of South Africa was fully 
integrated in the international community and, represented at the San 
5 UN Review, Objective: Justice, Special issue on Apartheid, Vol. XXI, N. 2, December 
1992. The first UN Resolution on South Africa dates back to November 1962. Muller, 
C.F.J., (ed.), 500 Years. A History of South Africa, Third Revised Edition, Academica, 
Pretoria, South Africa, 1988, passim from Chapter 18 onwards; Lugan, B., Storia de/ 
Sudafrica, Garz.anti Publisher, Milan, 1989. The introduction by law of the racial 
segregation originates in the Representation of Natives Act of 1936, according to 
which Blacks could have indirect representation, choosing their European delegates -
this provision abolished the rights that Blacks of the Cape Province had since 1853 -
and the revision of the Natives Trust and Land Act of 1913, which hindered land 
purchase by Blacks outside the established areas. 
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Francisco Conference by its Prime Minister, Jan Smuts, participated in 
preparing the draft of the United Nations Charter together with the other 
victorious powers. 
The South Aftican policy towards Non-Whites started to be a matter 
for discussion and criticism in 19466 . The South Aftican isolation started at 
the beginning of the 1950s, when, to coincide with the post-World War Two 
process of decolonisation, Pretoria underwent "an increasing attack in the 
UN from the newly independent Aftican states"7. 
As a consequence of the former colonies' UN membership, the critics 
against White colonialism became louder8, while in South Aftica the number 
of constitutional laws regarding racial separation increased9. In this respect, 
Mill explained Verwoerd's policy of separate development as originating in 
"The acknowledgement that it (South Aftica) had to adjust to new realities 
in the continent coupled with the need to offset Pretoria's growing 
international isolation"10 
Despite the increased opposition to apartheid, South Aftica still 
played an important role in the United Nations until the 1960s, when the 
6 Muller, C.F.J.(ed.), 500 Years. A History of South Africa, op . .cit. This criticism came 
from the newly independent states and not yet from the Western countries, which still 
had many colonial territories. Chapter 20 describes in detail that, at the very beginning 
of the controversy, India protested about how Indians were treated in South Africa. We 
cannot however go further in this area, in order not to neglect our main focus. See, for 
example, Barber, J., and Barrat, J., South Africa's Foreign Policy, Cambridge, CUP, 
1990; Leiss, AC., Apartheid and United Nations collective measures: an analysis, New 
York, 1%5. 
7 Mills, Gregg, The History of Regional Integrative Attempts: The Way Forward?, in 
South Africa in the Global Economy, op. cit., p. 218. 
8 Chapter I, pp. 15 et ss 
9 Lugan, op. cit., p. 217 onwards. In 1948, following the victory of the Herenigde 
National Party, United National Party, and Malan's election to the presidency of the 
South African Union, the apartheid legislation was given new impetus. 
10 Mills, op. cit., p. 218. 
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Sharpeville shootings seriously affected Pretoria's relations with the West. In 
1961, the Union of South Africa became a Republic, breaking away from the 
British Crown. In response to the Commonwealth's request to choose 
between the maintenance of apartheid and Commonwealth membership, 
South Africa withdrewt 1. 
Furthermore, the "Namibian question" relating to the independence 
of South-West Africa was an area of hostility between South Africa and the 
international communityl2. 
In the 1970s and '80s the Republic was isolated from international 
politics to such an extent that in the 1980s, the UN and the individual 
governments, particularly in the West, finally inaugurated the policy of 
sanctions13• 
In 1990, the new State President, F.W. De Klerk, started the reforms 
that led to the unbanning of political organisations, the release of political 
prisoners, the removal of restrictions on individual activities and the lifting 
11 Muller, C.F.J. , op. cit., chapters 20 & 21. As a result of the referendum of October 5th 
1960, on May 31st 1961 South Africa became a Republic outside the British monarchy. 
The Governor General was replaced by the State President and the British monetary 
system abolished. Independence was declared already in 1926, when the Balfour 
Declaration stated that Britain and its dominions enjoyed equal status. Nevertheless, 
South Africans were British subjects until 1949, when the South African Citizenship 
Act - N°44/1949 - provided for their own citizenship; the Union Jack and the British 
anthemn were abolished under Strijdom in 1957. 
12 Ezcurra, N. & Merizalde, D. L., SWA!Namibia. Dawn or dusk?, S.L., 1989; Du Pisani, 
A., Namibia: the politics of continuity and change, Ball, Johannesburg, 1984. For an 
extensive illustration of the South West Africa/ Namibia question. 
13 Lugan, op. cit., chapter 12. It is noteworthy that the policy of sanctions against South 
Africa was embarked upon at a time when the South African government was 
introducing some important changes. In 1984 a new constitution came into force in 
South Africa introducing the tricameral system for Whites, Coloureds and Indians 
respectively. It meant that non-Whites could enter the cabinet. Blacks were not 
included as the Botha's government still considered the bantustans as proper political 
structures for representation. After 1985, other apartheid provisions were gradually 
removed. 
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of the State of Emerg~~y. This proc~ss culminated in the 1994 multiracial 
elections that detenmJW4 tpe end Rf ~outh Africa's international isolation. 
The subsequent establishment of lP~ povernment of National Unity, GNU, 
officially reintroduced the couµfrY lO tlte ranks of the United Nations. 
4.2.1 The origin of European ~~fflpiunity's policy on South Africa 
The individual EC memb~r states have numerous links with the 
country, historical, cultural and ecopoµllc. The complex net of relations 
makes the formulation of the EC's South Africa policy problematic, as these 
relations are influenced by "sometiqtrs competing, mix of national economic 
and political factors, global security, as well as moral objections to 
institutionalised racism" 14. As t1w following analysis will show, the 
Community countries' extensive inlerests in South Africa explain their 
reluctance to sacrifice their ties wit~ the Republic, when faced with the need 
to endorse an anti-apartheid policy \n the 1970s. 
Besides the Afrikaner a:p.d British people, the South African white 
community includes other Europeans, who amount to 44,5% of total 
immigrants. There are large Portugu~se, German and Greek communities, 
followed by the French and the Italian ~mes, as shown in Table 2. 
14 Barber, J., The Uneasy Relationship: Britain and South Africa, Heinemann/Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, Lon~ 1983, p. 90. 
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Table 11 - Population of South Africa, 1993* 
Group Numbers % 
Black 29.773.738 75,8 
Coloured 3.381.125 8,6 
Asian 1.013.273 2,5 
White 5.136.896 13,1 
Total 39.305.032 100 
Source: Development Bank of Southern Africa 
Table 12 - Whites' linguistic groups, 1993 
Whites' 
linguistic group % 
Afrikaans 57,5 
English 38,7 
Dutch 0,8 
French 0,1 
German 0,7 
Greek 0,3 
Italian 0,2 
Portuguese 0,8 
Other 0,7 
Source: Central Statistics Service, Pretoria. South Africa 
These people are perfectly integrated in the country's social structure 
as well as in its productive sector, where they are either normally employed 
or, as in many cases, run business activities on their own. 
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The majority have both South African and their country of origin's 
passports, hence the cultural and economic links with their respective nations 
are very strong15 . It would be too simplistic to state that the EC policy is a 
reflection of economic ties only, even though, as Austin remarks, "South 
Africa disturbs the conscience of Western nations, but it also lines their 
pockets"16. As a consequence of the variety of existing interests, no official 
stance was expressed against South Africa and bilateral relations remained a 
predominant feature. 
The EC South African policy began to develop formally only after 
Great Britain entered the EC in 1973. Then, a transition took place from a 
bilateral British-South African relationship to a Community-wide one, as "the 
existing British policy was adopted, adapted and applied to the EC 
context" 17. 
Pressed by a strong international indignation against Pretoria, the 
establishment of precise guidelines to address the apartheid question became 
indispensable in the framework of the EC-ACP Association18. Indeed, the 
lack of a valid EC policy to fight apartheid seriously undermined the 
Europeans' credibility in the eyes of the black African states. Especially as the 
Front-Line States' membership in the Convention of Lome had established a 
closer relation between the EC and Southern Africa and the political 
15 This information results from interviews that the author held with EU member 
states'officers in South Africa, June 1995. 
16 Austin, D., South Africa, 1984, Chatman House Papers, N° 26, Routledge and Kegan, 
Royal Institute oflnternational Affairs, London, 1985, p. 64. 
17 Holland, M., op. cit., p. 29. 
18 Chapter II, para 2.6 
122 
contrast between the regional states and South Africa could not be 
ignored19. 
As a response to the anti-apartheid criticism that increased in Europe 
after the Soweto shootings in 1976, Steve Biko's death in 1977 and the 
South African campaign in Angola, the EC adopted a Code of Conduct 
establishing some guidelines for European companies operating in South 
Africa20. Although a formal policy of opposition to apartheid was elaborat~d 
only in 1985, the stand-still in the EC South African policy between 1977 
and 1985 outlines the importance of European economic interests in South 
Africa. 
Tlw exploration of the role of the economic ties between South 
Africa and the European states will be presented in the following paragraplls, 
in order to explain the reluctance of the EC members to work oul pn 
adequate strategy to fight aparthe,~. It seems in fact that the EC ~li­
apartheid measures were mainly a political solution to answer the criti«\~ffi 
of European involvement in South 1W1ca. 
19 Chapter III, passim. 
2o See para 4.4.1 
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4.3 The role of economic ties 
The European Community member states have always maintained 
stable economic ties with South Africa, strengthened by strong historical 
links and, as indicated previously, by the presence of a large number of 
Europeans in the country. Undoubtedly, the scope of the existing economic 
ties was a deterrent to the establishment of an effective policy to oppose the 
South African government. It should be noted that the European states and 
the European Community have always been extremely important partners 
for South Africa, representing a major market for its exports. 
Because of sanctions, data between 1986-1991 do not contain 
detailed trade statistics, hence information on trade flows are incomplete and 
unreliable. Available figures do not refer to South Africa only, as they 
include the BLS grouping and, before its independence, Namibia. As a result 
of a number of factors, including shipments through third countries, it is 
difficult to quantify the extent of the South African trade exchange with 
Europe. However, it is important to be aware of such data's inaccuracy as it 
could lead to an exaggeration of South Africa's commercial importance. 
The available information shows the size of the EU-South African 
economic relations and looking at trade figures, we can more clearly 
understand why the member states might have applied more persuasive 
measures towards South Africa, in order to give effectiveness to sanctions. 
The variations which occurred in respect of the single EC countries' share of 
the South African market can be seen in the tables below: 
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Table 13 - EC Member States' Trade with the RSA, 1975-1980 
(Imports= M, Exports= X, in 1000 ECUs) 
Comtry 1975 1976 
x M x M 
Germany 716,585 1.122,122 800,705 1.118,399 
France 231,928 347,755 287,674 440,453 
haly 443,097 273,882 616,107 241,521 
Netherlands 58,153 176,249 88,095 171,305 
Belgium & Lui 181,196 118,726 222,641 102,055 
G.B. 789,462 1.228,910 990,200 989,904 
Ireland 11,066 12,552 13,784 8,964 
Denmark 11,167 25,677 17,091 24,185 
1977 1978 
x M x M 
Gennany 929,579 981,046 902,042 1.205,834 
France 430,937 435,521 578,826 474,484 
haly 728,695 229,490 834,361 245,303 
Netherlands 107,518 127,386 145,811 134,648 
Belgium&Lu 1.244,539 117,601 1.502,385 114,165 
G.B. 3.154,568 889,453 3.365,431 1.005,507 
Ireland 11,997 9,229 10,094 10,803 
Denmark 24,131 19,772 30,586 20,690 
I 
1979 1980 
x M x M 
Germany 1.395,066 1.248,926 1.818,472 1.820,326 
France 677,987 385,892 855,330 694,472 
Italy 1.223,716 235,478 1.061,022 427,013 
Netherlands 180,780 154,556 134,464 189,003 
Belgium & Lui 1.652,279 125,399 1.816,264 182,377 
G.B. 1.760,394 1.102,782 1.326,242 1.671,275 
Ireland 11,482 12,444 10,539 16,299 
Denmark 62,489 24,083 97,054 41,263 I 
(*) Source: Eurostat, Statistics on Foreign Trade, 1981 
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Table 14 - South African Imports and exports by country, 
percentage 1977-1980 
RSA imaorts b~ coyntrv 1977 1980 
% % 
UK 12,3 12,1 
Germany 13,5 12,9 
Italy 3,1 3,1 
France 3,5 3,8 
Netherlands 1,7 1,4 
Belgium 1,5 1,2 
RSA exoorts bv countrv 
UK 21,1 12,6 
Germany 6,4 6,7 
Italy 2,4 4,0 
France 3,6 4,3 
Netherlands 2,3 2,5 
Belaium 2,9 3,1 
Source: South African Statistics, 1982, Central Statistics Service, 1983 
Table 15 - South Africa's Major European Supplier Countries, 1986-
1989 (in million US$) 
Countrv 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Germany 162,0 212,2 277,6 271,5 
UK 104,0 129,7 159,8 142,1 
Italy 29,0 37,9 52,3 51,9 
France 34,0 38,8 48,4 46,8 
Belgium & Luxemburg 17,0 22,8 30,7 32,1 
Netherlands 21,0 24,0 27,9 24,7 
Spain 7,5 8,2 12,1 10,5 
Source: Italian Institute of Foreign Trade-Annual Rq>on, ICE, Johannesburg, 
1989 
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Table 16 - South Africa's Major European Customers, 1986-1989 (in 
million USS) 
Countrv 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Italy 159,0 148,8 181,7 220,3 
Germany 91,0 93,4 143,9 141,7 
UK 101,0 90,7 121,3 121,2 
France 40,0 48,4 59,0 62,9 
Belgium & Luxemburg 30,0 32,1 46,9 58,7 
Spain 23,0 26,4 31,9 39,7 
Netherlands 20,0 9,8 11,3 16,2 
Source: Italian Institute of Foreign Trade-Annual Rq>0!b ICE, Johannesburg, 1989 
Table 17 - EC Imports from South Africa for each member state 
January-May 1990 (iu 1000 ECUs) 
Country ECU(OOOl 
Italy 935.275 
UK 659.476 
Germany 568.104 
Belgium & Luxemburg 483.267 
France 233.900 
Spain 130.129 
Netherlands 113.731 
Portugal 53.747 
Greece 21.195 
Ireland 3.965 
Denmark 180 
Source: Information ID! exchanges between South Africa mN the g, Directorate General 
I, EC Commission 
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Table 18 - EC Exports to South Africa for each member state, 
January-May 1990 (in 1000 ECUs) 
Country ECU (000) 
Germany 1.077.104 
UK 652.117 
Italy 227.354 
France 190.666 
Belgium & Luxemburg 127.861 
Netherlands 113.687 
Spain 35.446 
Portugal 12.960 
Ireland 12.138 
Denmark 5.510 
Greece 1.212 
Source: Information on exchanges between South Africa and the EC, Directorate General 
I, EC Commission 
In the years 1978-1979, there was a decrease in the EC's share of 
South African exports, which fell by 8% and by 10% in 1979-198021 . 
Ten years later, in 1990, EC exports to South Africa showed a 
further decrease of 8.5%, when compared to 1989 (See Table 18). 
On the whole, South Africa was more reliant on trade with the EC 
both for import and export markets. Although South Africa represented a 
small percentage of the EC countries' foreign trade, its importance lies in the 
type of products traded. 
21 Holland, M., The European Community and South Africa: the search for a policy 
for the 1990's, in International Affairs, Vol.64, n. 3, Summer 1988. 
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4.3.1 The European dependency on South African minerals 
South Africa is one of the world's leading producers of a wide range 
of minerals and metals. The country has been and still is a major supplier to 
the West, for products such as gold, platinum, vanadium, uranium, 
manganese, chrome, etc22. Many of these products are used in steel making, 
in electronics and in the defence industry. 
Table 19 - South Africa's role in world mineral supply, 1987* 
Products % of total World 
production 
Vanadium 54 
Manganese metal 48 
Aluminio-silicates 42 
Vermiculite 42 
Gold (metal) 35 
Chrome ore 31 
Ferrochronium 31 
Platinum 21 
Zirconium minerals 17 
Manganese ore 13 
Titanium 12 
Antinomy 11 
Diamonds 10 
Ferromanganese 9 
Fluorsoar 7 
Silicon 5 
Coal 5 
Asbestos 3 
Uranium not available 
source: IBRD south Afncan Trade Profile (*In order of% of total world production) 
22 European Commission, The European Community in Southern Africa, European 
Information, DE 32, , Brussels, 1981, p.14. South Africa's share of world reserves 
did not change very much during the years: in 1980 it was 45.8% of manganese ore 
deposits, 34.8% of chromite, 48.9% of vanadium and between 43 and 61% for 
platinum. 
129 
Source: IBRD South African Trade Profile (*In order of% of total world production) 
The general trend regarding trade between the EC and South Africa 
consists mainly of exports of South African raw materials and imports of 
European vehicles, machinery and chemical products. Table 20 shows a list 
of main EC imports of South African products referring to a period 
preceding the endorsement of sanctions by the Community. A trade analysis 
of commercial exchanges between South Africa and the EC denotes that, in 
the years between 1985 and the early 1990s, the trade flow as well as items 
traded remained almost unchanged23 • 
Table 20 - Main EC imports of South African products, 1985 
Gold Diamonds 
Metal ores 
Minerals Coal Iron & steel 
Fruit & vegetables 
Wool, animals hairs 
Copper Chemicals 
Ferro-alloys 
Krugerrands 
Source: Information on exchanges between South Africa and the EEC, Directorate 
General L EEC Commission (in Holland, ECP, p 56) 
The above products are also abundant in other African states which 
could have supplied the industrialised nations during the period of sanctions 
23 To obtain a picture of the commercial framework of the EU-SA relations, see Stevens, 
C., Trade Policy refom in South Africa, Draft Report prepared by the Institute of 
Development Studies, University of Sussex, April 1995. 
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against South Africa; but they lacked the infrastructure necessary to mining 
activities. Thus, considering the circumstances of most African st&tes, South 
African supplies to Europe were never interrupted. 
In addition to South Africa, the Soviet Union &nd Eastern f:urope 
are also important producers of minerals, but at the time of ~h~ ~9Jd War 
they could not be considered as suppliers. 
The EC's dependency on South African minerals has been a subject 
of great debate during the years of the sanctions policy. for in spite of the 
condemnation of apartheid, it was not worthwhile for the .f C melllber states 
to interrupt their long-standing links with Pretoria. As H;oll'l-Ocl remarks "the 
often-cited essential interest for the EC maintaining rel~tiQqs with South 
Africa is the latter's position as a leading supplier of sp~cifi,c qliµerals" 24. 
Furthermore, in the light of strategic considera1iop~, ~o~t~ ~ca's 
alignment with the West was particularly important during tqe y~ars of the 
Cold War. 
4.3.2 South Africa's strategic importance 
South Africa's geographic and economic fe~Nre& ma.lee it ~ country 
of great strategic importance. The political position <;)f &outl\ Africa S~in~d 
• particular emphasis during the period of the Cold Ww, wh~ as 4isc'1s~d in 
Chapter Three, geographic spheres of influence were qy-elem~nts fQf 'he 
maintenance of the balance of power between West ~4 f.~'' iµ A{ric~. 
24 Holland, M., op. cit., p. 61. 
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In this respect, the USSR was perceived as a menace both for 
political and economic reasons. As a maritime power, it extended its control 
to the shores of the Indian Ocean, with military bases in Ethiopia and 
Mozambique25. This presence emphasised the Cape sea route's strategic 
importance, since the European oil and raw material supplies transit round 
the Cape26. 
In view of factors such as the increasing influence of the Soviet 
socialist doctrine in numerous African countries, the Soviet and Cuban 
presence in Angola, the Soviet assistance to Mozambique and to Black 
revolutionary movements, among which the ANC, it was important both for 
the West and the South Africa government to maintain the status quo in 
South Africa, as it secured surveillance on Soviet expansionism in the whole 
of Southern Africa. 
In Chapter Three, Pretoria's search for stability has been exposed in 
the light of what was perceived to be a 'red threat'27, that generated a siege 
mentality among the South African rulers. Nonetheless, the South African 
government was not the only one to feel threatened, since many Western 
countries were keen to avoid the risk of Soviet infiltration in the richest 
African country and a further consolidation of its presence in the continent. 
Therefore, the European pressure in favour of domestic reforms in South 
25 The military base in the Dahlac Islands, in the Red Sea opposite to the Eritrean 
coastline, was maintained by Mengistu with the support of the Soviet Union. Its 
transfer to the Israelis pre-empted the Arab states' assistance to the Eritrean People 
Liberation Front, EPLF, in the war of independence against Mengistu's dictatorship. 
26 South African Foundation, The South African Foundation News, Vol. 9, N. 3, March 
1983, p.2. In 1980, 32 super tankers rounded the Cape every day in order to supply 
Europe with 80% of its oil supplies. In 1981 the European Parliament adopted a 
resolution on the surveillance and protection of the routes to the countries of the EC, 
which included the Cape route. 
21 Chapter ill, par. 3.2.1 
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Africa can only be seen as partially genuine. Nevertheless, it was regarded as 
such by the South African government28 and, in response to the increasing 
international criticism Pretoria tightened its security policy, since the loss of 
Western support increased white South Africa's perception of internal and 
external threats29. 
The above background is to be taken into account when analysing 
the EC policy towards South Africa, for it affected to a very large extent its 
effective opposition to apartheid. 
4.4 The EC's opposition to apartheid 
From the mid-1970s, when it first became closely involved in 
Southern Africa, to the mid-1980s, the EC's opposition to apartheid was 
expressed in several ways: by introduction in 1977 of a Code of Conduct, by 
public statements of condemnation, by the endorsement of the 'twin track' 
policy, which entailed both sanctions and constructive engagement. 
Furthermore, in response to the outbreak of popular unrest in South 
Africa in 1984-1985, culminating in the imposition of a state of emergency, 
the EC defined a 'Special Programme for the Victims of Apartheid', 
implemented within the framework of the 'twin track' policy. 
Despite the mid-80s policy of sanctions, the EC endorsed a strategy 
characterised by a strong dichotomy: the political condemnation of apartheid 
28 Chapter III, p. 3.2 
29 On the security imperatives infonning South Africa's policy see Mills, G., The History 
of Regional Integrative Attempts: the Way Forward?, in South Africa in the Global 
Economy, op. cit., pp. 222-3. 
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had to be combined with the continuance of economic ties with South 
Africa. This dichotomy poses a question on the nature of the EC policy: 
"genuine repugnance for the system of apartheid or a realpolitik concern 
with economic interests and strategic mineral dependency?"30 
In the attempt to provide an answer, the following section is going to 
illustrate the components of the EC's anti-apartheid policy. 
4.4.1 The EC Code of Conduct 
On 20 September 1977 the European Community adopted a 'Code of 
Conduct for Companies with Interests in South Africa' - hereafter referred 
to as the EC Code -, where 'to have interests', stands either for having 
subsidiaries or for being relevant shareholders of a company based in the 
country. 
The EC Code was adopted by the EC Foreign Ministers in the form 
of a recommendation, thus it was not compulsory. It was to be enforced by 
the individual member states with the aim of contributing to peaceful socio-
political change in South Africa, by codifying the labour relations practices 
of their national companies towards the black employees in the country. 
The Code dealt with two main issues: the conclusion of agreements 
with Black trade unions, in order to guarantee the workers' rights, and the 
non-utilisation of migrant labour31 . Companies were asked 'to abolish any 
30 Holland, op. cit. , p. 49. 
31 EC Code of Conduct, Section Two, on 'Migrant Labour'. A definition of 'migrant' 
worker is not given, therefore no distinction is made for foreign migrants and 
indigenous migrants from inside South Africa and the homelands. 
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practice of segregation' both on and off the job. On the basis of the principle 
'equal pay for equal work' a minimum level of wage was recommended, with 
the adoption of training practices, fringe benefits and job advancement for 
Black workers32. 
The non-compulsory nature of the Code did not help an effective 
observance by the European companies, having had very little impact33. 
In 1985, in response to the need to align it with the EC's 'twin track' 
policy, the Code was revised, even though no fundamental changes were 
effected34. The procedures set a wider scope of joint action, establishing 
that the Twelve's representatives in South Africa would meet annually to 
assess the actual impact of the Code35. 
Despite its revision, the main deficiencies were not corrected. First of 
all, because of its non-compulsory nature, the Code contributed only partly 
to removing the labour abuses that existed in South Africa in the middle of 
the Seventies, as its improvement was concerned mostly with the 'petty 
32 Holland, M., Disinvestment, Sanctions and the European Community's Code of 
Conduct in South Africa, in Africa Affairs, Vol. 88, N. 353, October 1989, p.259-547. 
The average salary was indicated to be at least 50 per cent above the minimum level 
needed to satisfy the basic needs of an employee and his family'. 33 Ibidem. The preparation of an annual report and the implementation of monitoring 
activities were established to control the application of the Code. The annual report 
from each company was to be submitted to the respective national government which 
edited a summary national report. The single reports were jointly supervised by the 
EC Council of Ministers that produced the EC general report, the sole EC joint act. 
34 Ibidem. The average salary was fixed at a new level and more emphasis was given to 
the promotion of black advancement through training and social assistance, such as 
insurance schemes, pensions, recreational facilities, subsidised transport and 
education. A great innovation concerned private black enterprise, as the Code 
recommended 'to encourage the setting up and the expansion of black business'. 
35 EC Code of Conduct, 1985. The firms' progress reports ·were to be submitted, 
domestically, to their respective parliaments, whereas at the Community level, to the 
European Parliament and to the Social and Economic Committee, even if the formal 
power to act on the report remained with the Council of Ministers. The joint report 
would be public. 
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apartheid' legislation and affected less than 100,000 out of an economically 
active black workforce of approximately ten million36. 
Secondly, the programmes envisaged by the Code were quite 
expensive for the companies which, after the adoption of sanctions, 
experienced many difficulties in remaining commercially competitive. 
Furthermore, the Code's capability of reaching its goals was definitively 
undermined by the EC call for disinvestment that, coupled with the 
restrictions imposed on new investments in South Africa, forced numerous 
companies to leave the country. 
In this context, the Code was criticised as a sort of loop-hole to 
divert criticism from the EC's weakness in dealing with the apartheid 
question. The origin of the 'twin track' policy emanates from within this 
framework. 
4.4.2 The 'twin track' policy 
In September 1985, following the declaration of a nation-wide State 
of Emergency in South Africa, the EC Foreign Ministers adopted a 'twin 
track' policy, named after its content that entailed a package of so called 
"restrictive measures" and "positive measures". 
36 Hanlon, Joseph & Omond, Roger, The Sanctions Handbook. For or against South 
Africa?, Penguin Books, 1987. The voluntary nature of the Code is attributed to the EC 
member states' belief that the apartheid legislation 'per se' was an issue under South 
African domestic jurisdiction, hence the Code could not exert actual interference. 
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It was designed to hasten the total abolition of apartheid through 
external economic, diplomatic and moral pressure combined with active 
support for the process of peaceful change within the country37. 
The restrictive measures included : 
• an embargo of the export of arms and paramilitary equipment to the RSA ; 
• a refusal to cooperate in the military field; 
• a recall of military attaches accredited to the RSA, and refusal to grant 
accreditation to military attaches from the RSA; 
• a discouragement of cultural and scientific agreements except where they 
contributed towards the ending of apartheid or had no possible role in 
supporting it and a freezing of official contacts and international 
agreements in the sporting and security spheres; 
• a cessation of oil export to the RSA; 
• a cessation of the exports of sensitive equipment destined for the police 
and armed forces of the RSA; 
• a prohibition of all new collaboration in the nuclear sector. 
On 16 September 1986, a separate package of measures was adopted 
by the EC Council of Ministers: ban on new investments, suspension of 
imports ofK.rugerrands, suspension of imports of iron and steel products. 
37 European Union, Southern Africa and the European Union, op. cit. p.48 
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The positive measures were designed to assist38: 
• non-violent anti-apartheid organisations, in particular the churches, 
• the education of the non-white community, including grants for 
university studies, 
• to promote awareness of the EC programme among European citizens in 
South Africa, 
• to intensify contacts with the non-white community, m a variety of 
sectors. 
The most important of the positive measures, that also included the 
above revision of the Code of Conduct of 1977, was the decision to 
implement a Special Programme in favour of the victims of apartheid within 
South Africa. 
4.4.2.1 The Special Programme, 1986-1991 
"The Special Programme is the largest European Community 
programme of this kind and constitutes the biggest single overseas 
development assistance programme in South Africa"39. 
38 The Community Special Programme in Favour of the Victims of Apartheid, in 
Cooperazione, Monthly Review of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n. 105, pp. 
45 e ss., Ed. by Fratelli Palombi, Roma, 1991 
39 Ibidem. Foreword. It is to be noted that this is the first EC official document 
concerning its new policy towards South Africa. It covers the period from 1975 to 
1993. 
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The Special Programme was promoted by EC development Ministers 
in 1985 and launched in The Hague European Council summit of June 1986, 
as part of the positive measures. In 1991, a second phase of the Programme 
was approved up to 1993. 
The Programme provided support to local organisations without going 
through the institutional channels and local authorities. 
After extensive consultations between the European Commission and 
South African church leaders, it was decided that financial assistance was to 
be channelled through four non-racial and non-governmental bodies, namely: 
1. the South African Council of Churches, SACC; 
2. the Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference (SABCC); 
3. the Kagiso Trust; 
4. the Trade Unions. 
From 1986 to 1991, 402 projects were approved, for a total funding 
of 130,7 million ECUs (495 million Rand) in three broad areas, namely 
training and education, the humanitarian and social sectors and legal 
assistance 40. 
The criteria for the approval of a project proposal were agreed jointly 
between the EC Commission and its South African partners, whereas the 
final decision of allocation lay with the Commission itseJfU. No project was 
40 Non-paper document, collected in Brussels in June 1991, in the directorate General 
VIII, Commission of the European Communities. For this specific part of the 
programmme, the EC made available 400,000 ECUs (1 million Rand). These funds 
were also directed at supporting the return programme of some 40,000 exiled 
persons, a program started in 1992 under the coordination of the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees. 
41 Projects were then submitted to the EC for funding through European NGOs with 
experience in South Africa or, in the case of trade union projects, belonging to the 
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eligible if it supported political organisations' activities and the approval is 
given on the basis of 'positive' and 'negative' guidelines. 
Positive guidelines recommended that all the projects approved and 
supported should subscribe and promote: i) the concept of non-racialism, ii) 
the general ideal of uniting people of different cultural, racial and ethnic 
backgrounds, iii) democratic practices, which should enjoy the support of 
the communities in which they are based, iv) the maximum participation of 
the target population, in order to obtain its co-operation. 
On the other hand, negative guidelines provided that no support 
would be given to: i) South African governmental programmes, ii) 
programmes which are sponsored by the South African government in 
health care, social welfare, etc, iii) programmes or organisations initiated, 
organised or controlled by homeland governments or in Transkei, Ciskei, 
Bophuthatswana or Venda, iv) political organisations. 
Despite the declared apolitical nature of the Special Programme, it 
was highly criticised both in Europe and in South Africa, because of the lack 
of control on the actual employment of the funds. This control was in fact 
impossible under the circumstances characterising the EC's anti-apartheid 
policy, which was only updated in 1991, when the Special Programme 
ended. Before dealing with its extension up to 1993, the analysis looks at the 
major shortcomings of the above policy, in order to evaluate its actual 
impact on the South African transition to a multiracial society. 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, ICFTIJ. The EC competent body 
for projects approval and funds allocation was the Commission. i.e. the Directorate 
General for Development Co-operation, DG VIII. 
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4.5 The impact of anti-apartheid policy 
As shown in the first part of the chapter, the 'twin track' approach 
was based on a restrictive policy aimed at opposing the South African 
government while also implementing a programme of assistance in favour of 
the victims of apartheid. As a result of sanctions, which were simultaneously 
implemented, the financial support provided to the disadvantaged in South 
Africa had a limited effect with respect to the economic growth actually 
needed42 . 
When looking at this dual mechanism, it seems appropriate to concur 
with Holland's argument that European policy towards South Africa was 
characterised by a discrepancy between its ultimate task - to hasten the 
abolition of apartheid and assist the South African people - and the strategy 
adopted to achieve it43. 
A review of existing literature on South Africa's role within the 
Western strategic and economic security« shows a second kind of 
contradiction emanating from the co-existence of Europe's political 
condemnation of apartheid and the protection of its own interests in the 
country. 
The result is an incongruent strategy set up to respond to the public 
by supporting anti-apartheid organisations and endorsing sanctions, without 
42 Hayes, J.P. , Economic Effects of Sanctions on Southern Africa, Gower, Thames 
Essays, n. 53, 1987, pp. 21-38. 
43 Holland, M., The European Community and South Africa, op. cit., chapter II passim. 
44 See for example, ibidem; Maull, H, South Africa's Minerals: the Achilles heel of 
Western economic security?, in International Affairs, n. 62, pp. 619-26; Allen, D., 
Rummel, R, and Wessels, W., (eds.), European Political Cooperation. Butterworths 
European Studies, Bonn, 1982, pp. 135-146. 
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actually severing economic ties with Pretoria. In this respect, it is important 
to bear in mind that not all the anti-apartheid organisations considered 
sanctions to be a valid vehicle of pressure on the South African government, 
despite the undoubted urgency of abolishing the apartheid legislation. 
Different political groupings perceived sanctions as a retarding factor 
in expanding growth, admonishing that South Africa's wealthy sector 
would only be affected by sanctions down the line, whereas their 
consequences would be almost immediate on the poorest. In the words of 
Suzman, "the best hope for South Africa lies in the economic advancement 
of the Blacks. Anything that retards the economic advancement of Blacks is 
counterproductive. "45 
Among sanctions supporters, important organisations, such as the 
ANC, the Pan Africanist Congress, PAC, the Azanian People's Organisation, 
AZAPO and the above-mentioned South African Council of Churches 
(SACC), backed sanctions throughout the electoral campaign, maintaining 
that all those against sanctions were automatically providing support to 
apartheid46• Thus, when in early 1991, the EC decided to update its 
restrictive policy in the wake of South Africa's political transformation, 
Mandela had a very negative reaction, because the decision was made 
"before the ANC changed its indications on this regard"47. 
45 Helen Suzman quoted in The Effects of Sanctions on Employment and Production in 
South Africa, Federated Chamber of Commerce, Pretoria, 1986. 
46 Scott Thomas, The Diplomacy of Liberation: The ANC in Defence of Economic 
Sanctions, in From Pariah to Participant, ed. by Greg Mill, South African Institute of 
International Relations., p. 169 et ss. In the Declaration of Harare, the ANC 
established the conditions for the international community's removal of economic 
sanctions. 
47 The Star, 11/02/92. Quotation from interview with Mandela. 
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Indeed, the maintenance of sanctions clashed with the need to 
contribute to a peaceful political transition, as discussed hereunder. 
4.5.1 The role of sanctions 
In the present study, the issue of sanctions is going to be taken into 
account only with the purpose of assessing their effectiveness in the 
framework of the European strategy. Initially adopted to hasten the end of 
apartheid, sanctions were maintained by the EC even during South Africa's 
political transition. In the spectrum of differing views on the effectiveness of 
sanctions, the EC is among those who believed in the conducive role of 
sanctions. As explained by Holland in one of the most analytical studies on 
the subject 
Advocates of sanctions argue that the likelihood of political 
change in South Africa is consequential on the ability of 
sanctions to have a significantly detrimental effect on the 
South African economy. Consequently, to bring about the end 
of apartheid, the most effective sanctions possible have to be 
adopted48. 
The present analysis aims to point out that the role of sanctions 
ought to be evaluated with respect to their impact. Despite the validity of 
Schmidt's position that "sanctions are a means of weakening the South 
48 Holland, M., The European Community and South Africa, op. cit., p. 158. 
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African economy"49, it does not appear to be possible to concur with the 
opinion that "a set of economic sanctions directed against white South Africa 
does not devastate non-white South Africans" as remarked by Becker50. 
The effects caused by the restrictive measures, delayed the 
improvement of general social conditions, with repercussions on the 
economy as a whole and with a very negative impact 
disadvantageds1. 
on the 
According to Jenkins, "financial sanctions, such as the ban on new 
investments, on exports and the withdrawal of the existing credit lines, led to 
the cessation of capital inflows with a consequent decline in the volume of 
domestic production, fall of capital productivity and decrease in the 
employment level"52. As a result, the amount spent on 'social responsibility' 
programmes, especially education and housing was reduced53 . 
The main effects produced by sanctions can be summarised as 
follows: 
49 Schmidt. E.S., United Nations Sanctions and South Africa: lessons from the case of 
Southem Rhodesia, Notes and Documents, N° 1/87, United Nations Centre Against 
Apartheid, New York, 1987, p. 4. 
50 Becker, C.M., Economic Sanctions against South Africa, in World Politics, N. 39, 
p.127. 
51 Hanlon, J. and Omond, R, op. cit. Passim. The effectiveness of sanctions can be 
calculated according to some basic requirements which must be met in order for 
sanctions to achieve their purpose and impact. In the South African case, many of 
these requirements were lacking and the impact or effect was different from that 
which was expected. Indeed, this is a subject of debate in the relevant literature. 
52 Jenkins, C., Disinvestments: Implications for the South African Economy, Durban, 
Economic Research Unit, University of Natal, Durban, 1986, p. 145. 
53 Community's restrictive measures towards South Africa, in Europa, n. 15, June 1990, 
Agency Europe SA, Brussels. After the withdrawal of the existing credit lines of 
some foreign banks to South African ones, the national Monetary Authorities 
proclaimed a foreign debt "standstill". Fortunately, the surplus in the current account 
of the balance of payments allowed South Africa to repay its foreign creditors. 
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c::> reduction of the per-capita real income, due to the diminished purchasing 
power of the Rand and the subsequent generalised increase in the 
consumers' costs54, 
c::> reduction of the per-capita income generating potential, due to a reduced 
availability of savings, 
c::> repercussions of the deteriorating economic situation on social security, 
Nevertheless, once the long-awaited political reforms had started, 
the EC's member states decided to 
maintain the pressure on the South African authorities in order 
to promote the profound and irreversible changes and to 
reconsider it when there is clear evidence that these changes 
have been obtained55. 
Furthermore, as remarked by the European Council of Ministers, 
"the objective (for maintaining sanctions) remains the achievement through 
peaceful means of a democratic and multiracial system in South Africa"56. 
Given the negative effects of sanctions, it is reasonable to doubt the 
congruency between the policy of sanctions and the objective of assisting 
the country in a "peaceful, irreversible and profound" transition57. Indeed, 
54 International Campaign Against Banking on Apartheid, End Loans to Southern Africa. 
Newsletter, N° 4. The value of the Rand declined by more than a half, compared to the 
US$ or to the European ECU, since the beginning of the Eighties. 
55 Ibidem. 
56 Council of Ministers, Statement on Southem Africa, Strasbourg, 8-9 December 1989. 
51 European Parliament, Resolution on South Africa, 13/6/1991. UN and EC 
declarations recalled the OAU's Harare Declaration of October 1989, according to 
which five conditions had to be met before sanctions could be uplifted: the unbanning 
of the prohibited political organisations; release of political prisoners; removal of 
restrictions on individual activities; lifting of the State of Emergency; the repeal of 
the security and apartheid legislation. 
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the deteriorating economic conditions and the subsequent political disorder 
in the years between the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s could 
have seriously jeopardised the success of the negotiations58. 
The contradictions inherent in the aim of the EC policy and sanctions 
far outweigh their compatibility. The ambiguity of the role of sanctions 
within the European policy is emphasised by the fact that in December 1989, 
their maintenance was depicted as supporting "the process which can lead 
rapidly to the cessation of violence on all sides and to a dialogue between the 
parties"59. One year later, the restrictive measures were removed due to 
quite different motivations. 
4.5.2 The removal of restrictive measures 
In December 1990, the EC Council of Ministers decided to lift the 
ban on new investments, in order "to contribute to combating 
unemployment and to improving the economic and social situation in South 
Africa, and to encourage the movement underway aimed at the complete 
abolition of apartheid "60. 
This declaration recognises that the restrictive policy did not help 
the dialogue between the opposing political parties, and thus did not 
58 Shortly after the unbanning of political organisations on February 2, 1990, opposing 
parties gave vent to the harshest eruption of political unrest ever experienced in the 
country. This was mainly due to the political intolerance among those organisations, 
whose supporters bad grown up in a culture of violence and thus responded with 
violence to the chance of competing openly for the first time. 
59 Ibidem. 
6° Council of Europe, Declaration on South Africa, 14-15/12/1990. 
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contribute to the securing of 'irr~y~rsible and profound change'. If one 
acknowledges that the viability of ~ democratic society is strictly linked to 
investment opflpfhmities, then sa~~tions are an impediment to promote 
steady econo~~ growth and soci~ stability. "It is far more important to 
persuade inve~'prs of the viabilifr of the society that will result from 
transition than · f o score debating points in the campaign for or against 
sanctions"61 . rws means that sanctions are seen as an obstacle to economic 
development which, even in thes~ days, is a fundamental feature for 
successful political transition in South Africa. 
As previously discussed, the boycott had negative repercussions 
especially on the most disadvantageq social classes, such as the Blacks anq 
the poor. Given that apartheid was· tlt~ domination of the white minority 
over the other population groups, H1e cpances of an economically weak 
majority somehow gaining sufficient µegotiating power was very unlikely, 
unless it was obtained through violence. 
Growing rivalry among warring Black factions was to be seen "both 
as a struggle for power as well as a need to get a quick access to the 
economic levers of the state in order t9 finally accede to an unracial social 
welfare"62. 
The removal of sanctions, which was carried out between April 1991 
and the end of 1993, was import~t for the advancement of the reform 
process, especially with respect to t~r concern that De Klerk was giving 
61 Ibidem. 
62 Scott ,T., The Diplomacy of Liberati<J(J..: lffe A.NC in defence of sanctions, in From 
Pariah to .Participant, op. cit. In this re~ 'l js to be pointed out that the existence 
of different ethnic as well as politica~ 'F.Qlfpi was not clear to the majority of the 
Europeans who were generally convi'1c¢d ~f the undisputed leadership of Nelson 
Mandela in the whole country. 
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"too much too fast while South Africa was being left to its destiny"63 . 
It is worthwhile noting that sanctions met the EC's need to gain 
consensus from those political groupings considered to be most dangerous 
for the safeguarding of European interests in the country. Throughout the 
transitional period, much attention was paid to the ANC by the EC member 
states, who wanted to shed the accusation of being economically advantaged 
through the existence of the apartheid system. However, they also deemed 
it necessary that the ANC abandoned its marxist dialectic in view of the fact 
that it was expected to become South Africa's major ruling party64. 
In this respect, the contradiction underlying the EC assistance to a 
quasi-communist movement can be interpreted as the need to support any · 
party which would assure democratic rules and, most of all, endorse a free 
market policy once in the government. 
Since the level of violence remained the major threat to the 
democratisation process, the EC undertook a broad programme to promote 
the transition towards representational democracy in South Africa. 
63 The Star, South Africa's deadly culture is thriving, 26/6/90. 
64 ANC, A better life for All, Department of Information & Publicity, Johannesburg, 
1993. The document, that is a forerunner to the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme, shows the party's abandonment of extremist positions. On the contrary, 
the South African Communist Party maintained a very vigorous position on 
traditionally marxist issues, such as the armed struggle and land redistribution. The 
SACP, officially re-established in January 1991, ran in the April 1994 elections and -
as the Pan Africanist Congress, which got 1,6% of the votes - won no seats at all in 
the National Assembly. 
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4.6 EC assistance towards SA's transition 
Given the above and in consideration of the progress made by the 
reform process in South Africa, in 1991, the EC approved a second phase of 
the Special Programme to run until 1993. Its primary objective was to assist 
the transition to a "peaceful, stable, non racial and prosperous South 
Africa"65 . 
In response to the new domestic situation, the second Special 
Programme was re-orientated. The political nature of the assistance took on 
a more developmental focus, meaning that the development debate started 
to be removed from "the partisan party-political conflict"66. Re-orientation 
was complemented by a substantial increase in the Programme's budget. 
During the first phase of the Programme, all funds were administered by a 
distinctive partnership of South African Non Governmental Organisations, in 
the second one, the funds were managed by a EC Programme Coordination 
Office established in Pretoria in 1991. 
From 1986 to 1993, a total amount of336 MECU (1,7 billion South 
African Rand) has been committed to South Africa, through the Special 
Programme. Of these fundings, 90 MECU (341 million Rand) were allocated 
in 1993, whereas the budget for 1994 amounts to 110 MECU. 
65 Ibidem. Introduction. 
66 The Community Special Programme in Favour of the Victims of Apartheid, op. cit. The 
new focus led to a transformation from a series of broadly related projects towards a 
sector-based development programme. 
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Table 21 - Sectors of the EC's assistance in the Special Programme 
and budget distribution, 1986-1993 
Sector % MECU 
Training & Education 44.3 148 
Rural Development 22.4 16 
Health 4.8 15 
Community development 4.5 15 
Housing 4.2 14 
Good government (1) 8.7 29 
Others 11 37 
I 1 
(1) Projects included in this category are those for the protection of human 
rights and for the voters' educational programme. 
As shown in the table, both Programmes were aimed at providing 
assistance to the most disadvantaged people through multisectorial projects 
countrywide. 
Education is considered a major priority together with training in the 
contribution to human resource development, also in view of the democratic 
government's economic constraints in this important area. 
For the health sector, the EC's programme foresees the development 
of a unified national health system based on the principles of accessibility, 
equality, affordability and efficiency. The number of rural and agricultural 
interventions has become very pronounced since the focus on development 
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has been shifted; the aim is to reduce the dependency on urban-based 
earnings and enable rural people and their communities to become 
productive. 
The community development sector is focused on urban 
development and local government, through assistance to youth, micro-
enterprises and trade unions. The housing issue is consequently the 
infrastructural aspect to be improved. 
The wording 'good government' indicates the assistance provided 
to human rights-related projects supplemented with support for the 
promotion of democratisation within the community itself and the transition 
from "resistance to development oriented structures"67. 
At the end of 1993, the Council of Ministers announced a package of 
measures to support the transition in South Africa. This support entailed: 
• assistance for the implementation of the South African first non-racial 
poll through the provision of a Voter Education Programme aimed at 
supporting the process of voters' registration and education; 
• assistance to the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) in monitoring 
the free and fair implementation of the elections through the deployment 
of 320 EU observers. 
Altogether, the EU's contribution to South Africa is the biggest of 
any single overseas aid donor in the country, with 535 projects and 
67 Ibidem. p. 66. See also Chapter III, par. 3.8. l 
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programmes implemented68. Its support to the transitional process represents 
the prelude to the EU-SA post-apartheid relations. 
4. 7 Towards EU-SA post-apartheid relations 
The re-orientation of the EU-South Afiican policy, which culminated 
in the opening of official negotiations for an extensive bilateral agreement, is 
expressed by a set of measures endorsed just before the first multiracial 
elections in South Afiica69. These were followed, in the early months of 
1995, by the formulation of a new framework for EU relations with the 
Government of National Unity (GNU), based on the following basic 
guidelines 70: 
to create a coherent global and stable framework for the EU relations 
with South Africa in a long term perspective; 
to enable South Afiica to play a role of "powerhouse" for economic 
development and regional co-operation in Southern Africa to the benefit 
of ACP countries in that region and beyond; 
to take account of the dualism in the South Afiican economy and society. 
68 Livi, G., South Africa: a democratic revolution., EC Commission DG VIII, Brussels, 
1994. 
69 EU Council of Ministers, Decision on EU South Africa's post-apartheid policy, 
18/4/1994. This package entailed. the establishment of the EPRD and the extension of 
financial and comJ'nercial supportive provisions to South Africa (GSP, ECIP, EIB 
loans) 
70 EU Council of Ministers, Outcome of proceedings by the Southern Africa Working 
Party, 4 April 1995, Confidential document 
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The above strategy guides all the EU initiatives since the elections 
and "responds to key aspects of the GNUs plans for economic growth and 
export oriented policies, sustainable economic development, social upliftment 
and business confidence"71. 
The illustration of the EU-SA temporary agreement of co-operation 
and the "European Programme for Reconstruction and Development" (EPRD) 
is preceded by the review of the factors that, at the institutional level, 
characterised the EU-South African co-operation before 1994. 
4.7.1 Re-organisation of the institutional framework 
Formal links between the EU and South Africa only date back to 
January 1994, when an official delegation to represent the Union in the 
country was established in Pretoria. 
The absence of official representation in the country corresponded to 
the lack of a Community procedure to deal with South African affairs72. The 
lack of institutional links and of a formalised procedure had direct 
repercussions on the implementation of an effective policy in the country, and 
can be regarded as one of the limits of the anti-apartheid policy. From the 
very beginning, in fact, the adoption of a South African policy by Europe 
71 EU, Address by Professor Joao De Pinheiro to Eurochambers of Commerce, 
Johannesburg, 11/5/95 
72 Holland, From Pariah to ........ , op. cit. Representation with South Africa was carried 
out either by the EC member state holding the presidency or, occasionally, through 
the 'Troika', whereas on the South African side, a mission attached to the EC has 
been in operation in Brussels since 1973. The Commission's Directorate General for 
External Relations, 00 I, and for Development Co-operation, 00 VIII, are in 
charge of supervising and managing the programmes concerning SA 
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shows, as Holland points out, "a lack of uniform and vigorous 
application"73. 
Firstly, all EC anti~apartheid measures were affected by the lack of 
co-ordination among the EC institutions, i.e. Commission, Parliament and 
Council of Ministers, and by the heterogeneity of the acts endorsed, e.g. 
regulations, decisions and statements74. As a result, the application of the 
above acts was neither compulsory nor subject to a joint monitoring. This left 
the EC with no real power vis-a-vis the large degree of discretion of the 
individual member states' action. 
Secondly, the absence of any form of EU representation in the 
country impeded the direct management of the assistance provided from 
1986 to 1991. Hence, it was practically impossible to co-ordinate the 
allocation of funds and to control their actual employment, as shown by the 
following observation: 
The four organisations, especially the SACC and the 
SABCC, were financing the organising of actions which are 
nearly exclusive (sic) political. They include legal aid, 
education programmes closely related to revolutionary aims 
and campaigns for 'civil disobedience'75 . 
73 Ibidem, p. 35. 
74 EC Treaty. The Communities' acts are, in descending order: regulations, directives, 
decisions, recommendations and opinions. Only regulations and directives are 
binding. 
75 Die Welt 19 March 1988, quoting an abstract from Crisis News, SACC bulletin. 
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Moreover, according to SACC, "revolution is not only permissible 
but obligatory for those Christians who see it as the only effective and far-
reaching way to make love for all people, a reality'176 
When in 1987, suspicious EC member states questioned the 
procedures, the South African recipient channels threatened to withdraw 
from the scheme!77. Instead, a joint management of the programme in favour 
of the victims of apartheid could have offered protection to its beneficiaries 
from possible interference by the South African government 78 . 
After the establishment of a multiracial government, the procedure 
for the EU development aid to South Africa is to be set anew. 
4. 7.2 The Interim Agreement of Co-operation 
In October 1994, following the Conference of Berlin79, the EU and 
the South African government signed an 'ad interim' agreement of co-
76 Ibidem 
77 Front File, The Kagiso Trust and the EEC, Southern Africa Brief, November 1988, 
Vol. 2, n. 15. The eventual utilisations of funds was not unknown, as strict 
confidentiality covered applicants and recipients of assistance. 
78 EC Commission, Non-paper document, Brussels, June 1991. In 1987, the Kagiso 
Trust offices in Johannesburg were raided by South African security police. All 
documents on the EC's funding programme were seized, with consequent 
imprisonment of Kagiso Trust members. 
79 In September 1994, the EU/Southern Africa Ministerial Conference, held in Berlin, 
was attended by delegations from the SADC and EU member countries, also with the 
participation of the applicants to the EU, Finland, Norway, Austria and Sweden, and 
of the ACP Secretary General and the European Investment Bank. It concerned the re-
organisation of the EU relations with SADC after South Africa's membership. 
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operation, with the aim "to cover the time gap from the elections of April to 
the definition of a more global agreement"80. 
Consisting of nine articles, the agreement deals with general 
principles on human rights, socio-economic development, implementation of 
co-operation on the basis of respective sectors of activity. Furthermore, it 
sets out a mutual commitment to set up co-operation in all areas within the 
spheres of competence of each party. 
In reference to the regional approach, the agreement establishes that 
it does not "involve dispositions in contradiction to the existing agreements 
between the Southern African States". Instead, it wants to serve as "a means 
to develop their co-operation in harmony with intraregional co-operation in 
Southern Africa and to promote the regional interests"81 . 
4.7.3 The European Programme for Reconstruction and Development, (EPRD) 
In 1995, in accordance with the Interim Agreement's dispositions on 
aid, the Special Programme has been renamed "European Programme for 
Reconstruction and Development", (EPRD), in South Africa. 
The EPRD continues to support development co-operation 
activities in South Africa, taking into account the GNU's Reconstruction and 
80 European Council of Ministers, Decision relating to the conclusion of an Accord of 
Co-operation between the European Community and the Republic of South Africa, 
19/4/1994. 
81 'Co-operation Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of South 
Africa', October 1994, Art. 6. 
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Development Programme (RDP) 82_ and in response to the overall objective 
of bridging the poverty gap in the country. 
The ERDP, as the previous Special Programme, is financed by a special 
EU budget line, that allocates 500 MECU (2.4 billion Rand83) for project 
implementation for the period 1995-1999, corresponding to a commitment of 
125 MECU per year84 . The Programme is focused on the following sectors: 
• Training and education 
• Health 
• Rural development 
• Urban development 
• Economic co-operation, trade and investment promotion, support for Small, 
Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs) 
• Promotion of good governance and democratisation 
It should be noted that for the first time since the establishment of the 
EU co-operation policy with South Africa, the EPRD provides for the direct 
allocation of aid to the South African government. Because of the previous 
political situation, the European financial assistance was subject to 'ad hoc' 
restrictions85 set by the 'twin track' strategy. 
82 The RDP is the Government's White Paper tabled in the South African Parliament on 
15/11/94. On South Africa's underdevelopment, see Chapter V, para 5.8.1. 
83 At the current exchange rate 1 ECU = 4. 9 ZAR 
84 EU Commission, European Programme for Reconstruction and Development 
(EPRD), Budget Line 87-5070 
85 Par. 4.4.2. l, on the Special Programme's 'negative guidelines'. Assistance could be 
channelled exclusively to non governmental actors 
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4.8 EU-SA negotiations towards future co-operation 
The EU proposal to negotiate a bilateral agreement with South 
Africa is a follow-up from the conclusion of the Interim Agreement in 
October 1994. On the basis of the above agreement the Commission 
presented a proposal to the Council of Ministers in March 1995 for 
negotiating a new framework of relations with South Africa .. 
In June 1995, the Council provided the Commission with a mandate 
to conduct direct negotiations with the Republic of South Africa, concerning 
the latter's request for the closest arrangement next to full inclusion in the 
Lome Convention86. 
4.8.1 The EU 'twin track' approach 
The 'twin track' approach, which reflects a continuity in the EUs 
South African policy, originated in the EU recognition of the dualistic 
nature of South Africa, characterised by the coexistence of Western World 
standards and Third World's features. 
Despite the fact that South Africa is the largest EU aid recipient, with 
a total of 625 MECU, the EU does not consider it eligible for the status of 
ACP membership. In fact, since South Africa is not classified as a 
86 The procedure to formalise the results of the negotiations into a formal agreement is 
very long. as after a first phase of the negotiations the draft of the agreement needs to 
be approved by the Council of Ministers. After that it goes back for the discussion of 
possible amendments. For the eventual ratification. the Commission must be 
authorised by the Council The latter is infonrted about the progress of the 
negotiations through periodic reports by the 'Committee 113'. 
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developing country, full inclusion in the Lome Convention has been 
excluded87. 
This aspect is extensively dealt with in Chapter Five, nevertheless it 
should be considered that the EU South African budget which amounts to a 
total of 625 MECU, is far in excess of the allocation that could be made 
within the European Development Fund (EDF). It is also interesting to note 
that, during the period 1990-95, Nigeria, the first largest EDF beneficiary, 
received a total of 355 MECU, followed by Ethiopia and Eritrea with 225 
MECU. 
4.8.2 The bilateral agreement 
Given this background, the Commission mandate proposes that the 
agreement be articulated on a Protocol and a Trade Agreement. 
The Protocol to the Lome Convention regulating the terms and 
conditions of South Africa's partial accession to the Convention88. The 
Protocol does not cover the areas listed hereafter, for which different 
arrangements have been proposed, such as: 
• financial co-operation: South Africa 1s not eligible for fund 
disbursements for development co-operation interventions under the 
87 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, South Africa and the Lome Convention, February 1995. 
Chapter Five is going to deal extensively with the question of the form of South 
Africa's association to Lome, as this aspect concerns both to the very nature of South 
Africa and related matters of regional integration. 
88 The ACP and the EU agreed t o include a "hook clause" that providesin the Lome IV 
bis agreement - which reflects the results of the mid-term review of Lome -, in order 
to allow South Africa's accession to Lome without individual ratification by the 
existing members of the Convention 
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European Development Fund (EDF). This fund consists of those financial 
resources which Lome allocates to National Indicative Programmes as 
well as to regional programmes, whereas EU's budget-line for co-
operation with South Africa is a separate fund, altogether89. South 
Africa's participation in the implementation of regional programmes 
cannot be funded by the EDF but rather within the EPRD budget, 
however the right to tender for EDF financed contracts is also extended 
to South African companies. 
• commercial co-operation: regarding access to the EU market, South 
African products can be included in the cumulative provisions of the 
rules of origin, according to specific percentages yet to be established. 
• structural adjustment interventions: South Africa will not be eligible 
for structural adjustment support, but will be granted direct access to the 
European Investment Bank (EIB). 
• Sysmin and Stabex funding. South Africa will be excluded from Sysmin 
and Stabex assistance. These two instruments are intended to protect 
ACP mining and agricultural products in situations where foreign 
exchange losses in ACP exports can occur. 
The Trade Agreement will provide regulations for the sectors and products 
excluded from the Protocol. It will be a selective agreement, negotiated 
sector-by-sector and product-by-product, aimed at the establishment of a 
Free Trade Area (FTA} realised through asymmetrical concessions. The 
latter will guarantee free access to the respective markets according to an 
89 The EU's budget-line for co-operation with South Africa is the "European 
Reconstruction and Development Programme' (ERDP) 
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asymmetric calendar. This means no tariffs will be applied on South African 
goods whereas EU goods will enter in South Africa duty free only after 
10/15/20 years. 
In consideration of its implications for third parties, i.e. the ACP 
states, SADC and SACU countries, the conclusion of a Lome-type 
agreement can be regarded as the most suitable option to ensure 
compatibility with existing treaties90 . Indeed, the harmonisation of EU-
South African relations with the wider EU-SADC co-operation, through the 
mechanics of the Lome Convention, represents a prerequisite to achieve a 
balanced development in Southern and sub-Saharan Africa. 
4.9 Conclusion 
The review of past relations between the European Union and South 
Africa has focused on the solutions adopted to oppose the policy of 
apartheid. The evolution of the EU-SA relations has been explained 
according to certain historical periods and a number of problems have been 
exposed in the attempt to evaluate to what extent the chosen European 
mechanism was instrumental and significant to the anti-apartheid strategy. 
Because of the necessity to protect its variety of interests, "the EU 
developed abnormal relations with South Africa, based on unique policy 
instruments"91 . The latter have been discussed and the relative effects have 
90 See Chapter V for the interrelation between EU-SA agreement and the region. 
91 Holland, M., The EC and South Africa, op. cit., p. 31. 
been evaluated, in order to show the duality of the Community's objectives 
and the incongruency of the anti-apartheid measures endorsed. 
Focusing on the dichotomy of the EC-South African policy, the 
review concurs with Holland's remark that "while political co-operation has 
never precluded bilateral action, there is a hypothetical threshold over which 
both credibility and efficacy of the common strategy are negatively 
correlated "92. 
In order to assess how the EC responded to the multifaceted challenge 
posed by South Africa, the major flows in its South African policy have been 
outlined. Besides the institutional deficiencies - lack of representation in 
South Africa, fragmentation of competencies within the Community itself, 
inappropriate mechanisms for policy implementation and monitoring - the 
approach followed had a diluted impact because of its very dual nature. 
Borrowing an example from mathematics, where the result of the difference 
between positive and negative is equal to nought, it can be argued that the 
highly political content of the 'twin track' strategy eventually neutralised the 
effects of its aid component. Eventually, sanctions hurt the very people that 
they were meant to liberate and increased the economic gap between South 
Africa and the international community. 
The resulting contradiction is that the economically isolated South 
Africa became the EUs largest aid recipient. The need to oppose apartheid 
first and then the need to correct its consequences gave rise to a 'sui generis' 
form of EU development co-operation. 
92 Ibidem. p.160. 
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The European Community's Special Programme on South Africa 
was in fact an 'ad hoc' instrument to deal with a state that was a 'pariah' in the 
framework of the EU assistance to Southern Africa. As discussed in chapter 
II, the EU support of SADC was channelled through the Lome Convention, 
"with two objectives: economic independence for the less developed 
Southern African countries; and the removal of apartheid "93 . 
Despite the establishment of a non-racial government, South Africa 
is still excluded from the Convention. The re-orientation of the EU-SA 
relations, thus, reflects the past requirement to treat South Africa as a 
'special partner'. 
In pointing out that "South Africa is a special case that deserves the 
best possible arrangement we can offer for future relations"94, the EU 
Commissioner responsible for External Relations with ACP and South 
Africa, emphasises continuity in the EU-South African policy, based on 
South Africa's unique position in the political, economic and development 
domain. Nevertheless, with the need for continuity, a contradiction rises 
again, concerning the complementarity between the EU commitment to 
increase development aid to South Africa without classifying it as a 
developing country. Considering the fact that the reformulation of the 
EU-SA relations has direct implications for Southern Africa as a whole, the 
bilateral agreement will have to be negotiated in the light of a new co-
operation not only between the EU and South Africa, but also for the whole 
region. 
93 Ibidem, p. 20 
94 EU, Address by Professor Joao De Pinheiro to Eurochambers of Commerce, 
Johannesburg, 11/5/95 
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Chapter Five will therefore concentrate on those factors which need 
to be taken into account when establishing the most suitable framework for 
regional co-operation. 
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CHAPTERV 
INTEGRATION AND CO-OPERATION IN SOUTHERN 
AFRICA: IBE FRAMEWORK OF A NEW APPROACH FOR 
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
5.1 Introduction 
The threads of the hypothesis drawn throughout the study are pulled 
together in this chapter. As such, the chapter will present the relevant factors 
to be taken into account in re-organising a post-apartheid EU's development 
strategy for Southern Africa. This review is a necessary background for 
presenting the trilateral co-operation model in the next chapter. Since this 
approach envisages a regional strategy, it requires an introduction based on an 
analysis of both theoretical and practical forms of economic co-operation 
and integration at a regional and international level. Following upon the 
previous chapters, this chapter sets the conceptual framework for considering 
the Lome Convention and South Africa's Reconstruction and Development 
Programme as setting a suitable basis for a new development strategy for 
Southern Africa. 
No theory should be transplanted from one region to another without 
adaptation. This premise is applicable in the Southern African context. The 
chapter points out that both the governments and the EU member states are 
faced by the challenge of adopting a pragmatic solution that boosts the 
benefits of the region's economic ties with South Africa and, at the same 
time, reduces the risks for the less developed countries of living next door to a 
far larger neighbour. 
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The chapter examines international assistance and the interdependence 
existing between adjustment programmes and strategies of economic co-
operation and integration. It emphasises the need for harmonising existing 
approaches and compares the programmes of the multilateral financial 
institutions to those of Lome. It concludes that the EU-ACP Convention 
results in closer alignment with Africa's views on development. Through its 
forms of regional co-operation, the Convention seems in fact to respond to 
Bade Onimode's call to the international community to 
allow the African countries to design their own recovery-
with-transformation programmes rather then imposing IMF-
World Bank orthodox structural adjustment programmes on 
them1. 
After discussing the importance of policy harmonisation at the 
general level, the closing part of the chapter focuses on other factors to be 
taken into account in Southern Africa. It assesses the need for balanced 
development in the region and considers South Africa's role in promoting 
regional growth. In this respect, various aspects are highlighted to show the 
importance of co-ordinating the EUs development policy on South and 
Southern Africa by providing assistance to the former's Reconstruction and 
Development Programme. Given the contribution that both Brussels and 
Pretoria can make to the region, the implications of the EU-SA agreement 
for Southern Africa are briefly analysed and a recommendation made that 
these negotiations are taken into account, as central to the issue of 
development in Southern Africa. 
1 Onimode, B., A future for Africa, Earthscan Publications, London, 1992, p. 152. Bade 
Onimode is Professor of Economics at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, and a member 
of the Economic Commission for Africa 
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5 .2 The concepts of regional integration and co-operation 
Any discussion of regional integration and co-operation in Southern 
Africa needs to be preceded by an illustration of the conceptual models at 
the base of existing regional schemes. 
A study of the literature on regional economic integration shows a 
whole spectrum of definitions, which have given rise to some overlapping 
between different theoretical models. Some writers have noted that the 
reason for this overlap is the fact that to date, no acceptable theory of 
integration has yet been developed2. Despite the variety of contexts within 
which the term is found, it is generally agreed that integration is a 
multidimensional phenomenon3. 
Robson points out that 'integration' can be used to denote "a state 
of affairs or a process involving the combination of separate economies into 
larger economic regions"4. Robson's definition encapsulates the essence of 
the most popular works dealing with integration, such as those by Bela 
Balassa and Tibergen, for example. The former defined economic 
integration as a process that entails different stages to gradually remove 
discrimination between economic units5. To paraphrase Tibergen, 
integration is aimed at the creation of an equitable and functioning joint 
market that eliminates the various forms of discrimination between national 
economies6. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Dougherty, J.E. & Pfaltzgraf( RL., Contending theories of international relations: a 
comprehensive survey, New York, Harper & Row, 1981, pp. 454-460. 
Ibidem, p. 447. 
Robson. P., The Economics of International Integration. Allan & Unwin. London. 
1980. 
Balassa, B., The Theory of Economic Integration, , Richard D. Irwin. Homewood, 
1961. 
Tibergen. J., International Economic Integration, Elsevier Publishing 
Company,Amsterdam, 1965, pp 75 et ss. On positive and negative aspects and aims of 
integration. 
167 
Some authors have argued that an additional aspect to be taken into 
account is the indiscriminatory use of the concept regional integration with 
that of co-operation. Robert Davies warns that 
at the outset it is necessary to distinguish the concept 
economic integration from the other two concepts with which 
it is often used interchangeably: co-operation and co-
ordination 1. 
'Co-ordination' refers to cases where policies, strategies or 
regulations are harmonised to bring them into line with other partners, not 
necessarily belonging to the same geographical area8. Thus, co-ordination 
can apply to both integration and co-operation. The latter, as defined by 
Davies, is 
a much more open ended concept referring to a range of 
situations in which individual countries act together for 
mutual benefit. It includes situations in which countries share 
or make available to each other resources, technology or 
expertise, collaborate in joint projects or act together in 
external economic relations9. 
In line with Davies, Jacqueline Matthews considers economic co-
operation as the context within which joint initiatives are implemented10. 
Balassa argues that the distinction between integration and co-operation 
shows that co-operation includes all those measures designed to harmonise 
economic policies and to lessen discrimination, whereas integration 
7 Davies, R, Approaches to regional integration in the Southern African context, in 
Africa Insight, Vol. 24, N. l, 1994, pp. 11-12. 
8 Ibidem 
9 Davies, op. cit , p. 12. 
10 Matthews, J., (ed.) South Africa in the World Economy, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
Johannesburg. 1983. 
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comprises only those measures related to the suppression of various forms 
of discrimination 11. 
5.2.1 Theories of regional economic integration 
An extensive literature on economic integration exists12, but only the 
main aspects of the relevant theory will be outlined in an attempt to relate 
past and present efforts at economic integration and co-operation in 
Southern Africa. The analysis therefore concentrates on the three main 
models: market integration, development integration and functional/ neo-
functional integration13. These three models of regional economic 
integration have been selected in line with Tom Ostegaard's observation that, 
considering the variety of approaches to international integration14, "a 
division into three categories facilitates theoretical discussion" 15. 
In his analysis of approaches to regional integration in the Southern 
African context, Davies describes market integration and development 
integration as the paradigms "underlying the various proposals for 
integration programmes in the region"16. On the other hand, he remarks 
that an alternative integration strategy "lies in the overall direction of the 
11 Balassa, B., op. cit. 
l2 See bibliography in Stewart, J.,B., Options for Regional Integration or Cooperation 
in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa, University of Stellenbosch, South Africa, 1994. 
13 The functionalist and neo-functionalist theory can be distinguished into two different 
schools of thought. Nonetheless, since the present analysis is aimed at presenting the 
most relevant models for regional integration in Southern Africa, the theory is 
looked at as a unit. 
14 Dougherty, J.E. & Pfaltzgraff, Contending theories of international relations: a 
comprehensive survey op. cit., pp.431 et ss. The main approaches to integration are 
functionalism, federalism, pluralism and neo-functionalism. 
15 Ostergaard., T., Classical models of regional integration - what relevance for 
Southern Africa?, in op. cit, . 29. 
16 Davies, op. cit., p.13. 
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basic concerns and thrust of the neo-functional and development integration 
approaches" 17. 
The following pages give a brief overview of the characteristics of 
the above models of regional integration. 
5 .2.1.1 The market integration approach 
The market integration approach "views integration as a process in 
which tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade between co-operating partners 
are progressively removed and in which the external trade regimes are 
harmonised"18. This approach reflects the classical theory on integration, 
that developed from the 'customs union' theoryl9. Integration is understood 
as involving the creation of different arrangements according to a linear 
succession. 
A free trade area is the first step, during which countries remove 
trade barriers between themselves and retain their own tariffs towards trade 
with the rest of the world. A preferential trade area goes a stage further: 
member countries charge each other lower tariffs than those applicable to 
non-members, but custom duties are still levied on imports from other 
members. A custom union implies the removal of all trade barriers and 
adoption of a common set of external barriers. A common market lies one 
rung higher in the ladder, as goods and all factors of production move freely 
within the market and an harmonisation of national policies is also 
17 Ibidem, p.14. 
18 Ibidem. 
19 Ostegaard, op. cit., p. 29. 
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envisaged. Finally, a full union is one in which political institutions of 
member countries are unified or federated20. 
This approach has been subject to criticism, the bulk of which can be 
summarised by Ostegaard's view that assumptions of the market integration 
model "do not apply in the advanced market economies, on the basis of 
which the theory was developed, and they apply even less in the 
underdeveloped economies of Africa1121. 
5.2.1.2 The development integration approach 
The development integration approach was developed in response to 
the shortcomings of traditional customs union theory. It is informed by the 
view that a different and more appropriate approach is required from market 
integration in Third World regions, where underdeveloped production 
structures and infrastructural deficiencies constitute major impediments to 
regional trade. This approach proposes functional integration or integration 
through project co-operation, aimed at promoting co-operation and 
interdependence among the regional partners22. In support of this approach, 
SADC 1992 theme document concluded that "the Development Integration 
approach, providing for investment, production and market or trade 
integration, is appropriate for SADC, and that it should be accorded priority 
20 These forms of integration are described according to the above features in various 
authors. See Davies, op. cit; Matthews, op. cit.; Leistner, South Africa's options for 
future relations with Southem Africa and the European Community, op. cit. 
21 Ibidem, p. 31. See also Maasdorp, G., The Southern African Custom Union, in South 
Africa in Southern Africa. Esterhuyzen, P., Leistner, E., (eds.), Africa Institute of 
South Africa, Pretoria, 1988, pp. 69-70. On the analysis of the trade diversion and 
trade creation effects inherent to this approach and for which it has suscitated main 
criticisms. 
22 Davies, op. cit., p.13. 
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in the overall integrative framework"23. While the development integration 
approach embraces a functionalist component, it essentially requires some 
form of harmonisation of development strategies at a regional level24. 
However, Blumenfeld has observed that Southern Africa is neither 
politically nor technically sufficiently mature to permit the level of 
harmonisation necessary for enhancing regional strategies25 . The reader is 
referred to Chapter Three for further elaboration of this point26. 
Considering the practical problems of implementation bedevilling 
this model, some authors have appealed to the validity of the functional/ 
neo-functional approach27. 
5 .2.1.3 Functional and neo-functional integration 
The functionalist school offers some interesting solutions to 
overcome problems of strong nationalism and the high valuation of national 
sovereignty which characterises the African state28. For the purpose of the 
present analysis it is sufficient to point out the relevant features of both 
functional and neo-functional approaches. The characteristics of each school 
of thought will not be explored. These have been adequately dealt with by 
numerous writers to whom the reader is referred29. Both the functionalists 
23 SADC, Towards Economic Integration: ... , op. cit 
24 Davies, op. cit., p.13. 
25 Blumenfeld, J., Economic Interdependence in Southern Africa, Oxford University 
Press, Cape Town,, 1991, pp. 197 et ss. 
26 Chapter III, para 3. 7. 
27 Ostegaard, op. cit., p. 39. 
28 Chapter III, para 3.8 et ss. 
29 Dougherty, J.E. & Pfaltzgraff, RL., Contending theories of international relations: a 
comprehensive survey op. cit.; Mitrany, D., A Working Peace System, Quardrangle 
Books, Chicago, 1966; Nye, J.S., Comparing common markets: A revised neo-
functionalist model, in Lindberg et al. (eds.), Regional Integration: Theory and 
Research, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1971. 
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and the neo-functionalists hold the view that international co-operation 
should be initiated in technical or basic functional areas, in order to 
overcome problems deriving from elements of ideology30. As Haarlov has 
pointed out, this model "has an advantage over the market integration and 
development integration models because its sector-by-sector approach 
minimises the problem of costs and benefits distribution among member 
states"31 . Two additional positive features of this approach are that it 
circumvents the problems of supranational institutions and envisages the 
involvement of international organisations to administer common tasks with 
member states32. 
This third model of integration offers some valid elements for the 
approach proposed in this study. Both functionalism and neo-functionalism 
conceive the inclusion of international actors in the regional process of 
integration and, as the next chapter shows, trilateral co-operation which 
associates regional players with the European Union. Second, the sector-by-
sector approach resembles SADC's sectoral co-operation strategy as well as 
South Africa's regional policy33. Finally, the functionalist and neo-
functionalist schools offer in essence a flexible approach to integration. This 
is more suited to Southern Africa's heterogeneity, discussed in the third 
chapter, which requires an option that is better suited to the 'multi-speed' 
and 'variable geometry' strategy recommended by both the ADB and 
SADC34. 
30 Ostegaard, op. cit., p. 40. 
31 Haarlov as quoted in Ostegaard, op. cit., pp. 40-41. 
32 Stewart, op. cit., pp. 52 et ss. 
33 See paragraph on 'South Africa's approach to development', 5.8.2. 34 African Development Bank, Integration in Southem Africa, Vol. 1, 1993, pp. 306-7; 
SADC 1995 Theme Document, op. cit., p.2. Variable geometry is a jargon for a 
formal multilateral arrangement that treats different partners according to their 
specific circumstances. 
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5.3 A new framework for integration in Southern Africa 
The dismal experience with integration in Southern Africa and the 
changes which have occurred in the region have made it necessary to find a 
new and pragmatic framework for regional integration. A review of 
existing literature on the most desirable economic strategy for development 
in Southern Africa shows the existence of a theoretical dilemma on whether 
such strategy should be focused on integration or on co-operation. Leistner 
remarked, ''co-operation formalises relations between countries without 
impairing the participants' national decision making"35, whereas integration 
implies some forms oflimitation to national sovereignty. 
However, the formidable political and economic problems facing 
Southern African countries suggest that a great deal of pragmatism is 
imperative. In this respect, it is argued that the issue is not concerned with 
the choice of one theoretical paradigm as opposed to the other. Rather, a 
combination of both strategies is called for. 
A realistic regional policy for Southern Africa does not 
demand a choice in principle. It will have to encompass both 
(integration and co-operation), with due regard to their 
proper roles and demands36. 
Echoing the above view, Davies recommended that no theory should 
be transplanted in the regional context without adaptation: 
35 Leistner, G.M.E., South Africa's options for future relations with Southern Africa and 
the European Community, op. cit 
36 Ibidem. 
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The evident failure of several previous projects based on the 
market integration, the neo-functional or development 
integration approaches has given rise to a perception that 
some development and modification of these approaches is 
essential to take account of weaknesses demonstrated in past 
practice37. 
Several authors have proposed that integration is a more complex 
process than co-operation. Thus Oden remarks, "experience demonstrates 
that regional integration is inherently complicated. For a number of reasons, 
it is particularly difficult in Southern Africa"38. 
In light of the political and economic constraints characterising past 
attempts at co-operation and integration in Southern Africa and given the 
changed circumstances in the region, the challenge lies in adopting a 
workable solution to regional development that reduces the risks for the less 
developed countries of living next door to a far larger neighbour and, at the 
same time, boosts the benefits of the region's economic ties with South 
Africa. Hence, co-operation combined with integration seems to be more 
suitable for Southern Africa. In Langhammers' view 
while integration aims at removing internal barriers to trade in 
goods, services and factors movements, economic co-
operation includes concerted action to lessen discrimination in 
certain areas of common interest and to economise on scarce 
supra-nationally mobile resources39. 
37 Davies, R., Approaches to regional integration in ...... , op. cit., p. 15. 
38 Oden, B., (ed.), Southren Africa after aparthei~ op. cit., p. 12. 
39 Langham.mer, R.J., Integration 'through the market': high costs and risks of failure, 
in The Courier, n. 142, November-December 1993, , p. 58 .. 
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These are therefore complementary strategies. As discussed in the 
third chapter, the overall dynamics of co-operation and integration in the 
region has been distorted by the political tension between South Africa and 
its neighbours. 
However, smce South Africa's economic pre-eminence over the 
region has outlived apartheid, the question to be addressed is that of how 
to ensure balanced growth and an equitable distribution of benefits between 
the countries of the region. Leistner comments that 
irrespective of South Africa's domestic policies and the 
pigmentation of its rulers, the weaker neighbouring countries 
will always resent the hegemony of the economically pre-
eminent power and, notably, any semblance of political 
pressure through economic means40. 
Given the above, Mytelka's pronouncement on the characteristics of 
a successful model for economic co-operation seems to be particularly 
appropriate for Southern Africa: 
a major factor enhancing the viability and durability of 
integrative systems within the developing world is the 
capacity of the system to maximise the potential for 
immediate gains and to minimise the conflicts arising from 
excessive sacrifices41 . 
In support of this theory, the ADB has underscored that in 
consideration of the importance of gains distribution for Southern Africa's 
40 Leistner, E., South Africa's regional role: some policy considerations, in South Africa 
in Southern Africa, op. cit., p.27. 
41 Mytelka, L.K., The salience of gains in Third-World integrative systems, World 
Politics, 1973, as quoted in Stewart, op. cit., p. 113. 
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overall welfare "a regional policy will be required that would ensure that all 
countries register net gain as a result of co-operative and progressive 
integration"42 . Moreover, the ADB has also indicated the necessity of new 
thinking in the elaboration of a new integration strategy for Southern Africa: 
An appropriate co-operation strategy for Southern Africa 
must have, as its starting point, not only the crucially 
significant political changes taking place in South Africa, but 
also the rethinking that is taking place throughout the world 
on the appropriate role of regional economic integration itself 
This rethinking does not supplant the analysis that has 
underpinned previous and current initiatives for economic 
integration in Africa and its subregions. Instead, in important 
respect, it usefully supplements it43. 
This leads the discussion to consideration of the international community's 
approach to development and the manner in which it has supported the process 
of regional economic co-operation and integration in Africa. 
5.4 International initiatives in favour of economic integration in Africa 
International initiatives in support of economic integration in Africa 
provide the background to the EU' s development approach in Southern Africa. 
The theoretical framework for foreign aid to Africa is to be found in a number 
of development agendas adopted through the years. Much of the debate on the 
direction of Africa's future has been conducted around proposals forwarded by 
42 ADB, Study on Economic Integration in Southern Africa, Vol. I, 1993, p. vi. 
43 Ibidem. 
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the OAU, the UN and the World Bank44• These discussions were infonned by 
the negotiations of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), which took 
place between 1974 and 1979, "with the aim of negotiating changes in the 
global economic system in order to make it more equitable and more supportive 
of development"45. 
The NIEO took as a premise the recognition that Africa's 
marginalisation had been increasing, despite the large scale of resources made 
available through technical assistance and economic co-operation in the 1960s 
and l 970s46 As a reaction, different strategies were elaborated expressing 
different positions on development approaches. These strategies set out the 
parameters of the debate in the evolution of the North-South dialogue on 
Africa's development47. 
In addition to these studies and declaration~ the ADB Study on 
Economic Integration in Southem Africa represents the latest theoretical 
fonnulation applicable to the field of our concern. 
Given the importance of the issues contained in these agendas, it would 
be tempting to explore and analyse the content of each approach. However, this 
is not in the purpose of this chapter and such analysis would detract from the 
44 They are the UN Declaration and Programme of Action on the establishment of a 
New International Economic Order of 1974, the OAU Lagos Plan of Action of 1980, 
the World Bank Agenda on Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa of 
1981, the UN Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and 
Development, 1986-90 of 1986, the UN-ECA African Alternative Framework to 
Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and 
Transformation and the World Bank Long Term Perspective Study on 'Sub-Saharan 
Africa - From Crises to Sustainable Growth: A Long Tenn Perspective' of 1989, the 
UN New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s of 1990, the UN 'Agenda 
21' on sustainable development (Declaration of Rio de Janeiro) of 1992, the Report of 
the South Commission of 1992 and the latest UN document on Development of Africa 
of 1995. 
45 UN General Assembly, Declaration and Programme of Action on the establishment of 
a New International Economic Order, 1974. As reported in the Report of the South, 
op. cit., p. 216. In selecting these agendas, the study refers to the works of authors 
such as Onimode, Bade, Ravenhill, Arnold and others listed in the Bibliography. 
46 See Chapter I, par. 1.8. 
47 Ibidem 
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main focus. It is sufficient to bear in mind that the positions expressed by the 
multinational institutions provide the theoretical basis of development aid. 
They are characterised by a dichotomy that originates in opposite views 
on development strategies expressed by Africa, on the one hand, and by 
multilateral financial institutions, on the other. They are explained in the light of 
two main threads coursing through the development literature during the 1980s. 
These two schools of thought are discussed by Kahn in a recent review. The 
first school attributes the causes of Africa's crisis to endogenous factors, 
whereas, the other school, expressing the 'African view', emphasises 
exogenous factors, although there was some recognition that "the roots of the 
crisis are fundamentally structural, requiring structural transformation"48 . 
In order to correct African countries' distortions, multilateral financial 
institutions conceived the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), seen by 
Africa as evidence that Western policies for adjustment displace rather than 
support, Africa's initiatives: "Though the multinational financial institutions 
maintain that they have been offering substantial assistance for recovery in 
Africa, its inadequacy is apparent. 49 
The adequacy of adjustment policies in Africa has been a widely debated 
issue since the first time they were formulated in the World Bank Berg's 
Report (Agenda on Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa)50. 
While the goals of these programmes are desirable, there is now a growing 
48 Kahn, B., South Africa's Perspective on the UN Agenda for Development for Africa in 
the 1990s, Background Document for the Department of Foreign Affairs/Development 
Bank of Southern Africa Workshop, Pretoria, June 1995, p. l. 
49 Onimode, B., The IMF, the WB and the Africa debt. The economic impact, Zed 
Books, 1991, p. 20-1 
50 Van der Hoeven, R, and Van der Kraaij, F., (eds.), Structural Adjustment and 
Beyond op. cit., passim. The Agenda on Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan 
Africa is commonly referred to as the Berg's Report. 
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concern about "the nee~ W t~ke tqe regio~l qilJl~nsion into account when 
structural adjustment programmes and policies are being formulatep"5l. 
l I ' ' ., · · ,' 
l' 
5.4.1 Interdependence between adjustment programmes and regional 
economic integration and co-operation 
As explained in the first chapter, the strategy elaborated by the World 
Bank and the IMF to pursue political economic adjustment within the African 
countries is represented by Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs)52· 
Critics argue that SAPs do not correspond to nor take into account the 
objectives elaborated in the Lagos Plan of Action53. The ADB Study on 
Economic Integration in Southern Africa for example points out 
Since the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action in 1980, 
Africa's effort to achieve fundamental socio-economic 
restructuring have met only limited success. . .. Under these 
circumstances, it is imperative that the ongoing structural 
adjustment operations should continue to be pursued with 
strong commitment; but they should concurrently be 
combined with intensified efforts towards regional co-
operation and integration54. 
51 UNCTAD, Scope and features of the subregional. regional and interregional 
omoonents of development assistance programmes of the donor communitv, op. cit., 
p. 27. 
52 Onimode, Bade, The IMF, the WB and the Africa debt. The economic impact, op. cit.. 
The accomplishment of the SAPs' goals is based on the following requirements: 
removal of import quotas, improvement of export incentives, reform of the budget or 
the tax system, improvement of the financial performance of the public enterprise, 
revision of agricultural pricing, revision of public investment priorities, revision of 
industrial incentives, increase in public enterprise efficiency, improvement of 
marketing and other support for agriculture 
53 Ibidem. 
54 The ADB Study on Economic Integration in Southern Africa., op. cit. 
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Emphasising the interdependence between economic integration and 
structural adjustment and the implications of such interdependence in Southern 
Africa, the ADB has unequivocally claimed that 
Adjustment, however rigorously pursued, is unlikely to have 
any significant positive impact on growth and development in 
the absence of more substantial progress with regional 
integration55 . 
Until relatively recently, regional integration was seen by the World 
Bank and the IMF as "at best, an irrelevance and, at worst, a diversion from 
the fundamental goal of lowering tariffs towards the world at large"56. As 
Davies notes the Structural Adjustments Programmes adopted by a 
succession of African countries at the behest of the Bank and the Fund, were 
partly premised on a view that the fundamental requirement as far as a 
country's external economic relations was concerned was to undertake 
unilateral trade reform aimed at opening up the domestic economy and 
integrate it more closely with the world economy"57. 
In its 1991 study on integration in Sub-Saharan Africa, the World 
Bank eventually conceded that regional integration was an important 
component of adjustment58. However, this change of strategy is not yet 
clear, since the UN, in a 1995 Report referring to the World Bank and the 
IMF, has expressed the view that 
The Bretton Woods institutions should reassess their policy in 
order to avoid social hardships, integrate poverty alleviation 
55 Ibidem. 
56 Davies, Approaches to regional integration., op. cit. p. 13. 
57 Ibidem. 
ss World Bank, Intra-regional trade in sub-Saharan Africa, World Bank Economic and 
Financial Division, Technical Department, Africa Region, Washington, 1991. 
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measures and encourage the elaboration of home-grown 
economic reforms. Furthermore, these programmes will bear 
fruit only if there is support from the donor community based 
on partnership. 59 
The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), on the 
other hand, indicated the Lome Convention as one of the most "systematic 
programmes" in favour of regional co-operation60. The following section will 
show how the EU approach to development reflects a different form of 
assistance to developing countries, notwithstanding some resemblance to other 
multilateral institutions. 
5. 5 EU development approach vis-a-vis the World Bank and IMF 
programmes 
A comparison of the multilateral financial institutions and the EU 
programmes reveals that the latter's approach, through the Lome Convention 
seems to be more aligned with Africa's views on development. This statement 
is true of both the EU support for regional integration as well as its 
partnership approach to aid, which is contrary to the "top-down" approach 
of the other multilateral institutions. In respect of integration and 
adjustment, the EU included a structural adjustment component in the 
Lome Convention as a means of encouraging '1he integration of markets by 
reducing distortions and opening up the economies concemed"61 . 
59 UN Economic and Social Council, Development of Africa, including the 
implementation of the UN New Agenda for Development of Africa in the 1990s, 
Conclusive Report, Geneva, 3-6 July 1995. 
60 EC Commission Directorate General for Development, Economic integration and 
structural adjustment and their interdependence, in The Courier, n. 142, Nov-Dec 
1993, pp. 67-70. 
61 Ibidem. 
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Towards the end of the 1980s, the EC started to reassess the 
adequacy of adjustment programmes in view of their impact on co-operation 
and integration efforts in developing countries. In line with the ADB, the EU 
has pointed out the importance of identifying "the right conditions for 
making both these aspects of co-operation - economic integration and 
structural adjustment - mutually reinforcing"62. Moreover, the convergence 
of these two components, through co-ordination of macroeconomic and 
sectoral policies is seen as one of the pre-conditions for achieving 
harmonisation and integration 
The main thing is to adopt a pragmatic, flexible and gradual 
approach: not to harmonise for the sake of harmonisation but 
to work towards greater harmonisation in some key areas 
with a view to achieving rational and consistent integration63 . 
In 1990, the EU had already formulated a commitment in this 
direction in the Lome IV Convention, stating that "the Community and the 
ACP States shall give special importance and high priority to regional co-
operation and integration"64_ 
The above analysis sets the framework for further examination of the 
Lome Convention, complementing and strengthening the information 
provided in chapter Two. On this basis, it is now possible to explain why the 
EU-ACP Convention can be regarded as a viable alternative for Africa in 
respect of the development initiatives of other international aid institutions. 
62 Ibidem. 
63 Ibidem. 
64 Lome IV, in The Courier, n. 120, March-April 1990, artt. 7 and 156, -p. 69. 
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5. 5 .1 The Convention of Lome: assistance to integration through 
partnership 
The Convention of Lome, which epitomises the most comprehensive 
North-South co-operation arrangement, is a form of co-operation between 
Europe and the ACP countries to establish a more equitable international 
economic system within the framework of the New International Economic 
Order (NIE0)65 . Development co-operation analysts argue that the 
strategies to pursue a NIEO have been adopted mainly upon the approval 
of the World Bank and the IMF, despite the formulation of different 
approaches by other actors66. In this context, Stevens observed that 
The Lome Convention appeared to offer an opportunity for a 
group of industrialised and developing countries to break out 
of the impasse created in the global negotiations to establish a 
regional arrangement that would incorporate a number of the 
items on the NIEO agenda67. 
The EU development approach is guided by the principle of 
partnership. Its strategy is informed by a co-operation system based on the 
conclusion of 'framework agreements' with different regions of the Third 
World68. These agreements have been described as a 'pyramid of privilege' 
where those at the top receive more favourable treatment than those at the 
base. According to Stevens, this "pyramid" is composed of four models. At 
65 Hvccm, Helge, Mini- NIEO and national vulnerabilities in Southern Africa, in op. 
cit., pp. 27 et SS. 
66 Williams, G., op. cit., pp. 5 ct ss. 
67 Stevens, C., The Lome Convention, in Kiljiunen (ed.), op. cit., p. 77. 
68 Stevens, ibidem, op. cit., p. 78. In recognition of the centrality of trade to the 
developing countries for their social and economic development, these agreements 
establish a variety of measures to facilitate the access to the European market to 
products of developing countries. 
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the base there is the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)69, followed by 
bilateral association agreements and by the Super GSP70. 
Diagram 1 - THE PYRAMID OF PRIVILEGE 
---1 Super- CSP I 
I 
... 
I 
! 
Source: Reconstituting and Democratising The Southern African Custom Union, Report of 
the Workshop held in Gaborone, Botswana, March 1994, p. 45. 
69 Sec Glossary. 
70 Stevens, op. cit., p. 92. The Super GSP is a form of improved GSP that provides 
access to developing countries' products under terms that are as favourable as those 
under Lome). 
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The ACP countries, through Lome (by inference this includes 
Southern Africa, through SADC) are at the top of this pyramid. The Lome 
agreement represents a unique form of region-to-region co-operation71 , 
expressed in particular by the National and the Regional Indicative 
Programmes. These programmes represent a departure from the IMF's and 
World Bank's SAPs. Lome has conceived the above programmes for 
allocating funds on the basis of joint planning and taking into account the 
recipients' specific needs72 . The SAPs, on the other hand, are "a static 
package of economic policy reforms" based on standard terms and 
conditions''73 . In this context, Lome National and Regional Programmes not 
only represent a model of full partnership with Africa but also reflect the 
principle that while, on the one hand, Africa's development is primarily the 
responsibility of Africans74, on the other, development problems have to be 
sorted out by Africa with the help of the donors agencies. These concepts 
are central to the achievement of self-sustainability. 
These ideas underlie South Africa's Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP), in its approach to development aid and for this reason, 
Lome and the RDP could be the starting points for harmonising development 
policies in Southern Africa. 
71 Kiljiunen, K., op. cit. Region-to region co-operation is a form of co-operation whereby 
a group of industrialised countries and a group of developing countries set up joint 
initiatives aimed at the latter's' development and tailored on the specific needs of each 
actor. 
72 Chapter II, para 2.5 et ss. 
73 Van der Hoeven, op. cit. p. 43. The observance of the WB's and IMF's terms is a 
condition for obtaining loans, that are structured on fixed loan conditionalities, 
providing the prograinmes with a widely criticised 'familiar resemplance'. 
74 On Africans' role in solving their own problems, see also Van Hecrdcn, NP, South 
Africa and Africa: the New Diplomacy, ISSUP Bullettin, 4/90, pp. 1-11. 
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5.6 The harmonisation of development policies in Southern Africa 
The limited success obtained by development programmes following 
three decades of North-South co-operation and conflicting relations, has 
brought the realisation that harmonisation of development by donors and 
recipients is imperative. 
A review of existing literature and an examination of past experience 
reveals that, in order to achieve results in implementing development 
programmes and projects, the formula adopted must be elaborated in 
accordance with basic guidelines. As a general rule, international assistance 
should be structured in a way that integrates the recipients' own development 
plans so as to ensure both viability and sustainability of regional and 
international development strategies. The EC-ACP Council of Ministers 
established that 
the achievement of development co-operation objectives 
demands a differentiated approach which has regard both to 
the effectiveness of their (developing countries) development 
efforts and to the economic, social, cultural and political 
development of the country or region to which it belongs75. 
On the whole, this divergence of positions between African and 
external actors on development strategies emphasises the need for 
convergence, as so far no comprehensive strategy has been elaborated that 
combines these two approaches. Onimode pointed out that "each time Africa 
prepares a recovery or development programme, the World Bank produces a 
counterprogramme"76. 
75 Declaration of the Council and Representatives of Governments of Member States 
meeting in the Council on aspects of development co-operation policy in the run-up to 
2000, in The Courier, n.137, January-February 1994. 
76 Onimodc, Bade, op. cit. pp. 21 
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In this context, Lome appears to be the only example of close 
partnership between the African and the industrialised countries that shows 
this type of convergence in approach. Through its support for regionalism 
and joint planning, the Convention meets one of the basic tenets of a 
workable co-operation. Its mechanism, in fact, pays adequate attention to 
the gains emanating from implementing collective strategies and this is 
important, considering that 
Even if a strategy is beneficial from the point of view of the 
donor, taken together, it may not be successful (or survive) if 
the single recipients are not convinced about the national 
gains accruing to them11. 
The third chapter pointed out that external assistance plays a 
fundamental role in Southern Africa's development efforts. Given this 
dependence on external actors, which is unlikely to diminish, a post-apartheid 
strategy conducive to economic growth should incorporate the 
harmonisation of the donors' and the Southern African states' policies. As 
SADC affirmed 
The International Cooperation Partners of SADC (ICP) are 
urged to support the Framework for Regional Relations and 
Co-operation Post-Apartheid, as an integral part of the 
process of regional integration in Southern Africa78. 
77 Blomqvist, H.C., Lindholm, C., Lundhal. M. and Schauman, S., Some Experience 
from Regional Co-operation between Third World Countries, in Oden (ed.), op. cit., 
p. 51. 
78 SADC 1994 Annual Report, op. cit., p. 37. 
188 
In post-apartheid Southern Africa, regional co-operation and 
development aid also needs to be co-ordinated. This is necessary to maximise 
the results of a regional strategy and of external support. Thus, the need for 
policy co-ordination and harmonisation becomes imperative79. 
Through policy harmonisation, external assistance can better address 
the region's political, social and economic development needs, in pursuit of 
balanced and sustainable growth in Southern Africa. Before focusing on the 
implications of such an assumption about EU co-operation with South and 
Southern Africa, it is necessary to highlight further elements which require 
consideration in re-orientating development co-operation in the region. 
5. 7 Balanced development in Southern Africa 
Chapter Three illustrated the nature and the causes of Southern 
Africa's heterogeneity. Because South Africa's GDP which is four times the 
combined GDPs of the ten other countries in Southern Africa, there are 
potential gains as well as risks for the Southern African states from closer 
economic links with South Africa8o. 
This section looks at polarisation and diffusion of economic growth 
as two possible side-effects to be taken into account in the re-orientation of 
the present approach to regional development. The extent to which regional 
development is affected by the polarising effects of the South African 
economy is a long-debated issue. The two main schools of thought on the 
topic express opposite opinions. They reflect the traditional dichotomy 
79 The Report of the Commission of the South, op. cit., p. 214-225. 
80 Sec Africa's Role Model, in The Economist, 12/8/95, p.11. 
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between the modernisation or diffusionist paradigm and the dependency 
paradigm. 
The dependency theorists warned against polarisation viewed as the 
concentration of all economic activity in South Africa, as a consequence of 
its economic predominance over its neighbours. Dependentists interpret the 
relationship between South Africa and its neighbours in the light of the 
traditional division between North and South, in which South Africa is seen 
as a middle power or semi-peripheral state81 . Following this line, Seidman 
argues that, as a sub-imperial power, South Africa seeks to tum Southern 
Africa into a kind of neo-colonial fiefdom82. 
According to the modernisation theory, South Africa's economic 
superiority can radiate growth to the surrounding region, encouraging the 
emergence of industries and the process of development in its neighbouring 
countries. As a result of a 'trickle-down' effect, the growth of the South 
African economy would spread to the other countries in the region. 
As can be seen, the debate concerns the general context of relations 
between a strong economic centre and weak surrounding states. However, in 
the light of the complexities characterising the Southern African region, both 
viewpoints can be regarded as applicable. As Davies observes 
The current pattern of economic interaction between South 
Africa and the rest of Southern Africa has always been 
profoundly influenced by the overall accumulation or growth 
path of the South African economy ... Apart from producing 
acute domestic inequalities and an extreme vulnerability, ... 
this growth path also had a major impact on the shape of the 
81 Leistner, E., South Africa's regional role: some policy considerations, in South Africa 
in Southern Africa,., op. cit., p.23. 
82 Seidman, A & Makgetla, N.S., Outposts of monopoly capitalism: Southern Africa in 
the changing global economy, Hill, Westport, Connecticut, 1'80, pp. 3-15. 
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trade relations that emerged between South Africa and the 
rest of the region83. 
Leistner, on the other hand, comments on the effects experienced by 
South Africa's neighbours as a result of their interaction with the modern 
South African economy 
For the SADCC countries outside the Southern African 
Custom Union, the polarisation effects appear to be of minor 
importance and to be overweighed by the trickling-down 
effects (sic), notably the ready availability of essential 
commodities and services at competitive prices and South 
Africa's technological know-how and research facilities as 
well as the fact that many multinational corporations operate 
in the region which would not be there but for the 
comparatively large South African market84. 
In the light of Southern Africa's heterogeneity, the challenge in 
choosing the best option for an alternative regional strategy is to find the 
most appropriate way to bridge the present asymmetries and reduce the risk 
of polarisation in the region. This can be obtained through a restructuring 
of the existing regional groupings in Southern Africa. As discussed in 
Chapter Three, SADC, SACU and CMA could be utilised in a new formula 
for regional development. Despite the fact that these arrangements are based 
on models of either sectoral co-operation or trade integration or both85, none 
of them, as they stand, represent a viable option for future successful co-
operation. Member states claim that SACU and CMA are 'inequitable' as they 
83 Davies, in Oden, op. cit.. 
84 Leistner, E., South Africa's regional role: some policy considerations, in South Africa 
in Southern Africa,, op. cit., p.26. 
85 Maasdorp, G., Southern African Development Community (SADC), Briefing 
Document, Helderfontein, June, 1995. 
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favour South Africa86. Yet, the ongoing renegotiations of SACU renewal and 
the applications for accession by non-members implicitly indicate that these 
arrangements provide benefits and that it should not be disbanded87. 
5.8 Southern Africa between multilateralism and regionalism 
Both regional and international circumstances suggest that the 
endorsement of a programme promoting a closer regional integration is 
one of the few viable options left to Southern Africa to avoid the risk of 
marginalisation88. As a result of the changes in the international 
environment during the 1980s, the agenda for regional interaction will have 
to be restructured so as to incorporate a mechanism that allows the Southern 
African states to operate as a bloc89. 
At present, two new trends characterise international relations -
namely globalism or multilateralism and regionalism90 - Davies points out 
86 SADC Annual Report 1994, op. cit., p.28 
87 Sisulu M., Nkosi M., Setai B. and Thomas R.H., (eds.), Reconstituting and 
Democratising the Southern African Custom Union, Report of the Workshop held in 
Gaborone, Botswana, March 1994. 
88 On the function, effects and benefits of regionalism, see Cable, V., Overview, in 
Trade blocs? The Future of Regional Integration, Cable & Henderson (eds.), The 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1994, pp. 10-16. 
89 For the use of the term 'bloc', see Henderson, D., Putting 'Trade Blocs' into 
Perspective, in Cable & Henderson (eds.), op. cit., pp. 180 et ss. The analysis 
assesses the significance of the concept 'trade bloc' and points out that the diversity 
of views reflects a difference in the criteria adopted. Hence, a 'bloc' is a trading 
entity, but it is also a notion that implies a higher degree of convergence and 
uniformity 
9° Cable & Henderson (eds.), Trade Blocs? The Future of Regional Integration, op. Cit. 
pp. 1-16. Globalism is the tendency arisen from the conclusion of the Uruguay Round 
of the General Agreements on Trade and Tariff (GAIT) and the subsequent 
establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). It has been paralleled by 
regionalism, with the transformation of the EC into a single market, the formation of 
new trade integration schemes in North America (the Northern American Free Trade 
Area, NAFT A), in South America (the Common Market of the Southern Cone, 
Mercosur) and South-East Asia (the ASEAN Free Trade Area). 
98 Ibidem, p.12. 
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that they have led to "significant modifications in the paradigms most likely 
to inform efforts to promote integration in Southern Africa"91. In Maasdorp's 
view, the globalisation of the world economic relations as well as the 
formation of regional trading blocs have given renewed impetus to trade 
integration in Southern Africa92. 
Despite the risk that "regionalism reduces the motivation for and 
commitment to multilateralism"93, it can still be regarded as a viable 
alternative for the Southern African countries, (excluding South Africa) not 
to be marginalised in the globalisation of world relations. Moreover, in view 
of the fact that "regionalism breaks down economic nationalism and 
increases awareness of economic interdependence"94, it endorses a regional 
co-operation formula that comprises the relatively well developed South 
African economy and the less diversified economies around it. Within this 
framework, it is advisable that Southern Africa builds upon existing 
institutions, namely SADC , SACU and CMA, assisted by the regional 
orientation present in the donor community's current development strategy. 
This approach finds approval with the UN Standing Committee on Economic 
Co-operation among Developing Countries (ECDC) which highlighted the 
importance of "incorporating a regional dimension into future development 
strategies, by reviewing development assistance programmes through a 
'regional lens"'95 . 
In this context, the demands of the European Union that South 
Africa plays a leading role in establishing closer economic ties in the region 
91 Davies, ibidem, p.13. 
92 Maasdorp, G., Southern African Development Community (SADC), Briefing 
Document, op. cit. 
93 Cable & Henderson (eds.), op. cit., p.12. In this respect it is worth referring to Cable's 
observation that "the question of whether regionalism and multilateralism are 
conflicting or complementary process is in substantial part an empirical one". 
94 Ibidem, p. 12. 
95 UNCTAD, 1994 Report, op. cit., p. 3. 
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are significant in two respects. On the one hand, these expectations reflect 
the perception that the Republic is a pivotal actor in improving present 
attempts at regionalism, on the other hand, they are based on the 
consideration that South Africa is linked to the global economy while the 
other countries of the region are peripheral to it. On reflection, this stance 
of the EU is derived from the diffusionist paradigm of development based 
on the view that "the functioning of the South African economy promotes 
rather than impedes economic development in the region"96. An important 
aspect of this has been emphasised by SADC: 
SADC does not expect that the country will play the role of 
'engine', 'locomotive' or 'powerhouse' of development of the 
whole Region. Notions of South Africa being the 'saviour' of 
the Region need to be examined in the context of the realistic 
assessment of the state and the performance of the South 
African economy97. 
However, the envisaged role of South Africa in restructuring regional 
relations on an equitable basis will be influenced by the dualistic nature of its 
economy which has implications for its relations with both the region and 
Brussels. 
96 Declaration of Berlin, EU-SADC Ministerial Conference, Closing Statement, 5-6/9/94. 
97 SADC Annual Report 1994, p. 33. 
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5.8.1 South Africa's position in regional development 
At the outset, it is to be remembered that South Africa, as discussed 
in Chapter Four, is a 'sui generis' aid recipient. Not only because of its 
dualistic nature, but also because it is the first recipient to have elaborated 
its own approach to domestic and regional development. The Republic's 
official position on development issues reflects the RDP approach, which is 
the base for its position relating to development as a whole. The RDP entails 
a commitment to integrated development within South Africa as well as to 
balanced development in the Southern African region98. 
Domestically, the need to pursue equilibrium originates in the fact 
that whilst the establishment of the Government of National Unity has 
ended apartheid at the political level, the disfunctions that the latter 
generated at the social and economic level remain. This has created a 
situation where although in per capita income terms, South Africa is 
classified as a middle income country99, the life conditions of the majority of 
its black population are such to give it many of the characteristics of a 
developing country. 
According to a 1992 publication commissioned by the Economic 
Policy study Group: 
many of the low income countries outperform South Africa in 
terms of health and other social development criteria. For 
98 This position was illustrated by Naidoo, J., Development of Africa, Statement to the 
United Nations Economic and Social Council, Geneva, 5 July 1995. 
99 World Bank, Development Report 1994, op. cit. See par. 3.5. Amongst the ACP 
countries which are above South Africa in per capita GNP terms are: Mauritius, $ 
2,700; Botswana,$ 2,790, St Lucia,$ 2,920; Trinidad and Tobago,$ 3,940; St Kitts 
and Nevis, $ 3,990; Surinam, $4,280; Gabon, $ 4,450; In addition the Seychelles, 
Antinqua and Barbuda, Barbados and the Bahamas all have a per capita income of 
above $ 5,000. 
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instance South African life expectancy is far lower than that of 
other countries in its category and worse than many much 
poorer countries.100 
It was estimated that the white per capita income in South Africa is 
about $ 6,000 and the black per capita income is $ 600101. According to the 
1994 World Bank Development Report, South Africa's per capita GNP is 
$2,670. The above figures show that South Africa's classification as a 
middle income country is by no means indicative of the general economic 
and social situation of the vast majority of black South Africans. 
In evaluating South Africa's contribution to regional programmes, 
SADC pointed out the implications of the country's massive socio-economic 
disparities: 
The political dispensation and econoffilc realities of the 
immediate post-apartheid period in South Africa may impose 
constraints, not only on policies designed to address the 
domestic socio-economic reconstruction agenda, but also on 
the country's meaningful participation in the restructuring of 
regional relations on an equitable basis after apartheid.102 
In re-organising its development policy in respect of Southern Africa, 
it is advisable that the EU take into account South Africa's approach in 
addressing its domestic and regional concerns. Further, South Africa's 
position on the role of international assistance provides a new approach to 
building an alternative strategy for co-operation. 
100 Economic Policy Study Group, as quoted in South Africa and the Lome Convention, 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (ed.), South Africa Office, march 1995, p. 1. 
101 Ibidem 
102 SADC Annual Report 1994, p. 33 
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5.8.2 South Africa's approach to development 
At the 1995 UN Conference on Development in Africa, South 
Africa confirmed its official stance on development issues as being the one 
reflected in the RDPI03 
On the whole, South Africa's present strategy for development 
consists of a step-by-step procedure, consonant with the needs, constraints 
and possibilities of its domestic situation as well as those of the region. This 
strategy can be described as an application of a functional model of co-
operation and integration both at the regional as well as the international 
level. 
As concerns South Africa's relations with the community of 
international donors, an International Development Co-operation Committee 
(IDCC) was set up in September 1994 by the Government of National 
Unity, with the aim of optimising the use of international assistance 
through the co-ordination of foreign aid104. The rationale underlying this 
policy is informed by the belief that assistance must be programmable and 
part of the national budget in order for development to be sustainable105 : 
South Africa believes that Overseas Development Assistance 
(ODA) flows are a temporary bridging measure to assist 
Africa out of its present crisis and should be used not as a 
permanent measure, but as a catalyst to self-sustaining 
103 Naidoo, J., Development of Africa, Statement to the United Nations Economic and 
Social Council, Geneva, 5 July 1995. 
104 The IDCC is composed of representatives of the State President's Office (RDP), 
Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Trade and Industry, Department of 
Public Expense, Reserve Bank, under the direction of the Department of Finance. It 
has a linking function between the South African administrative institutions and the 
International Development Assistance Community (IDAC). 
105 On the concept of sustainability see World Commission on Environment and 
Development, Our common future, Oxford University Press, passim. 
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development and foreign direct investment as envisaged in 
South Africa's RDPl06 
In expressing alignment with the more general strategy endorsed by 
the UN-ECA African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment 
Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-
SAP), Naidoo indicated that ODA should be more effectively used not only 
by the recipients but also by the donors, adding "to the diversification of 
priorities determined by African countries themselves"107. In addition, 
"taking cognisance of the close interdependence of economic and political 
processes within and between the countries of Southern Africa"108, the 
South African government has called upon international aid and trade 
partners to provide support to regional co-operation and integration in 
Southern Africa within the framework of the institutions and programmes 
existing between the countries concerned. 
At the regional level, Pretoria's wariness of international as well as 
regional expectations on its contribution to Southern Africa's growth is 
reflected in the approach followed to negotiate with its neighbours. Its 
Southern African policy unfolds through a parallel process that adopts co-
operation or integration tactics according to the specific sector for which 
joint action is to be undertaken109. In so doing, no commitment is made to 
grandiose and economically impractical designs even if politically accepted 
106 Naidoo, J., Development of Africa, quoted above. The document is a summary of 
conclusions and does not indicate the page numbers. 
107 Ibidem. 
108 Ibidem. 
109 Ibidem. The statement addresses the problem of co-operation and integration, 
explaining that so far co-operation concerns sectors like for example energy, 
transport, telecommunication, water resources, whereas integration is carried out in 
sectors like finance and trade. Policy co-ordination in infrastructure and investment is 
an additional way to implement joint actions and pursue a balanced regional 
development. 
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by the other states. This sector-by-sector approach seems to be an 
appropriate response to the regional concern about South Africa's 
hegemony. 
5.9 Towards a co-ordinated strategy of regional development 
Given the importance attributed by the Southern African states to 
reducing their present economic heterogeneity, and considering the EU and 
South Africa's commitment to regional development, the co-ordination of 
their respective roles should drive the re-orientation of the EU-Southern 
African development co-operation policy as a whole. Such co-ordination is 
important for a sound strategy aimed at reducing the differences between 
levels of development in Southern Africa. In light of Southern Africa's call 
for more equitable regional development and bearing in mind the ongoing 
EU-SA negotiations for South Africa's qualified membership of the 
Convention, Lome can be regarded as a valid framework for setting a new 
formula for co-operation between the EU and Southern Africa. However, if 
Lome is to provide a successful instrument for the economic, social and 
political development of sub-Saharan Africa, then it is essential that the 
question of South Africa's relationship to the Lome Convention be 
resolved11°. 
In this respect, the EU-SA agreement plays a crucial role in the 
adoption of an integrated approach to development co-operation in the 
region. As pointed out by the few existing studies on the regional impact of 
South Africa's association with the EU111, while South Africa's qualified 
110 South Africa and the Lome Co11Vention, op. cit., p.3 
Ill Stevens, C., Kennan, J. and Ketley, R, EC trade preferences .... , op. cit., passim; 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, op. cit. 
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membership in Lome would enhance regional development and integration, 
on the other hand , the EU' s proposal for a free trade agreement with South 
Africa contradicts the EU's recognition that "the bilateral (EU-SA) 
negotiations need to be reconciled with South Africa's commitments in the 
context of both SACU and SADC11 112. 
In this context, one of the major questions to be addressed is whether 
the current EU strategy reflects its member states' commitment to assist 
Southern Africa to achieve balanced development through integration. 
Indeed, the EU-Southern African Foreign Ministers' Declaration at Berlin in 
September 1994 acknowledged the importance of locating future SA-EU 
relations in the wider context of region-to-region co-operation 113 . Yet, the 
EU mandate to negotiate a bilateral agreement with South Africa only partly 
accommodates harmonisation concerns, as a separate trade protocol entail 
some risk of increasing the region's present economic heterogeneity114. 
In this regard, there is a perception within the EU that South Africa's 
reluctance to accept a free trade agreement is because of its desire to be 
ranked as a developing country. South Africa for its part accepts the 
importance of the role of the EU in reducing the divergence in the levels of 
development in the region and is concerned that a free trade agreement with 
the EU will result in the opposite effect. This explains the South African 
government's view that it is necessary "to consolidate the EU-SA ties in such 
a way to assist the economic and industrial development of the entire 
region" 115. 
112 De Pinheiro, J., Address to Eurochambers of Commerce, Johannesburg, 11/5/95. 
113 EU/SADC Ministerial Conference, Closing Statement, Berlin, op. cit., passim. 
114 European Research Office, provisional draft of the study on Future EU-SA relations, 
May 1995, p. 1. 
115 Trading places in the world order, in the Sunday Times, interview to Faizel Ismail, 
Department of Trade and Industry, by Sven Lunsche, 7/5/1995. 
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5.9.1 The regional dimension of new EU-South African relations 
Given the above, the regional dimension of the EU-South African 
relations appears of crucial relevance in re-orientating the whole EU post-
apartheid co-operation strategy. As discussed previously, South Africa's 
dualistic nature, with the juxtaposition of developed and underdeveloped 
features, makes it a unique partner in the context of EU relations with other 
African countries. The EU believes that an active South African role is 
indispensable if the region is to have any hope for meaningful economic 
progress. Both the EU 'twin track' approach and Programme for 
Reconstruction and Development (EPRD) show that South Africa's social, 
econonuc and political stability is central to regional stability and 
development116. At the same time, these initiatives also reflect European 
uncertainty about South Africa's future stability and economic health, given 
the fact that the country faces "huge socio-economic problems arising from 
unemployment and demands for housing, education and health care for the 
impoverished masses" 117. 
Given the above, EU policy should address two interrelated issues. 
The first one concerns the inclusion in the bilateral agreement of measures 
that would assist South Africa to play the expected pivotal role in uplifting 
the region's economy. As SADC has itself affirmed:" South Africa could not 
hope to grow and develop while the rest of the region is stagnated (sic)" 118. 
116 Chapter IV, par. 4. 7.3 
117 Esterhuysen, P., Fair, D., Leistner, E., (eds.), op. cit., p. 65. 
118 SADC Annual Report 1994, p. 33 
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Second, the EU should ensure that whatever actions are taken, they do not 
raise barriers between South Africa and its neighbours. 
The EU' s Southern African policy should reflect consistency and 
congruency between the content of the bilateral agreement with South 
Africa and the policy adopted to promote the material well-being of the 
region as a whole. These are fundamental aspects to hasten sustainable 
development and achieve a balanced growth in Southern Africa. 
5 .10 Conclusion 
Southern Africa is characterised by a high level of economic 
heterogeneity. Regional integration is desirable in order to reduce these 
disparities. Yet, integration is a complex process, as both theory and practice 
have shown. In light of the analysis carried out throughout the chapter, co-
operation, both at regional and international level, can be seen as an 
intermediate strategy to narrow the current economic gap and eventually 
facilitate a higher degree of economic integration. The form of regional co-
operation and integration needs to be carefully chosen and tailored to meet 
Southern Africa's circumstances. It has been pointed out that a workable 
option is one which moulds the most suitable features of the present 
schemes for regional relations with development strategies. 
The difficulties evident in past attempts at integrating the region's 
economies are to be taken into account not only by the regional players, but 
also by the international actors involved in assisting the region in pursuing its 
objectives. As concerns the EU, in particular, it faces the challenge of 
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elaborating a viable co-operation formula for Southern Africa, one which 
incorporates the EU, South Africa's and Southern Africa's strategies. 
The above analysis has shown that the Lome Convention, the RDP 
and existing forms of regionalism can constitute the framework for 
harmonising present approaches to development m Southern Africa. 
Moreover, the proposed EU agreement with South Africa needs to take on 
board a joint regional strategy that will benefit the whole region119. 
In this context, the development model proposed in the next chapter 
represents a viable approach, as it is the result of the convergence between 
the dynamics of regional integration and international co-operation. 
119 Incisa di Camerana, M., Statement on Regional Co-operation by the Head of 
the Italian delegation at the above mentioned Conference of Mbabane. 
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CHAPTER VI 
TRILATERAL CO-OPERATION AS A NEW STRATEGY OF 
DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 
6.1 Introduction 
The chapter begins with a description of trilateral co-operation 
envisaged to be a pragmatic attempt to go beyond the traditional 
North/South dichotomy. Such an approach is presented as a possible option 
for the EU's development strategy in Southern Africa. 'Trilateral' refers to the 
co-operation between three parties, namely the European Union, South 
Africa and the rest of the Southern African states1. 
This chapter is to be viewed as an extension of the previous one, 
which in its conclusion pointed out the importance of an EU-SA agreement 
in the overall re-orientation of a post-apartheid development policy in the 
region. Thus the trilateral strategy is presented as a new form of co-
operation reflecting the importance of South Africa's position as regards the 
EU relations with Southern Africa, in line with EU Council of Ministers' 
statement that 
the new EU South African policy is aimed at enabling South 
Africa to play a role of 'powerhouse' for economic 
In this chapter we refer to SADC as the present EU collective recipient, receiving 
funds through the Lome regional programme. The possible replacement of SADC 
with a new regional organisation would not affect the rationale of the trilateral 
scheme. 
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development and regional co-operation in Southern Africa to 
the benefit of the ACP countries in that region and beyond2. 
However, it should be noticed that while the EU articulates the idea 
of South Africa as being the region's "engine of growth" and "powerhouse", 
it does not address the issue of how such a role can be played. 
In accordance with the negotiating directives of the EU-SA 
agreement "to promote economic co-operation in the Southern African 
region to contribute to its harmonious and sustainable economic and social 
development"3, the European Union strategy must take care not to generate 
a contrast between external and endogenous approaches to development. 
This aspect is dealt with in the chapter, when the analysis dwells on how the 
trilateral articulation of the relations can harmonise the interests of each 
party involved in the co-operation. 
As shown throughout the study; despite Southern Africa's vast 
potential and the EU's long-standing commitment to regional development, a 
combination of regional and international circumstances has led to the 
present economic stagnation. Among the factors highlighted in the previous 
chapters, the incongruency which has characterised the EU's South and 
Southern African strategy has been identified as one of the impediments to 
an effective development strategy. The EU's renewed commitment to "give 
2 EU Council, Outcome of proceedings by the Southern Africa Working Party, 4/4/95 
3 Draft of the Negotiating Directives for an Agreement for Trade and Co-operation 
between the European Community and the Republic of South Africa and a Protocol to 
the Lome Convention covering the terms and conditions of the South African 
accession to the Convention, Preamble. 
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moral and practical support to SADC in its development"4 has already 
given rise to the question on what motivates this supports. An answer is 
provided at the end of the chapter, through an overview of South Africa's 
and Europe's common concern for Africa. 
6.2 A new EU approach as an alternative to the North/South 
dichotomy 
In proposing this new approach a departure point is represented by 
Europe's assumption that South Africa is to Black Africa what the North is 
to the South in the global context6. This consideration is central to building 
a strategy that finally overcomes the developed/underdeveloped dichotomy 
underlying the history of the North-South development relationship. 
Thus far, any attempt to endorse a workable model of development in 
Southern Africa has been handicapped by the limits inherent in dichotomies 
in general. As Black points out 
Most dichotomies coincide to some degree with what might 
be labelled First World and Third World perspectives. Such a 
division, however, fails to account for the fact that Third 
World elites often adopt First World perspectives, and that a 
4 Kinkel, Klaus, Opening Address on the occasion of the Conference of the Foreign 
Ministers of the European Union and the Member States of SADC, Berlin, Germany, 
5-6/9/95. 
5 On contrasting views relating these issue see Van Nieuwkerk , A, Big or Small, Open 
or Closed? A Survey of Views on Regional Integration, in Mills, op. cit., pp. 251. 
According to one school of thought, the EU new initiatives represent a breakthrough; 
whereas for the other one, the EU strategy is a public relations excercise, to reassure 
the Southern African contries that the EU is still interested in regional developments. 
6 Livi, G., Addressing SADC 1994 Annual Meeting, Gaborone, Botswana. 
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great many scholars and practitioners of development from 
the First World choose to identify with the nonelites (sic) of 
the Third World. 1 
All the hallmarks of a Third World region are present within Southern 
Africa. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the co-existence of First 
and Third World elements within the South African borders makes this 
country an outstanding semi-peripheral area, that could bridge the gap 
between the different economic levels existing between the donor countries 
and the Southern African states, without neglecting their cultural 
heterogeneity. In line with Tevoedjre's thought that 
co-operation will be easier between countries with similar 
potentials, having identical characteristics and the same types 
of problems ( ... ) It is therefore essential to encourage 
horizontal exchanges in lieu of pyramidal relations8 
the approach envisaged, in which South Africa acts as conduit between the 
developed North and the underdeveloped South, represents a way to link the 
co-operation relationship along horizontal and pyramidal lines. In so doing, 
the distance between North and South could be reduced. 
The following section turns now to the illustration of the trilateral 
co-operation approach and its effect on a balanced development in Southern 
Africa. 
7 
8 
Black, K.J., Development in Theory and Practice. Bridging the Gap, op. cit., p .23. 
Tevoedjre, A, Africa: the search for alternative forms of co-operation, in The 
Challenge of African Economic Recovery and Development, Adedeji, A, Teriba, 0. 
and Bugembe, P. (eds.), Frank Cass, p. 752. Horizontal relations are those between 
countries of the South, whereas pyramidal refers to the North-South ones. 
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6.3 Trilateral co-operation 
Trilateral co-operation is the solution envisaged for the re-orientation 
of the European assistance to Southern Africa with the aim of achieving a 
sustainable growth in the region. The trilateral model can be regarded as a 
new pragmatic strategy of development co-operation between North and 
South. It is new in the sense that it provides a departure from the traditional 
North-South relationship and introduces an innovative rationale in the 
classical First World/Third World co-operation paradigm, by proposing that 
South Africa acts as intermediary in the flow of aid from the EU to its 
Southern Africa developing partners9. 
While the above scheme brings in an intermediary, as additional 
component in the pattern of aid flow, it is in no way contradictory to the 
development strategy followed thus far. At present, development assistance 
is routed through multilateral or bilateral channels and is referred to as 
multilateral or bilateral aid10. The kind of co-operation envisaged in this 
new model entails a third category, as illustrated in the following model11 : 
9 It should be noticed that according to the eventual results of the EU-SA negotiations, 
concerning the conclusion of a bilateral agreement for trade and aid co-operation, this 
approach could be adopted also for other African ACP countries. This possibility 
would not change the trilateral nature of the scheme proposed. 
10 Hawkins, E.K., op. cit., p. 100. Multilateral and bilateral aid is a concept that refers to 
the way assistance is provided by the donors. Multilateral aid refers to the resources 
made available by individual donors and channeled via multilateral agencies to to the 
recipient country, whereas bilateral aid refers to flows that go directly from the donor 
government to the recipient one. 
11 The EU is considered as an individual donor. 
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• Categories of Aid : 
I. Bilateral aid 
II. Multilateral aid -
EU ¢ individual SADC member states 
EU ¢ SADC 
III. Trilateral aid - EU ¢:::> South Africa ¢ other SADC member states 
The above categorisation expresses the nature of the approach, which 
has been elaborated without a corresponding theory but in accordance with 
a method of 'pragmatic adequacy•12. 
At the outset, it is to be pointed out that this model represents a 
recommendation and not a prescription of the pattern to be followed, bearing 
in mind Black's observation that "the empirical problems encountered in any 
attempt to move models and theories of development from the drawing 
board to a real-world testing ground are myriad"13. In accordance with the 
theory of practice, trilateral co-operation is to be viewed rather as an attempt 
to systematise development action in order to correct the economic 
polarisation both within the region and between the region and the world 
economy. 
6.3 .1 Main features of the trilateral approach 
The trilateral approach is aimed at co-ordinating the EU and regional 
countries' development initiatives within the context of integration and co-
12 Fawcett & Do'\\ns, op. cit., p. 66. As explained in chapter I, the concept 'pragmatic 
adequacy' means that the findings of the thesis - on which the model is based - "are 
related to an area of practice for which a theory is sought" 
13 Black, K.J., Development in Theory and Practice. Bridging the Gap, op. cit., p. 31. 
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operation activities carried out in Southern Africa. At present, EU 
development co-operation in Southern Africa operates on two parallel 
levels: 
1. bilateral co-operation between EU and SADC without South Africa 
2. bilateral co-operation between EU and South Africa 
The new approach proposes to bring the above two types of co-
operation together into one single strategy, in which South Africa would act 
as a conduit for aid between Europe and Southern Africa. This means that 
the new co-operation would be centred on the trilateral articulation of the 
relations between the donor, i.e. the EU countries, the recipients, i.e. 
Southern Africa's developing countries, and a third player, i.e. South Africa 
that ranks between the status of donor and recipient. 
Because of its dual economy, South Africa will still be a EU aid 
recipient. Yet, by virtue of its developed features, the Republic could act as a 
donor as well. The introduction of such a 'sui generis' player in the 
donor/recipient relationship, which is capable of understanding both sides, 
puts South Africa in the unique position of being able to facilitate the 
achievement of long-term development goals. This approach would have a 
direct impact on the pursuit of sustainable growth in Southern Africa. 
Sustainability, in this respect, depends to a large degree on the equal 
distribution of gains as well as of responsibilities among participants in the 
co-operation scheme14. In fact, such a trilateral co-operation would not only 
yield significantly positive gains in terms of resources optimisation, but also 
14 Chapter V, para 5.7 
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generate a great deal of commitment from each party involved in the co-
operation. As Oteiza describes the relation between co-operation and 'auto-
responsibility' 15: 
Co-operation is first and foremost a reciprocal commitment 
between two peoples, aimed at pooling together their energies 
and resources to achieve their legitimate aspirations ( ... ). 
Consequently, each party should have full responsibility over 
his actions. Each should be able to mobilise without hindrance 
his people and resources in a manner best suited to his needs. 
In trilateral co-operation, each party involved should participate m 
the project according to its actual capacity and resource availability, 
calculated using a preliminary joint assessment during which single respective 
roles and competencies are established. From project elaboration to its 
conclusion, each player would make sure that their own resources would be 
utilised in the best possible manner. This mechanism would be positive in 
two respects. On the one hand, with regard to the donors, it would alleviate 
their financial burdens, diminishing what Onimode referred to as perception 
of 'aid fatigue'l6. On the other hand, as concerns intraregional relations, 
trilateral co-operation could help to diminish the concern that Southern 
African countries have of being dominated by South Africa. In this respect, 
the implementation of co-ordinated EU-SA joint interventions in Southern 
Africa could be seen as a safeguard. The envisaged approach, due to the 
15 Oteiza, E., le developpement par la cooperation technique entre le pays du tiers 
monde, in Travail et Societe, Vol. 3, n. 3-4, July/Oct. 1978, p.478, quoted in 
Tevoedjre, op. cit., p.753. 
16 Onimode, Bade, op. cit., p. 148. 
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geanng in place, could prevent aspirations of domination and possible 
obstacles raised by national interests, be it from Pretoria or any other country 
in the region17. As discussed in Chapter Five, the economic heterogeneity as 
well as the asymmetrical levels of development between the Southern African 
states could be diminished through the harmonisation of develepment policies 
in the region. Trilateral co-operation works in this regard, as regional 
development programmes would be implemented by each player in co-
operation with and according to that which was previously agreed with the 
other partners. Therefore, the risks of one state dominating the others or 
endorsing damaging policies for the rest of the region would be reduced 
too18. 
On the whole, this strategy is instrumental to the realisation of the 
political, economic and technical conditions necessary to implement a 
development co-operation that is mutually beneficial to all parties involved. 
6.4 Trilateral co-operation as a mutually beneficial strategy 
Trilateral co-operation could facilitate and expedite the process of 
regional integration and improve EU co-operation with the region as a 
whole. This approach actively contributes to development co-operation in 
17 SeeChapterlll,para3.8.l,p.101 
18 Lewis, S. R, Jr, Economic Realities and Prospects for Trade, Irrvestment and Growth 
in Southern Africa, in Africa Insight, Vol. 24, n. 4, 1994, pp. 245-49. Zimbabwe in 
the years after independence can be seen as an example of protectionistic policies 
implemented to the detriment of the other regional states, e.g. agreements with its 
neighbours were abrogated, its goods dumped on regional markets and exports from 
regional trading partners prevented 
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Southern Africa and also lays the foundation for a mutually beneficial 
development strategy, based on the optimisation of the overall utilisation of 
the resources. It is to be considered that a rational utilisation of the resources 
is a pre-requisite to guaranteeing mutual satisfaction on the donors' and 
recipients' side, as it has a direct influence on both technical and political 
aspects of the interventions. 
Technical feasibility is central to the sustainability of development 
programmes. In the trilateral approach, it would result from a new 
convergence between Southern Africa's own plans of development and the 
EU initiatives. By joining South Africa's and Europe's know-how and skills, 
the trilateral scheme offers an opportunity to correct the shortcomings 
experienced so far. As previously discussed, the EU decreased the amount 
allocated to SADC because of the under-utilisation of facilities made 
available to the region under Lome IV19. 
As Tevoedjre remarks, because of the fact that Third World 
countries are neither capable of evaluating their own potential nor skilled 
enough to propose a counter-strategy for their own development20, foreign 
models were imposed with no success in the African reality. South Africa's 
targeted participation in EU supportive mechanisms would diminish such a 
risk. This assumption is made in line with Tevoedjre's view that 
The challenge of a genuine partnership, attentive to the 
demands of the societies concerned, founded on negotiation 
19 Livi, G., Speech at a seminar on Post-apartheid Regional Cooperation: International 
Support for Transforming Southern Africa, Gaborone, 27-29 April 1992. See chapter 
II, para 2.6.1. 
20 Tevoedjre, A, op. cit., p. 754 -5. 
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and respect of reciprocal interests shall be taken up. A number 
of prerequisites must be fulfilled before a positive and loyal 
dialogue can begin: the countries of the Third World should 
be capable of sharing the knowledge required for an accurate 
evaluation of their potentia121. 
Given the above, the trilateral strategy would ensure that each party 
participates in development programmes in accordance with its potential, in 
order to minimise the possible negative repercussions of an imperfect 
relationship between industrialised and developing countries. 
On the basis of joint planning aimed at optimising the available 
resources, the trilateral approach would also give rise to a system of checks 
and balances between donors and beneficiaries. This mechanism would have 
a positive effect on both the technical and political feasibility of the 
interventions. In this respect, the following section is dedicated to the review 
of the existing programmes which could be regarded as suitable options for 
structuring the trilateral co-operation. 
6.4.1 Potential instruments for the implementation of the trilateral 
strategy 
The elements for building a new partnership between SADC 
countries, the EU and South Africa are already in existence. Nevertheless, 
what is needed is the establishment of a common platform to launch joint 
initiatives, based on the principles of mutual benefits aimed at increasing the 
21 Ibidem. 
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regional impact of the interventions. Thus, it is recommended that the EU 
co-ordinates the existing programmes in favour of both South and Southern 
Africa in order to reassure the Southern African countries that the bilateral 
co-operation with Pretoria has a regional perspective. 
EU instruments used in supporting trilateral co-operation are 
offered by Lome programmable and unprogrammable assistance22, in the 
framework of aid and supportive commercial measures. Joint interventions 
could be implemented in infrastructure, trade and financial sectors, the use of 
loans provided by the European Investment Bank (EIB), grants by the 
European Development Fund (EDF), and facilities in favour of market 
access, such as the cumulative provisions under the rules of origin23 . 
As concerns the utilisation of EIB loans, South Africa gained access 
to this lending facility in 199424. It should be pointed out that these funds are 
being under-utilised as financial institutions are using them to pay off existing 
debts and not for development tasks25 . It should be noted that the possibility 
of South Africa emerging as an engine of growth within the region depends 
also on its access to and use of international financial instruments26 . As 
discussed in chapter Four, South Africa is not eligible for fund disbursements 
for development co-operation interventions under the EDF, which means 
that at present the country's participation in the implementation of regional 
22 Chapter II, para 2.5 et ss. 
23 Lome IV, Art, 168, relating the cumulation provisions in the rules of origin.; see 
Chapter II, para 2.5.3.l 
24 Chapter IV, para 4.7 
25 Attie van Zyl, Head Financial Analysis Centre, DBSA It is to be remembered that the 
convenience of such operations lies in the fact that these loans offer a rate which is 
slightly cheaper than the commercial one. 
26 Lewis, S. R, Jr, Economic Realities and Prospects for Trade, Investment and Growth 
in Southern Africa, op. cit., pp. 245-49 
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programmes is only possible if funds from within its own EPRD budget are 
utilised27. 
The cumulative provisions under the rules of origin are to be 
regarded as central to the issue of South Africa's contribution to revitalising 
the economy "of the ACP countries in that region and beyond"28. In the light 
of the key-role that these dispositions play in assuring duty-free access for 
ACP exports to the European market, their extension to South Africa i~ 
crucial to enhance the region's structural change. Indeed, South Africa's 
inclusion in the rules of origin would not only increase value added content 
to SADC-ACP production, but also ensure that the Republic plays a 
constructive role in Southern Africa's economic growth. 
Further facilities identified for the endorsement of joint initiatives 
concern the industrial, small and medium enterprises sectors. They are a EU 
financial instrument to promote the formation of EU-SA joint ventures, 
European Community Investment Partners (ECIP)29 and the services 
available through the EU-ACP Industrial Co-operation Board and a Centre 
for Industrial Development30. However, their utilisation is limited as ECIP 
excludes the ACP whereas the latter two exclude South Africa. In view of a 
new trilateral partnership, the above measures ought to be extended to all 
parties. It is recommended that such an extension is operated also taking into 
21 Chapter IV, par. 4.8.2 
28 EU Council, Outcome of proceeding by the Southern Africa Working Party, 4/4/95 
29 EC Commission, European Community Investment Partners - ECIP. A user's guide, 
DG I-K-3. This instrument, made available to South Africa in 1995, offers financial 
support to the creation of joint ventures in the developing countries of Asia, Latin 
America and Mediterranean. South Africa is the first sub-Saharan country to benefit 
from it. 
30 Chapter II, par. 2.5.3. l 
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account South Africa's Regional Industrial Location Strategy of recent 
elaboration31. 
As can be seen, interventions could be carried out in different areas, 
such as human resource development, trade integration, supply creation and 
capacity expansion through improved levels of production, technology, etc. 
IBtimately, such a joint platform would represent a precious 
contribution to pursue balanced relations between trade and aid. 
6.5 The harmonisation of trade and aid 
The impact of the EU Southern African strategy on the 
harmonisation of trade and aid is particularly important in two main 
respects. On the one hand, because of the extensively discussed concern 
about South Africa's domination over the region. On the other, trade and aid 
are two pivotal measures of reducing the disparity between North and 
South. In the wake of an overall reduction of foreign aid to Third World 
countries32 and of an increasing marginalisation of weak economic systems, it 
is imperative that development co-operation is implemented in such a way 
that it ensures a balance between aid and trade. As Naidoo points out 
3l Thomas, R.H., Centre for Policy & Information, Development Bank of Southern 
Africa. The Regional Industrial Location Strategy is a South African study which has 
been recently launched to identify industries with comparative and competitive 
advantage to enhance export trade in the Southern African countries. 
32 World Bank. Report on Development 1994, A decline of 0,8 per cent a year in real 
income per head is a worrying figure, considering a net real transfer to Sub-Saharan 
Africa averaging more than $10 billion a year between 1980 and 1992 
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The trends in trade strategies of some of the developed 
countries and the growing recourse to the creation of 
powerful trade blocs contradicts their insistence on free trade 
policies in the poorest countries and exacerbates trade 
imbalances and global inequalities33. 
It has been argued that "what poor countries need more than 
anything, more than outside advice, more than aid, more than foreign 
investment, is trade"34. However, the numerous risks entailed in market-
driven initiatives in developing countries can be reduced only through the 
adoption of a sound development co-operation strategy. The latter can work 
as a security valve which balances the pressure generated by the need for 
fast economic growth. 
Moreover, sustainable development by its very nature should 
eventually reduce the amount of foreign aid and ultimately 'only' act as a 
catalyst for the flow of resources for economic growth. In this regard, the 
position endorsed by South Africa on self-sustainability and development is 
indicative of the wider stance of the South, when stating that "The 
international community is compelled to support a strategy that places our 
destiny squarely in our hands"35. 
Under the present circumstances, the EU co-operation strategy in 
Southern Africa is potentially geared to meet the challenge of achieving a 
more balanced development not only in the region, but also between the 
33 Naidoo, J., Development of Africa, op. cit. 
34 Africa's role model, in The Economist, op. cit., p. 11. 
35 Naidoo, J., Development of Africa, op. cit. 
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industrialised European countries and their African partners as a group. This 
view is supported by the OECD acknowledgement that 
The challenges in Southern Africa present all development 
partners with a need and an opportunity to address the issue 
of aid effectiveness, resource flows, policy dialogue and aid 
co-ordination36. 
In this context, it is advisable that the EU South African policy 
reflects an effective convergence with its development strategy for the 
whole region, in order to facilitate South Africa's role of 'powerhouse'. The 
result would be an unprecedented co-operation model that, through the 
co-ordination of donors' and recipients' policies, ultimately harmonises the 
respective efforts in the pursuit of a balanced and sustainable development. 
6.6 Africa: a common concern for Europe and South Africa 
The improvement of the living conditions in the African continent is 
a priority for the African governments, but it is also a major concern for 
Europe. In Livi's words 
Europe cannot get disinvolved from Africa's destiny. For the 
European Community, its relationship with Third World 
countries are of primary importance. Historical, geographical, 
36 OECD - DAC, Development Challenges and the Role of Aid in Southern Africa, op. 
cit., Conclusions, p. 7. 
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economic and strategic reasons make Africa a great pre-
occupation for Europe37. 
South Africa, as part of the continent, is also very concerned about 
Africa's future. As Nelson Mandela declared, 
South Africa cannot escape its African destiny. If we do not 
devote our energies to this continent, we too could fall victim 
to the forces that have brought ruins to its various parts38. 
Given the above, the existence of a common interest between 
Brussels and Pretoria can hardly be disputed. The difference is that Africa's 
development is one of the numerous objectives of the EU foreign policy, 
while for South Africa, as Thabo Mbeki remarked, "its foreign policy begins 
with Southern Africa"39. The similarity lies in the fact that both can play an 
active role in re-orientating the regional development strategy. 
South Africa and the EU also have something else in common, m 
respect of the criticism by a number of African as well as Western authors 
who underlined the existence of both a South African and European 
responsibility to Africa40 . According to these views, imputations of 
37 Livi, G., translated quote from Conference on Development Co-operation in Southern 
Africa, held in Milan, January 1992. 
38 Mandela, N., 1993. Quoted in Mills, G., The History of regional Integrative Attempts: 
The Way Forward?, in Mills, G., Begg, A, van Nieuwkerk, A, (eds), South Africa 
in the global economy, Johannesburg, SAIIA, 1995, p. 214. 
39 Mbeki, T., Reshaping Southern Africa, in News, SAHA, Vol. 2, N. 1, April 1994, p.8 
40 See for example Onimode, B., p. 149; Mills, G., op. cit., pp. 214 et ss. These 
convergence of EU-SA responsibilities in Africa is referred, on the one hand, to the 
emphasis on apartheid as the source of all woes in Southern Africa and, on the other, 
to Western responsibility for exploitation of the continent's resources in the past. 
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colonialism and econotnlc predominance could apply with almost no 
distinction to both players. 
Yet, on various occasions, South African representatives remarked that 
"it is in the interests of all of us that Africa should be a prosperous continent. 
After all, it is better to have a prosperous man for a neighbour than a beggar. 
You cannot trade with a beggar"4I. 
On the European side, as stated by the President of the EU Council, 
"Economic co-operation, both in Southern Africa itself, as well as between 
our two regions, is the cornerstone of political stability - something of capital 
concern to us"42_ 
The above stances strengthen the validity of the principle that both 
South Africa and Europe cannot hope to be an 'island of prosperity in a sea 
of misery'43. 
The EU has repeatedly emphasised South Africa's role in Africa, 
pointing out that the country's level of development is far above all the other 
countries on the continent. Moreover, the EU believes that South Africa's 
well advanced position in the global economy with respect to its 
neighbouring states offers them the opportunity of achieving a more balanced 
growth. As previously discussed, however, current EU development co-
operation in the region consists of two distinct programmes - the one within 
Lome in favour of SADC (without South Africa) and the EPRD. In spite of 
the fact that South Africa's membership of the Lome Convention is 
41 Mills, G., p. 219-20. Quotation by South African Foreign Minister, Hilgard Muller, 
House of Assemb~y Debates, 12/3/1961, col. 4385 in Cockram, GM, Vorster's Foreign 
Policy, Academia, Pretoria, 1970, p. 16. 
42 Kinkel, K., Conference of Berlin, quoted above. 
43 Mills, ibidem, p. 220. 
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considered "good for South Africa, good for the ACP and good for the 
Lome Convention", since it will add "an important new dimension and 
impetus" to the EU co-operation with sub-Saharan Africa44, no official view 
has been formulated so far on the structuring of a co-ordinated EU' s South 
and Southern African strategy. 
6. 7 Conclusion 
In light of the many factors analysed, it seems obvious that 
Pretoria and Brussels should implement a joint strategy of development in 
Southern Africa. Such a strategy is conducive to balanced and sustainable 
growth in the region. The model of trilateral co-operation envisaged could 
constitute a guarantee for a mutually beneficial development strategy 
rooted in pragmatic co-operation and integration policies between countries 
of the South as well as between North and South. Because of its practical 
features and of its underlying philosophy, such an approach has the 
potential to resolve the long-disputed question on the role of European 
development aid to the continent. 
Against the above background, trilateral co-operation has been 
presented as an attempt to strike a balance between rhetoric and reality as 
well as between the constraints of the past and the opportunities of the 
future. 
44 Statement of the Commissioner Pinheiro at the occasion of the opening of the 
negotiations between the EU and South Africa regarding a long term framework for 
co-operation, Brussels, 30/6/95. 
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